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Abstract 
The thesis analyses the Croatian city of Vukovar as a way of animating theoretical 
debates about the relationship between security, emancipation and practice. It claims 
that emancipation must be understood through experiences of security and insecurity 
as they are lived. 
Located in security studies, it begins with a critical reading of the Welsh School. 
Ken Booth's original move to associate security with emancipation opened up new 
possibilities for reimagining the field and for practicing security, but subsequent 
developments orientated the security as emancipation move towards closure. A 
genuinely open way of exploring this move is the context of Andrew Linklater's 
adaptation of Habermasian discourse ethics. In this way an engagement between 
Booth and Linklater is opened which runs throughout the thesis. 
The second part introduces Vukovar. It details the violence of late-1991 seen in the 
city, and outlines how the emergence of Croatian democracy represents a form of 
settlement. Yet patterns of memorialisation and reconstruction in Vukovar entrench 
a pro-Croat narrative of settlement at the expense of non-Croats who are unjustly 
excluded. Furthermore, interviews with leaders of local civil society, religious and 
political groups suggest that difference and contestation, rather than settlement, 
characterise the post-war period in Vukovar. 
The third part presents an analysis of the emancipatory practices which take place 
within the local context of contestation. Interviews with NGOs in Vukovar support 
Booth's emphasis on civil society groups as agents of emancipation. Subsequent 
interviews challenge his view in important ways as the human limits of emancipatory 
practices are revealed. However, even when such limitations are taken into account, 
certain civil society practices show how Booth and Linklater's respective 
understandings of emancipatory practice are played out in what are termed micro- 
dialogic communities. These alternative dialogues open new spaces and allow 
dominant understandings of the war to be challenged. 
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And all our dainty terms for fratricide; 
Terms which we trundle smoothly o'er our tongues 
Like mere abstractions, empty sounds to which 
We join no feeling and attach no form! 
From Fears in Solitude, S. T. Coleridge, 1798 
Introduction 
The violence done by and to others has long been of interest to scholars. Many have 
worked, often with sympathy and compassion, to understand, alleviate and prevent 
violent acts, and the creativity upon which academic work thrives has given rise to 
numerous approaches, methods and theories informed by these sentiments. A central 
problem, however, which may never be fully rectified, is the distance between 
scholars and the subjects of scholarship, between the comfort of study and the pain 
of that being studied. 
Although the academic fulfils an essential role in a free society, exercising 
the right to learn, think and speak for oneself, there is a real danger of even the best 
intentions resulting in those `empty sounds to which we join no feeling and attach no 
form', as Coleridge wams in the quotation at the beginning of this thesis (Coleridge, 
2001 [1798), p. 54). The sounds that are made through scholarship, that are given 
life through the page and which resonate in lecture halls, seminar rooms and 
conferences cannot be of those for whom the bell tolled, but they can at least be 
given feeling and form by including in scholarship the voices of those who were 
there to witness. There is a quality to such accounts of politics, particularly when 
violence is involved, which the scholar alone will usually not be able to penetrate. 
The discussions to follow concern a specific academic discourse which 
developed during the 1990s and into the new century, which in this thesis is termed 
the Welsh School of Security Studies. In some of the material to be discussed in 
chapter 1 the same discourse is described as Critical Security Studies (CSS). To 
avoid the debate around the meaning of `critical' and CSS that label is not employed 
here. Furthermore, the expression Welsh School helps to define a particular branch 
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of critical approaches to security studies, at a time when many scholars would see 
themselves as in some way engaged in developing such approaches. That branch is 
largely concerned with the relationship between the concepts of security and 
emancipation, but it also claims to be greatly concerned with the meaning, scope and 
implementation of political practice. 
The thesis claims that the Welsh School of security studies has so far 
insufficiently bridged the gap between scholarship and subject. Indeed, what is 
required is a fundamental shift away from forms of closure which are apparent 
within the discourse in its current state, and towards understandings of emancipation 
through experiences of security and insecurity as they are lived. Such a step seeks to 
reclaim Ken Booth's groundbreaking move to associate security as emancipation 
within contemporary debates about security (Booth, 1991 a). 
Yet it also moves beyond any notion that the security as emancipation move 
can be framed, managed even, within any body of academic literature, because 
attempts to understand security and emancipation as lived experiences reveal a 
characteristic of political violence that cannot be easily translated into a programme 
of study. Indeed, that characteristic may even refuse understanding, given the limits 
of human empathy. Scholars who have studied suffering through fiction, for 
example, have noted that what literature says about suffering `concerns the need for 
respect in the face of an experience that always holds back part of its truth, 
inaccessible and alien' (Morris, 1996, p. 42). 
In contrast to tendencies within the Welsh School towards formulating the 
security as emancipation move in terms of a scholarly programme, the thesis argues 
that the theories developed by the Welsh School should be used as a guide to 
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identifying specific locations where emancipatory practices might be evident and to 
then attempt to understand such practices in their own context, instead of using them 
solely to support theory. 
The movement towards the specific locality as a means to understanding 
politics is therefore key for the progression of this thesis, but should not be 
understood in terms of a movement away from the global or the international as vital 
ontological categories and realities, nor from the idea of globalisation. The thesis 
sees no dichotomous relationship between the local and the international, but rather 
seeks to understand the ways in which these two sites are mutually constitutive in 
terms of political reality. 
As such, the idea of the international in the local, of international and global 
political and social developments manifesting themselves in specific and localised 
places, is central to this thesis. It is in the locality that wider developments are 
played out by individuals, and it is at the level of the individual that new 
perspectives on those developments can be grasped. The importance of attempting 
to understand those perspectives in the context of debates about security and 
emancipation will become apparent as the thesis develops. Another way of 
expressing this relationship is in terms of the macro and the micro. Macro political 
developments concerning dialogue also play out in micro form. One important 
contribution the thesis seeks to make is to claim that important insights regarding 
emancipation and security as lived experiences can be seen when understood through 
the perspective of those engaged in what are described as micro-dialogic 
communities. 
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Such points bring this introduction to the empirical focus of the thesis, which 
is the Croatian city of Vukovar. In the autumn of 1991, Vukovar was subject to a 
long bombardment led by the Yugoslavian National Army assisted by paramilitary 
troops. Targeting was indiscriminate, and subsequently hundreds of civilians were 
killed and thousands more driven from their homes. Vukovar was one of the first 
places in the region to experience the violent bouts of ethnic cleansing that would 
characterise the Balkans wars of the 1990s. 
So much has already been written about those wars, and rightly so, but this 
thesis contributes to that literature only indirectly. The central focus is on 
understanding Vukovar as a specific site of security and insecurity through which it 
is possible to understand emancipatory practices as they play out. The war that 
began in 1991 caused direct forms of insecurity, but more subtle and longer lasting 
forms of insecurity persist. Different agents employing different strategies and 
understandings of security have been active in Vukovar. Some of those agents 
would see Vukovar as having undergone a successful post-war transition towards 
settlement. The thesis challenges such a view and suggests that the post-war 
settlement is only partial, a view which emerges primarily through the experience of 
the everyday. 
The everyday, it is argued, reveals the extent to which forms of insecurity 
prevail, and the extent to which the state is complicit in the insecurity of its citizens. 
In reaction to these forms of insecurity, practices which can be described as 
peacebuilding emerge. This thesis does not seek to make a direct contribution to the 
literature surrounding peacebuilding, conflict resolution or peace studies, which is 
very large indeed. It may, however, speak to some of the themes covered within it, 
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particularly the relationship between dialogic relations and the idea of peace which 
has been noted by scholars (Richmond, 2006, p. 389). 
Such practices allow dominant understandings of the war to be challenged 
and facilitate dialogue between those who would otherwise be unlikely to 
communicate in such an open way. The emotional engagement required in such 
exchanges and the extent to which participants in these practices, including micro- 
dialogic communities, are willing to be revealed to members of the `other' 
community as vulnerable, should not be underestimated. 
Using Vukovar in this way opens up a number of opportunities for studying 
the security as emancipation move as it is experienced by individual subjects. The 
fact that comparatively few academic studies have been written about Vukovar in 
English further lends the city to empirical analysis. 
It is in Vukovar that, for the author of this thesis, ideas about war and peace, 
security and insecurity, even politics itself, have been made more real. That politics 
can do great harm to the innocent is all too evident in such a place. The thesis 
attempts to convey something of the human impact that war has by using a number 
of firsthand testimonies and opinions. This is one way of developing the security as 
emancipation move through lived experiences. 
The thesis opens with a critique of the Welsh School built around the 
proposition that Ken Booth's original move to associate security with emancipation 
opened up new possibilities for reimagining the field and for practicing security, but 
the subsequent development of a School led to the emergence of a number of 
closures. Chapter 2 moves the thesis forward by arguing that a genuinely open way 
of exploring the security as emancipation move would be in the context of Andrew 
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Linklater's adaptation of Habermasian discourse ethics. This opens up an 
engagement between Booth and Linklater, two of the most serious recent thinkers 
within the discipline of International Relations to have reflected upon the meaning of 
emancipation in relation to contemporary world politics, which runs throughout the 
thesis. This first part of the thesis is concerned with developing the theoretical basis 
for subsequent chapters. 
The second part opens with chapter 3 and is concerned with introducing the 
empirical setting of Vukovar. It details the violence of late-1991 seen in the city, 
and outlines how the eventual acceptance by post-Westphalian Europe of Croatian 
democracy represents a form of settlement. In an attempt to understand what 
happened in Vukovar in late 1991 and to explore how contemporaries understood 
their predicament at the time the chapter uses a number of primary sources written 
mainly by civilians. In this way the experience of insecurity is introduced through 
their words. It is this period of insecurity which shaped the specific social and 
political context of the city during the post-war period. 
What is important for discussions of security and emancipation are the ways 
in which different agents appeared to accept the notion of a post-war settlement in 
Vukovar and Croatia as a whole. Forms of memorialisation and reconstruction in 
Vukovar, however, attempt to entrench a pro-Croat narrative of settlement at the 
expense of non-Croats who are unjustly excluded. The work of Jenny Edkins is 
utilised at this juncture, discussed in chapter 4. This suggests that notions of 
settlement, and therefore emancipation, are premature in Vukovar. Chapter 5 
develops the argument that the settlement is partial by drawing upon interviews 
conducted in Vukovar among local residents. Interviews with leaders of local civil 
society, religious and political groups suggest that difference and contestation, rather 
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than settlement, characterise the post-war period in Vukovar. In this way the 
dynamic interplay between the universal and the particular in Linklater's work 
comes alive through empirical analysis which also speaks to Booth's call for a focus 
on `real people in real places'. 
The third part further explores this interplay through an analysis of the 
emancipatory practices which take place within the local context of difference and 
contestation. Interviews with NGOs in Vukovar support Booth's emphasis on civil 
society groups as agents of emancipation. Chapter 6 provides evidence to support 
this view, and as such offers support to those who would look to global civil society 
as agents of emancipatory change. Chapter 7, however, challenges this view in 
important ways as the human limits of civil society engagement in emancipatory 
practices are also revealed. It is in this chapter that the security as emancipation 
move as seen through lived experiences reveals the challenge of practice and 
implementation. Contradictions with theoretical literature which sees civil society in 
a positive light emerge. 
Yet even taking these limitations into account, the thesis argues that civil 
society organisations in Vukovar perform a vital role within the locality. Certain 
civil society practices show how Booth and Linklater's respective understandings of 
emancipatory practice are played out in micro-dialogic communities. Such practices 
allow individuals to explore their competing truth claims about the war in Croatia 
through open dialogue. These alternative dialogues open new spaces and allow 
dominant understandings of the war to be challenged. Reflections about the 
potential role of such communities are made in conclusion. 
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In these ways the thesis seeks to make a contribution to security studies. By 
doing so, the thesis asserts that it is essential for scholars to engage further with such 
practitioners in developing an emancipatory approach to security that would embrace 
the contingency of practice rather than the disciplinary powers of the Academy. The 
central argument is that understandings of security and emancipation must be seen 
through lived experiences. 
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Chapter 1 
Possibility and Closure: A Critical Analysis of the Welsh School of Security 
Studies 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to situate the thesis within the subdiscipline of security 
studies and in relation to the Welsh School. Although this thesis is sympathetic to its 
aims, the chapter presents a critical analysis of the Welsh School and argues that Ken 
Booth's original move to associate security with emancipation opened up a number 
of possibilities for reimagining and practising security but subsequent intellectual 
developments, which led to the formation of the Welsh School, also served to 
orientate the security as emancipation move towards closure. The chapter begins by 
locating the Welsh School in its subdisciplinary context, and by outlining the 
contemporary intellectual geography of the subdiscipline of security studies. 
It then discusses the Welsh School and outlines the move towards closure as 
critique, which is made in three stages. The first stage argues that the Welsh School 
shifted the emphasis of the security as emancipation move from the politics of 
process to the politics of crisis. The second asserts that the Welsh School 
emphasises the differences with other approaches to security over their 
compatibility. The third argues that there is an absence of voice `from below' in the 
Welsh School. The need to move beyond the Welsh School towards an 
understanding of emancipation as lived experience is expressed in the final stages of 
the chapter, and is taken up in more detail in the following chapter. 
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The Subdiscipline of Security Studies 
This thesis seeks to make a contribution to the study of security, and as such it is 
necessary to locate the thesis in the broader security studies literature which forms 
the wider context of this study. Security studies can be seen as a subdiscipline of 
International Relations (IR) and as a subfield of a number of other disciplines such as 
Sociology and Geography. As Stuart Croft argues, within the subdiscipline there is a 
divide between a realist/liberal/constructivist triangle on the one hand and a number 
of critical approaches on the other. Understood as a subfield, security studies can be 
seen as a multidisciplinary approach to various forms of violence which is concerned 
with, among other things, the relationship between security, culture, images and 
identity (Croft, 2008). Three constructed disciplinary spaces are being passed 
through in order to locate the thesis. First, the thesis is located within security 
studies understood as a subdiscipline of IR. Second, within that subdiscipline it is 
located within the family of critical approaches. Third, within that family it 
identifies with the Welsh School of security studies. 
The thesis is sympathetic towards the Welsh School, but simultaneously it 
seeks to move beyond the Welsh School. It is thus an outwardly facing thesis, 
situating itself in close relation to a school of thought whilst being concerned with 
looking beyond the school to the immediate area of other critical approaches, and to 
the new pastures opening up beyond the subdiscipline within the subfield. The 
argument is that scholars must move beyond the Welsh School in order to 
understand security as emancipation through lived experiences. This is to take issue 
with some tendencies apparent in the scholarship of Ken Booth, around whose work 
the school has developed. This will be discussed in depth below. Whilst the thesis 
recognises that it is desirable to have a subfield which engages with disciplines 
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outside IR like Sociology, Anthropology and Psychology, what is important for the 
thesis is to first sketch the parameters of the subdiscipline in order to locate the 
Welsh School. 
Security studies is one subdiscipline among others within IR, which also 
includes the subdisciplines of International Political Economy, Development 
Studies, Area Studies and IR theory. The distinctions between them are never set; 
however, it is clear from the range of IR publications, from the internal arrangements 
of departments and taught courses, and from the organisation of scholarly 
organisations such as the British International Studies Association and the 
International Studies Association that these subdisciplines form a social `reality'. 
Debates within the discipline of IR and within the subdiscipline of security 
studies over the last two and a half decades have transformed the subdiscipline from 
a rather stale pursuit in which the study of military strategy and the national interest 
ruled to a vibrant, open and exciting place in which to engage in academic inquiry. 
It is according to one observer, `a wonderful time to be a scholar of the 
(sub)discipline - and by any scholar I mean students and tutors - because there is so 
much new and innovative thinking taking place that it is impossible for it not to open 
your mind' (Collins, 2007, p. 9). 
The debates that led to the creation of the innovative subdiscipline which is 
now apparent have been ongoing since at least the 1980s, when the concept of 
security began to be exposed to a level of scrutiny which had not been forthcoming 
within the neorealist/neoliberal mainstream of the time. Barry Buzan was 
instrumental here in suggesting that the focus of security studies should be 
broadened to include societal, environmental, economic and political threats, as well 
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as traditional military ones (Buzan, 1983). Booth would later be key in arguing that 
the referent point of security - the matter of what is to be secured - should be the 
individual human being (Booth, 1991a). Martin Shaw made the case for including 
the notion of community in such debates, as well as the state and individual (Shaw, 
1993. ) These arguments led to the broadening and deepening of the subdiscipline 
(Krause and Williams, 1996). Such contributions were important in shifting the 
subdiscipline away from the statist, neorealist driven mainstream which had been 
greatly influenced by Kenneth Waltz (Waltz, 1979). 
Wider disciplinary debates fuelled innovation within the security studies 
subdiscipline into the 1990s. Alex Wendt's constructivism was eventually able to 
join the American mainstream along with neorealists and neoliberals (Wendt, 1992; 
Wendt, 1995). Feminist approaches to IR proliferated and challenged patriarchal 
assumptions (Tickner, 1988; Enloe, 1990; Tickner, 1992; Enloe, 1993; Sylvester, 
1994). Poststructuralist thought arrived late to the discipline but became more 
influential within it (Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989; Ashley and Walker, 1990; 
Walker, 1993). Postpositivism, a view sceptical towards the notion that truth can be 
objectively discovered, was increasingly seen as the metetheoretical basis for many 
within IR, albeit outside the American mainstream and not without controversy 
(Smith, 1995). What these disciplinary debates illustrated was the challenge of 
understanding the post-Cold War era as well as the influence of wider intellectual 
and cultural movements. 
It was in this disciplinary context that new debates within the subdiscipline 
took place. For some, the lack of theoretical cohesiveness that innovation within 
security studies meant was to be deplored, as it has been argued that broadening 
understandings of security produces incoherence by reducing the utility of security 
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as an analytical concept (Haftendorn, 1991; Baldwin, 1997; Morgan, 2000). 
Traditionalists tried to defend their position by asserting the timeless wisdom of 
neorealism (Gray, 1999; Mearsheimer, 2001). Indeed realism has seen a resurgence 
after 9/11 and remains the dominant theory of international security, positioned at 
the centre of theoretical disputes and the first reference point for competing theories 
(Williams, 2005). 
Others embraced the new avenues available to scholars in security studies 
which began the process of further dividing the subdiscipline into different, often 
geographically signified schools of thought. In the mid-to-late 1990s, when it was 
clear that such a range of approaches had developed, they were characterised as 
critical security studies (Krause and Williams, 1997). This was an attempt to 
embrace the variety of ways in which the traditional focus on states and national 
security was being challenged. A more recent attempt to synthesise various critical 
approaches is made by Karin Fierke, who provides a broad approach to critical 
security studies which highlights the fact that most critical approaches (the possible 
exception being some uses of human security) adopt a constructivist view of security 
(Fierke, 2007). 
Although it is important to highlight the ways in which these approaches 
relate to one another to ensure their commonalities are seen, it is also important to 
recognise the various strands of critical thought within security studies to appreciate 
the depth and difference within the subdiscipline. Difference makes the 
subdiscipline stronger because the meeting of contrasting viewpoints acts as a spur to 
intellectual dynamism and creativity. Five approaches stand out: The Copenhagen 
School; poststructuralism, which is sometimes referred to as the Paris School within 
the subdiscipline; human security; feminism; and the Welsh School. Before an 
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analysis of the Welsh School can begin, it is important to discuss these other 
approaches because the Welsh School developed at the same time and came to be 
defined against them. Their development is part of the intellectual history of the 
Welsh School also. 
The Copenhagen School emerged and coalesced around the 1998 publication 
of Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Buzan et al, 1998) which tied together a 
decade of new thought on security (see Huysmans, 1998). ' Building upon the 
constructivist insight that both security interests and the identity of actors are 
socially produced, the Copenhagen School used the term `securitisation' to describe 
the process of taking politics `beyond the established rules of the game' and framing 
an issue `either as a special kind of politics or as above politics' (Buzan et al, 1998, 
p. 23). An issue becomes a security issue when it is accepted by an audience as an 
existential threat as part of a `securitising move' which can be enabled by favourable 
conditions such as the position of the speaker (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 25). Ultimately 
the reverse of securitisation, desecuritisation, is preferable because it keeps key 
issues within public discourse rather than restricting their consideration to elites 
(Buzan et al, 1998, p. 29). 
A large number of empirical studies have been generated from these insights 
as well as much critical discussion (for example Hansen, 2000; Buzan and Waver, 
2003; Abrahamsen, 2005; Balzacq, 2005; Jutila, 2006; Emmers, 2007; Floyd, 2010). 
In addition to these contributions a number of constructivist studies have emerged 
which do not necessarily submit to the Copenhagen School agenda (Katzenstein, 
1996; Weldes, 1996; Desch, 1998; Barnett, 1999; Weldes, 1999; Croft, 2006). 
1 Buzan and Waver were both associated with the Copenhagen Peace Research School. 
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Scholars within the subdiscipline influenced by poststructuralism developed 
an important body of work at the same time as the Copenhagen School; indeed, the 
two approaches often overlapped (an early example is Klein, 1990). David 
Campbell's Writing Security was a landmark in using Foucauldian theory in relation 
to US foreign policy, being concerned with subjectivity rather than with relations 
between predetermined subjects, a theme later continued by Rob Walker (Campbell, 
1992; Walker, 1997). Others turned to Nietzsche and called for scholars to embrace 
the new disorder `through a commensurate deterritorialisation of theory' (Der 
Derian, 1995, p. 41). Lene Hansen saw the links between poststructuralism and the 
Copenhagen School, prompting more openings for discussions of how security is 
discursively constructed (Hansen, 1997). David Mutimer exemplified these 
similarities in a discussion of the use of metaphor in security discourse (Mutimer, 
1997). A study of Bosnia showed the inherent violence within notions of national 
community (Campbell, 1998). 
Such questioning of the ontological integrity of security gave rise to 
understandings of security as a system rather than a commodity (Burke, 2002). 
These developments made it difficult for poststructuralists to engage in detailed 
policy discussions (Sheenan, 2005, p. 149) Lene Hansen provides a notable 
exception (Hansen, 2005). Furthermore, poststructuralists have mounted important 
critiques of contemporary security issues such as the `War on Terror', and the wider 
context of late modern warfare of which it is part (Jabri, 2006). 
Some poststructuralist writings, particularly those centred upon the work of 
Didier Bigo (Bigo, 2002; Bigo and Guild, 2005) have been grouped into what has 
been referred to as the `Paris School' of security studies (Waever, 2004. ) Jef 
Huysmans, for example, draws upon Bigo among others to develop a study of the 
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relationship between security and migration (Huysmans, 2006). It is noticeable 
however that many of the authors mentioned above appear to be reluctant to embrace 
being `schooled' in this way, a sign perhaps of the poststructuralist scepticism 
towards attempts to capture and order academic discourse. 
A further contribution to critical approaches has been the discourse on human 
security. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali brought the notion of human 
security to prominence in an early speech (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The 1993 United 
Nations Development Report called for a new age of global cooperation built around 
the concept of human security soon after. The focus of security, it argued, must 
change from an emphasis on arms to human development, from the security of the 
state to a concern with food, employment and the environment (UNDR, 1993, p. 2). 
The Commission on Global Governance, which had drawn some of its members 
from the Palme Commission as well as the World Commission on Environment and 
Development and the South Commission, also professed a concern with human 
dignity, but asserted the security of people and planet as well the state as the central 
concern. 
Reflecting (unreferenced) continuity with Buzan's earlier call for the 
broadening of the concept, the Commission on Global Governance urged for 
consideration not only of military threats to human life but also economic, social, 
environmental and political threats, as well as adopting the Palme Commission's call 
for nuclear disarmament based on the premise that such weapons were not legitimate 
national defences (Commission on Global Governance, 1995). The call for a focus 
on human security has had an important impact on the subdiscipline and offers 
policy makers an alternative and easily adoptable discourse to that of national 
security (see Thomas, 2001; Kaldor, 2007). Scholars have noted however that such 
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attempts to place the human at the heart of security debates is hardly new 
(Rothschild, 1995). 
Wider debates about feminism also impacted the subdiscipline. In many ways 
the feminist critique of traditional approaches to security is more profound and wide 
ranging than those offered by the Copenhagen and Paris Schools or the human 
security paradigm because they seek to problematise the international political 
system as a whole which is seen as complicit with the insecurity of women (Tickner, 
1995). Rethinking security from a feminist perspective would involve thinking 
about militarism, patriarchy, environmental degradation, poverty, debt, population 
growth and the distribution of resources (Steans, 2006). The reason behind this 
broad rethinking is that traditional conceptions of security rely upon but 
simultaneously silence the vital concept of masculinity, and hence feminist 
approaches have attempted to highlight the centrality of gender to conceptions of 
security (Hansen and Olsson, 2004). 
Although there are different strands within feminist approaches, they argue 
that international politics in practice and in academia is gendered. Key concepts 
such as power, the state, the warrior and sovereignty are seen as masculinised and 
thus contribute to a conceptualisation of women as passive receivers of protection 
rather than agents of security, when in fact evidence suggests that women are agents 
of security in a variety of ways, for example in human rights campaigns or in conflict 
resolution. The empirical chapters to follow certainly support that view. Feminist 
approaches are also more inclined to take the individual human as the subject of 
security than approaches informed by the Copenhagen or Paris Schools (Sheehan, 
2005). What has now become clearer is that trying to understand security without 
17 
understanding the importance of gender leads to an unsatisfactory understanding of 
both (Kennedy-Pipe, 2007). 
What these comments seek to show is the plurality of approaches available to 
contemporary scholars within the subdiscipline of security. The above discussion 
has focused on one side of the debate within the subdiscipline, those approaches to 
security studies which are broadly critical of traditional approaches. One problem 
with the use of the term `critical' is that it has different definitions, which can lead to 
an over-emphasis on semantics as the expense of engaging with more pressing 
issues. 
However, it is important to see the family of critical approaches to security as 
connected, as they all share a common dissatisfaction with traditional approaches 
which have tended to reify the state and state sovereignty as core concepts and 
military strategy as the central focus of study (Booth, 1991a). All of the approaches 
discussed above have helped to make the subdiscipline such an exciting place to be, 
and security is now a genuinely contested concept (Smith, 2005). It is important to 
note this because it is within the subdisciplinary openness now available to 
contemporary students of security studies that this thesis is located. 
The chapter began by saying that the thesis is located within security studies 
understood as a subdiscipline of JR and within that subdiscipline it is located within 
the family of critical approaches. The above discussion has provided a broad outline 
of these first two layers of academic work within which the thesis broadly situates. 
It has sought to capture something of the variety within the subdiscipline and within 
critical approaches, in order to make the point that a number of approaches exist and 
that this is desirable for scholarship. The discussion has also served the purpose of 
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contextualising the theoretical literature from which the thesis develops. The way in 
which the Welsh School developed is thus deeply embedded in this wider context, 
and the nature of that development cannot be fully understood without first noting 
the above discussion. The chapter will now turn to this third layer of scholarship, the 
Welsh School of security studies, to which the thesis closely relates. 
The Welsh School of Security Studies 
It is first necessary to define the Welsh School. There are at least two approaches to 
this. The first would be to describe the Welsh School as an approach to security 
studies driven by the view that `emancipation is security' (Booth, 1991 a). This might 
be understood as the `textbook' approach. The second approach would be to 
describe it as a socially constructed trend within academia, created primarily in 
British universities and existing only in journals, books and the minds of scholars 
and students. The difference is that the first approach accepts and reifies the idea of 
the Welsh School, whilst the second attempts to emphasise that fact that the Welsh 
School has been invented for a purpose. The benefit of such an approach is that it 
opens up a degree of critical distance between this thesis and the School itself. 
This second approach to understanding the Welsh School suggests that such a 
school only exists because scholars say it does, which correlates with the fact that 
there is no Welsh School building and scholars sympathetic with or even `within' the 
Welsh School do not carry membership cards or have special privileges of any kind. 
This is important because it helps students of security studies remember the fluidity 
of modem scholarship on security - there is no Welsh School building because it 
could never be built. Furthermore, it is crucial to bear this in mind if scholars are to 
understand and ultimately be critical of the first definition of the Welsh School 
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presented above. The use of the term Welsh School is to some extent a trick of the 
mind, and is used to denote authority as much as coherence. 
What is clear however is that the `textbook' understanding of the Welsh 
School is now part of the `reality' of security studies (McDonald, 2008). The 
`textbook' approach to exploring the Welsh School would be to outline the key 
epistemological and ontological positions of the school and its core concepts which 
help to distinguish it from other schools. Steve Smith and Pinar Bilgin exemplify 
this approach very well (Smith, 2005; Bilgin, 2008). The problem with these 
approaches which seek to define the Welsh School is that they present only an 
endpoint, which is really a projection of what they want the Welsh School to be: 
coherent, solidified and, crucially, able to defend itself against critics. Indeed, the 
very term `Welsh School', a key signifier of coherence and stability for exponents of 
the `textbook' view, limits understandings of the concepts it advocates. This point 
will become more obvious as the thesis progresses, particularly with regards to the 
chapters dealing with Vukovar directly. 
The analysis to be undertaken in this way suggests that the Welsh School 
shows tendencies to open up and close down simultaneously. At a subdisciplinary 
level, the opening up of the field to new understandings of security occurred 
simultaneously with the fragmentation of the subdiscipline into various approaches, 
some geographically defined, as discussed in the first section of this chapter. At an 
individual level, the opening up of understandings of security to the idea of 
emancipation, and the potential of such a move, has been closed off to an extent by 
Booth himself and others who have built upon his position and aided the 
development of the Welsh School. This closure has been caused by Booth's 
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insistence on defining a single approach against all others, in other words, to win the 
new battle for the soul of security studies. 
It is this tension between opening up and closing down which can be seen to 
define the Welsh School, and which provides the basis of the argument that scholars 
sympathetic to the security as emancipation move should think beyond the Welsh 
School. The argument in this section, then, is that the move to define security as 
emancipation opened up new opportunities for the theory and practice of security, 
but the development of the Welsh School closed off the more radical possibilities in 
favour of a thin `theory to be applied to case study' approach. 
As Booth has been the driving force of the Welsh School it is important to 
analyse his work in depth, as the next section does, however a number of scholars 
have played important roles in this development such as Richard Wyn Jones, Paul 
Williams, Eli Stamnes, Graeme Cheeseman and others. These scholars can also be 
seen to `speak for' the Welsh School and their work is discussed in a subsequent 
section in order to understand how the Welsh School has evolved outside Booth's 
own work. The thesis as a whole will suggest how the radical edge of the 
emancipation as security move can be regained from the closures that have emerged 
as the Welsh School grew. What is needed is a move towards understanding 
emancipation as lived experience. 
The assessment below is advanced in three stages, each focusing on a 
separate critique. The first describes a movement away from an emphasis on the 
politics of process to the politics of crisis. The second discusses a movement away 
from focusing on the benefits of scholarly compatibility towards greater emphasis on 
the differences between approaches. The third and longest section reflects upon the 
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relationship between theory and practice and the absence of voice in much Welsh 
School empirical work. The discussion as a whole is an attempt to outline how the 
Welsh School orientates the security as emancipation move towards closure, which 
frames further discussions regarding the need to move beyond the Welsh School, 
taken up towards the end of the chapter and outlined at length in chapter 2. 
Critique 1: From Process to Crisis 
In an important collection of essays published in 2005, Ken Booth outlined his desire 
to move beyond the version of critical security studies he had inspired `as a body of 
critical knowledge and outline a specific critical theory of security' (Booth, 2005, p. 
259). He justified this move as follows: 
`The challenges faced by humans at all levels demand a more effective theory 
of security: our times are too complex and the world too varied for the 
reductionisms, parsimony, simplicities, regressive implications, silences, and 
normative assumptions of political realism in its various manifestations' 
(Booth, 2005, p. 259). 
Booth is saying here that a theory needs to be developed to rival neorealism, and two 
years later his own Theory of World Security was published (Booth, 2007). This can 
be read as an attempt at shaping the Welsh School into a more cohesive approach to 
security studies; however, it is important to note that Booth explicitly states that he is 
not trying to create a new orthodoxy because he argues that such a development 
would not be in the spirit of critical theorising. He also states his hope that `students 
will critique the framework (of a critical theory of security) and reassemble the parts 
in their own ways' (Booth, 2005, p. 259). This thesis can certainly be seen in the 
spirit of those remarks. 
Such sentiments in Booth's later work, which are conducive towards 
openness, show consistency with his earlier scholarship. In his seminal article, 
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Security and Emancipation, Booth appeals to `the tradition of critical theory' 
because `its most important contribution in the present state of the subject lies in 
recapturing the idea that politics is open-ended and based in ethics' (Booth, 1991a, p. 
321). This would require a new language for politics, he argues, as the words 
traditionally used in international political analysis are no longer fit for purpose, with 
concepts such as sovereignty and the state being incapable of accurately helping 
scholars to understand a changing world. 'New times', which is what Booth 
originally called the immediate post-Cold War period, required a new language of 
politics for which the notion of emancipation could be a starting point, the danger 
being that if scholars `insist upon old images, the future will naturally tend to 
replicate the past' (Booth, 1991a, p. 315. See also Booth, 1995). Such is Booth's 
appeal to openness in thought and in language. 
Yet in Theory of World Security, although aspects of the theorising are given 
over to outlining an apparently open approach to politics through the construction of 
'emancipatory communities', much of the work is an attempt to focus thought on the 
urgency of the present rather than on the open-endedness of politics. This point will 
be elaborated upon below. 
Booth's understanding of emancipatory politics is informed by his definition 
of emancipation, which `as a discourse of politics... seeks the securing of people from 
those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, 
compatible with the freedom of others' (Booth, 2007, p. 112). This understanding of 
emancipation provides a threefold framework for politics which Booth describes in 
the following way: 
`As a philosophical anchorage, emancipation serves as a basis for saying 
whether something is `true'; in other words, whether particular claims to 
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knowledge should be taken seriously. An anchorage is not a neutral 
(objective) foundation, but instead represents the soundest understanding 
then available on which to frame future political projects. As a theory of 
progress, emancipation offers an account of the actual world of world politics 
in which projects are possible. Progress is understood, reflexively, as a 
dynamic and reversible process; it is not therefore an inevitable outcome of 
politics, nor is it identifiable with one timeless blueprint of social 
organisation. Finally, as a practice of resistance emancipation is a 
framework for attempting to actualise both nearer-term and longer-term 
emancipatory goals through strategic and tactical political action based on 
immanent critique' (Booth, 2007, p. 112). 
Booth's elaboration of the concept of emancipation outlines an epistemological and 
ontological basis for thinking about world politics, a theory through which politics 
can be understood, and a guide to practice. The extract above provides a starting 
point for thinking critically about world politics, but Booth also outlines a desirable 
endpoint encompassed in the idea of the `emancipatory community' which is 
arguably Booth's central theoretical contribution in Theory of World Security. This 
form of political organisation is described by Booth as follows: 
`An emancipatory community recognises that people have multiple identities, 
that a person's identity cannot be satisfactorily defined by any single 
attribution (religion, class, race, etc. ), and that people must be allowed to live 
simultaneously in a variety of communities expressing their multifaceted 
lives. An emancipatory community is therefore a free association of 
individuals, recognising their solidarity in relation to common conceptions of 
what it is to live an ethical life, binding people together with a sense of 
belonging and a distinctive network of ideas and support' (Booth, 2007, p. 
138-9). 
What is required for world security, Booth argues, is `a world community bound 
together by networks of emancipatory communities within and across cosmopolitan 
states, and infused by shared world order values' (Booth, 2007, p. 142). Such an 
approach to world security `requires imagination', Booth asserts, `but it is not 
another dreamworld', indeed, `it rests on the immanent potential in the world today' 
(Booth, 2007, p. 148). Booth is quite clear about where that potential lies: 
`Progressive global civil society informed by world security principles represents 
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critical theory's organised political orientation at this period of history'. (Booth, 
2007, p. 457). 
By concentrating thought on the idea of emancipation and action on global 
civil society, Booth argues in earlier work, a human rights culture may emerge over 
time to replace the dominant nuclear culture which had defined so much of post- 
1945 international politics, indeed 
`a human rights culture must be intrinsic to any comprehensive notion of 
security (one that promises human security, and not simply the security of 
states or regimes), and that without such a construction of security there must 
be an indefinite postponement of the practices of sustainable peace' (Booth, 
1999, p. 2). 
What Booth recommends is a `process utopian' approach (after Joseph Nye) in order 
to foster an emancipatory politics. The aim of such an approach `is not to become 
overburdened by distant ideal structures, but to concentrate on reformist steps to 
make a better world somewhat more likely' (Booth, 1991a, p. 324. See also Booth, 
1991b). Presumably such reforms would take time to evolve; a slow process of 
building respect for human rights driven by the greater involvement in world politics 
of a growing global civil society. In these ways Booth describes an open political 
project in which all can participate, indeed, the empowerment of individuals is 
central to it: 
`The implementation of an emancipatory strategy through process utopian 
steps is, to a greater or lesser extent, in the hands of all those who want it to 
be-the embryonic global civil society. In a world of global communications 
few should feel entirely helpless. Even in small and private decisions it is 
possible to make choices which help rather than hinder the building of a 
world community. Some developments depend on governments, but some 
do not. We can begin or continue pursuing emancipation in what we 
research, in how we teach, in what we put on conference agenda, in how 
much we support Greenpeace, Amnesty International, Oxfam and other 
groups identifying with a global community, and in how we deal with each 
other and with students. And in pursuing emancipation, the bases of real 
security are being established' (Booth, 1991 a, p. 326). 
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The focus on empowering individuals is present in Booth's recent work also. In 
Theory of World Security Booth highlights the work of `ordinary people living 
extraordinary lives' as `world citizens'(Booth, 2007, pp. 458-9). Such people hold 
the key to world security as much as any other form of agency, Booth argues: 
`If enough people live globally - taking strength from each other - the 
structures that divide might yet melt into the air, as did those of feudalism, 
the divine right of kings and colonial empires in living memory, and - only 
yesterday - the structures of Soviet style communism' (Booth, 2007, p. 458). 
This is Booth at his best, advocating an open, democratic form of political 
transformation, looking outside the Academy for inspiration and hope, considering 
the activist roots of a new global order. 
However, the appeal to openness in Booth's early writings and in Theory of 
World Security is countered by the sheer urgency of the present, because grave 
challenges stand in the way of world security, Booth argues. Immediate decisions 
have to be made about the future of nuclear weapons, how to manage globalisation 
and population growth, the best way to protect the natural environment, to reform 
structures of global governance and to tackle `unreason' - religious fundamentalism 
and virulent nationalism. These issues represent a `decisional crisis' for the world's 
leaders (Booth, 2007, pp. 403-419). This crisis is framed by a `structural crisis' 
produced by the long gestation of `patriarchy, proselytising religion, statism, 
capitalism, race, and consumerist democracy', which `have conspired together to 
create a distinctive global sociology which does not work for the majority of people 
in the world, or for nature as a whole' (Booth, 2007, p. 402). 
Moreover an all encompassing 'epochal crisis' is at hand which envelops 
these two challenges (Booth, 2007, p. 398). Booth's elaboration of this notion 
consists of a thought experiment in which he claims that an `omniscient God' 
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making the `broadest generalisations' about the current state of humanity might 
propose that the world's first `Global Age' is currently out of control, and that 
humans have not made as much progress as they might think because technological 
advances are relatively recent and have not been matched with developments of 
collective wisdom or concern for perpetual global inequality (Booth, 2007, pp. 399- 
400). 
These three sets of crises, decisional, structural and epochal, converge in the 
present to create what Booth terms, in an updated formulation of E. H. Carr's 
famous work, a `New Twenty Years' Crisis' which is described as `a unique world- 
historical challenge' (Booth, 2007, p. 396). If this great challenge, which takes place 
in the context of `a more general crisis facing the world in the first half of the 
twenty-first century' called 'The Great Reckoning', is not met in the first two 
decades of the century, then by the middle of the century `human society faces the 
prospect of a concatenation of global turmoil unlike anything in the past' (Booth, 
2007, p. 2). 
There are, then, two distinct understandings of time in Booth's work. One 
points to the gradual process of emancipation which activist-citizens, thinking and 
acting globally, can help to bring about; the other points to the politics of the `now', 
and injects a sense of urgency to discussions of political action. The f irst 
understanding, which argues that collective action would help to create a more 
emancipated order, embraces the politics of long process, and all those who seek to 
make a leap of what Booth terms the `empathetic imagination'(Booth, 2007, p. 460). 
The second, however, embraces the politics of immediate crisis, which is by 
definition a politics which concerns all of humanity but which can only be acted 
upon by a small elite of key decision makers, given that structures of global 
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governance are `poorly equipped to handle the most long-term and significant issues 
between states that relate to security conceived broadly' (Booth, 2007, p. 413). 
By outlining the cocktail of crises which the world apparently faces, Booth 
leads the security as emancipation move away from the open-endedness of an 
ethically guided, critical theory inspired politics which was attempting to develop a 
new language for addressing global affairs shaped by the seductive concept of 
emancipation, and towards what is in fact a very traditional focus on the old 
language of threats, necessity and power politics. For Booth this is perhaps the 
`realism' in his notion of `emancipatory realism' (Booth, 2007, p. 90). Yet as a 
central part of his Theory of World Security, it serves to orientate the security as 
emancipation move towards closure, because it reduces all the possibilities of open- 
endedness, of ethics, of critical theorising, of thinking differently about security and 
insecurity - of emancipation itself - to addressing the heart and soul of traditional 
security studies: self preservation. 
Critique 2: From Compatibility to Difference 
A second way in which the Welsh School directs the security as emancipation move 
towards closure concerns the relationship between Booth's theorising and other 
approaches to security. It has already been noted above that Booth's early work 
attempted to orientate the security as emancipation move towards an engagement 
with ethics and open-endedness. This came about as a result of Booth's own 
interaction with literature outside of traditional security studies, indeed, Booth 
describes how he `suffered what some colleagues regard as a severe professional 
disorder, the symptoms of which involve believing that the study of international 
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relations can gain more from studying Foucault than NATO' (Booth, 1995, p. 109). 
This was followed by a defence of disciplinary openness: 
`The true renaissance in security studies these days is being brought about 
not by those seeking to prioritise and modernise the theories of peace and 
security that dominated the Cold War, but by those struggling to develop, at 
the end of a century of violence and change, a postrealist, postpositivist 
conception of security that offers some promise of maximising the security 
and improving the lives of the whole of humankind - the security studies of 
inclusion rather than exclusion, of possibility rather than necessity, and of 
becoming rather than being' (Booth, 1997a, p. 105). 
Yet the security studies of inclusion that Booth advocates here was not entirely 
forthcoming. Although Theory of World Security is filled with references to a wider 
range of literature beyond the subdiscipline, key approaches within security studies 
are neglected, most notably poststructuralism and the constructivist inspired 
Copenhagen School. Booth defends this move. 
In a section tellingly subtitled, `Contending Approaches', which featured in 
an essay outlining the basis of Theory of World Security, Booth argues that 
postructuralist authors `celebrate insecurity, which I regard as a middle-class affront 
to the truly insecure' (Booth, 2005, p. 270. ) Furthermore, he argues that such writers 
are closer to more conservative approaches than they might assume: 
`Political realists and poststructuralists seem to share a fatalistic view that 
humans are doomed to insecurity; regard the search for emancipation as both 
futile and dangerous; believe in a notion of the human condition; and 
relativise norms. Both leave power where it is in the world: deconstruction 
and deterrence are equally static theories' (Booth, 2005, pp. 270-1). 
In Theory of World Security itself, Booth argues that poststructuralism is `invariably 
obscurantist and marginal, providing no basis for politics' (Booth, 2007, p. 468). 
One reviewer of Theory of World Security regards Booth's overlooking of 
poststructuralist scholarship to be a serious oversight, arguing that the work of 
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authors such as David Campbell and Cynthia Weber tackle many of same issues as 
Booth, such as conflict, identity, sovereignty, ethics and nuclear weapons (Mutimer, 
2008). This thesis shares that view, and challenges Booth's neglect of 
postructuralism in two ways. First, by adopting the work of a scholar associated 
with integrating poststructuralism into IR, Jenny Edkins. The work of Edkins is used 
to understand the exclusionary nature of memorialisation in Vukovar, discussed in 
chapter 4. Secondly, by drawing heavily upon the work of Linklater the thesis 
accepts the benefits of interaction between poststructuralism and other critical 
approaches. This is because Linklater explicitly draws upon poststructuralism in 
developing his conception of universality and difference. This will be discussed 
further in the following chapter. 
Booth's dismissal of poststructuralist thought is mirrored in his treatment of 
the Copenhagen School: 
`Claims have been made that securitisation studies should be the next phase 
in the study of the theory and practice of security, but this would be 
mistaken, for the Copenhagen School is a curious combination of liberal, 
poststructural, and neorealist approaches. Not surprisingly, a bundle of 
conceptual problems and political issues is piled up by this curious 
theoretical mixture. The conceptualisation of the central themes of 
securitisation and desecuritisation are state-centric, discourse-dominated and 
conservative' (Booth, 2005, p. 271). 
Neither poststructuralism nor the Copenhagen School feature heavily in Booth's 
Theory of World Security for these reasons. This is a curious development 
considering Booth's earlier comments regarding the need for openness and plurality. 
It is also intriguing given Booth's adaptation of Hannah Arendt's `Perlenfischerei' 
(pearl-fishing) method, which involves `looking for wisdom not through the study of 
the history of ideas, genealogies, or categories of thinkers, but through plundering 
ideas that have survived and seem rich in possibility for one's purposes' (Booth, 
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2007, p. 3). Whilst Booth is content to scour far and wide for ideas, drawing upon 
Mahatma Gandhi, Ulrich Beck, Karl Deutsch and Immanuel Kant, he is also happy 
to ignore the growing and significant bodies of literature produced by scholars 
interested in poststructuralist and Copenhagen School approaches within security 
studies - scholars who, as with Booth's own work, are explicitly concerned with the 
relationship between security and ethics. 
Furthermore, by neglecting poststructuralism and the Copenhagen School, 
Booth locks himself away from recent scholarship which attempts to build bridges 
between the Welsh School and other approaches (for example Floyd, 2007). If the 
security as emancipation move was to be truly open, in the way Booth suggests in 
the developmental stages of the Welsh School, it might be expected that continued 
engagement with contrasting - rather than contending - approaches would be 
encouraged rather than deterred. The danger for the future of the security as 
emancipation move is that its staunchest advocate, Booth himself, risks becoming 
synonymous with an approach to scholarship which draws lines of division between 
approaches rather than lines of mutually constructive comparison and compatibility. 
Once again, this shows a tendency towards closure, rather than openness. 
Critique 3: The Absence of Voice 
In an important piece of self-reflection, worth quoting at length, Booth reveals how 
his involvement in the work of Amnesty International led to a profound change in 
his approach to the subdiscipline of security studies: 
`The more I thought about the individual cases that are the staple of 
Amnesty's work, the more I thought about the significance of thinking about 
international relations from the perspective of individuals rather than states. 
For me, the experience of writing those first letters to governments about 
perfect strangers - victims of those governments - was a real turning point. 
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Here were some names and sometimes faces of the hitherto unseen casualties 
of the structures of international relations. It was not only war that produces 
casualties. This turning point was almost as vivid - although obviously 
neither as personally life threatening or other life saving - as it was for Oskar 
Schindler, in Steven Spielberg's film, when he focused, through all the 
carnage, on the solitary little girl in a red coat. At least this is how I read the 
moment in the film: the reality of gross human wrongs suddenly becomes 
clear in the image of a single stranger. One consequence of this visualisation 
for me was the wish to read literature previously ghettoized by realist 
ideology. As a result, individual victims came to be seen not simply as a 
feature of domestic politics, but as a part of an international system that, 
through a mixture of rationality and historical happenstance, had developed 
into the business of power politics rather than into the exploration of 
common humanity. The individual/bottom-up/victim perspective began to 
change what I thought about the state, state types, social power, security 
problems other than the military inventories of the superpowers, the state as 
the exclusive security referent (which legitimized nuclear deterrence), and 
states as a source of threat rather than as a source of security. The sovereign 
state came to be seen as an important part of the problem of insecurity in 
world politics, not the solution' (Booth, 1997a, p. 99). 
What this passage illustrates is the importance of the approach to understanding 
security which this thesis seeks to deploy. The approach described by Booth above 
can be seen as one that seeks to understand the experience of insecurity as it is being 
lived. Booth starts with the individual and with attempting to understanding their 
particular predicaments in specific contexts, and from that starting point he 
extrapolates meaning which in turn leads him to question previous knowledge about 
world politics, most notably, the knowledge upheld and proclaimed by realism. 
What is also implied by the extract is that Booth felt sympathy and perhaps even 
solidarity with those victims, an assumption supported by the fact that Booth chose 
to write letters on their behalf. 
Booth's testimony suggests in important ways the impact that can be had by 
considering insecurity as lived experience upon understandings of world politics and 
the relationship between self and other. The key point in the extract is that Booth 
came to see `the significance of thinking about international relations from the 
perspective of individuals'. By engaging with the plight of the insecure other, Booth 
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came to question himself and his role in society, a move which had a profound 
impact upon his intellectual career. It is the nature of that engagement that is 
significant here, because Booth emphasises that he attempted to form a genuine 
empathetic relationship with strangers, that they were the people educating him, that 
he was the student and they in possession of knowledge and experience that could 
not be gained through traditional security studies. What is also important to note 
here is the fact that when Booth began the process of letter writing he had no idea 
where it would take him - the engagement was genuinely open-ended. 
Yet within Booth's work there is also an attempt to define more specifically 
the nature of the engagement between theory and practice, and this produces a form 
of closure which limits the possibilities of engagement with people in circumstances 
similar to those Booth mentions the passage above. In Theory of World Security, 
Booth remarks that `if human society is to be reinvented in an emancipatory 
direction, then thinking about doing must be given its due' (Booth, 2007, p. 198). 
This brings about a section in the book framed by a classic question of political 
theory: `how might we act? ' (Booth, 2007, pp. 198-206). Ultimately for Booth, this 
question is answered by reflecting upon what theory offers to others, as he argues 
that 
`it is always legitimate to ask of any theory purporting to have something to 
say about security in world politics what it means for real people in real 
places. Theories about gender, deconstruction, emancipation or whatever 
remain abstract and incomplete unless they engage with the real by 
suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help humankind move 
away from existing structural wrongs. Such engagement is never easy, and 
may not result in clear answers, but the test of a body of scholarship is 
whether it says anything meaningful about, or contributes however remotely 
or indirectly towards, the improvement of the security of individuals and 
groups in villages and cities, regions and states, and ultimately globally - and 
does this in ways that promote emancipatory aims' (Booth, 2007, p. 200). 
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It is important to reflect upon the differences between the two extracts used thus far 
in this section because they reveal a key movement towards closure with regards to 
the relationship between theory and practice in the Welsh School. That movement is 
captured by comparing a line from the first extract, `the significance of thinking 
about international relations from the perspective of individuals', to a line from the 
second, referring to how theory must `engage with the real by suggesting policies, 
agents, and sites of change, to help humankind move away from existing structural 
wrongs'. 
What this comparison is attempting to highlight is that there has been a shift 
away from trying to understand the perspective of individuals who suffer the 
consequences of world politics, and towards the building of theory which is tasked 
with finding ways of changing the status quo and preventing more suffering. The 
emphasis has moved from the individual `victim as educator' towards the more 
familiar ground of `scholar as educator'. Theorists associated with the Welsh School 
have adapted Gramsci's notion of the `organic intellectual' to summarise this 
position, in which academics work with social movements and other civil society 
actors to implement progressive change (see Wyn Jones, 1999). 
The argument being made here is not that theory is unimportant. It is rather 
that there is something unpredictable, exciting and genuinely open about trying to 
engage with individuals from their own perspective, which Booth demonstrates so 
well when describing how he came to formulate the security as emancipation move, 
but which risks being lost when scholarship becomes embroiled in the act of 
suggesting possible changes to the status quo more than the act of listening to others. 
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Booth is adamant that any theory about emancipation and security should 
have something to say to those who have suffered from the consequences of world 
politics. Yet surely this is the wrong way to look at the relationship between theory 
and practice, between scholars and others. What, if anything, can a theory of 
security say to a father looking for the body of his lost son, or the woman caring for 
the boy who will never know his father, or the daughter who saw her father killed in 
the garden of the house he built with his own hands? These are real experiences that 
the author encountered in Vukovar, and it prompts the thought that there is perhaps 
more that such stories and individuals can tell scholars involved in security studies 
than the other way round. This theme will be raised again in subsequent chapters. 
The point to note now is that the genuinely open engagement which Booth 
pursued when he began writing letters for Amnesty International, in which he 
attempted to empathise with people experiencing insecurity, is being lost in the 
process of defining how scholars who are sympathetic to the security as 
emancipation move should act. Booth advocates `mutual synergy', in which `theory 
arises out of practice, practice is shaped and modified as a result of theory, and 
theory develops in the light of practice (Booth, 2007, p. 198). Yet a more limited 
form of engagement exists, exemplified by a number of empirical studies inspired by 
the Welsh School, which often conclude with predictable suggestions for change 
rather than reflecting on an open engagement with the individuals they are concerned 
with. When the Welsh School is `applied' in different ways the loss of radicalism 
becomes apparent; indeed many such studies, to be discussed below in this section, 
become little more than advocacy for `more civil society' and `more human 
security'. These are important points in themselves but do not go as far as they 
might within the security as emancipation move. 
35 
Many of the empirical studies which have sought to contribute to the Welsh 
School have been based upon the work of Booth and to a lesser extent Wyn Jones. 
One problem with these studies is that many do not question their work in the way 
that the above section has attempted to do, and the limitations of the Welsh School 
go unchallenged. The result is the reification of the Welsh School as a whole, and 
the production of an approach which is apparently unaware of its own limitations. In 
other words, a `critical' approach to security is being developed which is 
insufficiently critical of itself. Examples of this tendency will be examined in this 
section. 
Paul Williams provides a Welsh School approach to the study of Africa 
which illustrates many of the limitations of the approach (Williams, 2007). He 
affirms the Welsh School argument that `the point of thinking about security is to 
affect political practices and outcomes on the ground' (Williams, 2007, p. 1022). He 
starts however by attempting to clarify the conceptual terrain which surrounds 
studies of Africa and proposes fundamental questions, themselves shaped by Booth's 
work: 
`Whose version of the real world should we analyse? What is security, and 
whose security are we talking about? Which `Africa' should we study? 
What should the relationships be between regional and global structures and 
processes? Who or what are the most appropriate referents for security? 
Who is best placed to deliver it? What principles should security policies 
promote? And whose answers to these questions should we listen to? ' 
(Williams, 2007, p. 1022) 
These are all important questions for getting beyond traditional thinking on security. 
It is also highly significant that Williams argues that if security is dependent upon 
relationships between humans then it makes sense to consider the insecurity of the 
most vulnerable groups, such as certain women in certain tribes in Africa (Williams, 
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2007, p. 1024). Such arguments and the questions raised above highlight some of 
the important steps taken by the Welsh School in constructing a new approach to 
security. 
Problems emerge however when the analysis turns to the people that 
Williams wants to secure. He begins by listing the threats they face such as 
violence, health challenges and environmental degradation (Williams, 2007, pp. 
1028-34), and then the sites where insecurity is experienced including war zones, 
shanty towns, displacement camps and rural peripheries (Williams, 2007, p. 1035). 
Having identified the key threats and the places where they are experienced, he then 
proposes a multi-tiered response to these issues based on action undertaken by 
domestic and global civil society like the West African Civil Society Forum, and 
institutions shaped by reformist elites such as the African Union Peace and Security 
Council (Williams, 2007, p. 1036-37). He ends with the laudable conclusion that 
however the threats are addressed, African voices must be at the fore. 
To make the argument in a different way, the radicalism of the security as 
emancipation move is lost when Williams tries to apply it to a case study because he 
ends up arguing for more rights, more protection from harm, more dialogue - more 
liberal democracy. The argument is not that this is in any way a weak argument, or 
even an argument to be heavily contested. The argument is rather that the security as 
emancipation move could potentially offer more than what Williams is suggesting - 
perhaps even going beyond the conception of liberal democracy Williams advances. 
Other studies follow this pattern. Eli Stamnes and Richard Wyn Jones use 
the Welsh School to inform a case study of Burundi (Stamnes and Wyn Jones, 
2000). As with the Williams article discussed above they begin by setting out the 
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key questions the Welsh School seeks to ask, questioning the meaning of security as 
a concept, asking whose security is at stake, and what kind of security studies should 
develop (Stamnes and Wyn Jones, 2000, pp. 40-42). This discussion draws upon 
Booth and Wyn Jones heavily. As with the Williams piece on Africa, they argue that 
individual security must take precedence over national security, and then list the 
various threats faced by individuals in Burundi before exploring potential paths 
towards emancipation. 
However, even after stating the Welsh School preference for emancipating 
people from insecurity, Stamnes and Wyn Jones are reluctant to provide an analysis 
of how this might come about, and instead, much like Williams, concentrate on 
applying a programme for change (Stamnes and Wyn Jones, 2000, p. 50). They 
suggest a focus on `the development of unfulfilled potentials within the actual 
conflict situation as it stands, as part of an emancipatory process', citing negotiations 
between government, military groups and civil society which might bring about `a 
more just and secure environment' (Stamnes and Wyn Jones, 2000, p. 51). They 
also suggest grassroots activist organisations as potential agents of change. 
Yet there is no theory of agency or dynamic of action here, nor any real 
attempt to go further than pointing out several potentially progressive groups which 
might be able to contribute to an emancipatory process. Once again the analysis of 
an empirical case study fails to fulfil its radical potential. Negotiations and the 
development of civil society is important, but is not distinctive. The voices of the 
individuals being written about are curiously absent. 
A similar pattern is followed by Stamnes in a piece on the UN mission in 
Macedonia (Stamnes, 2004). Stamnes argues that the UN mission contributed to a 
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process of emancipation in the following ways: deploying military forces and 
observing borders; election monitoring; facilitating meetings between political 
parties and youth organisations; employment generation; providing humanitarian aid, 
transport and infrastructure; and supporting women's organisations (Stamnes, 2004, 
p. 175). 
The problem with this argument is not the conclusion that the UN can act as 
an agent of emancipation. The problem is that the security as emancipation move is 
not being pushed further. It would seem obvious to many that the UN would be 
capable of acting in ways which promote democracy, humanitarianism and security. 
The point is therefore that this seems a limited conclusion considering the study is 
informed by the security as emancipation move which is in itself full of more 
promise - the promise of unpredictability which comes about through genuine open- 
endedness. What Stamnes is really arguing is that the UN is capable of promoting 
liberal democracy, which leaves the Welsh School with an important but not 
particularly distinctive or radical argument, nor with an engagement which directly 
engages `real people in real place' in an open exchange. 
Graeme Cheeseman, who is also sympathetic to the security as emancipation 
move, contributes a discussion of Western defence policy-making to a key collection 
of papers in the development of the Welsh School (Cheeseman, 2005). Once again, 
however, his contribution amounts to a list of what is wrong with the particular case 
study when held up against the critical theoretical looking glass followed by a brief 
summation of what is required to address the issue. In this particular case 
Cheeseman argues that neorealism continues to be the dominant strand of thinking 
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within policy-making circles and academic communities around the world at a time 
when new thinking is required (Cheeseman, 2005, p. 80). 
Following Booth, Cheeseman argues that new thinking is required in order to 
address the new times that have brought AIDS, transnational crime, New Wars, 
drugs and environmental degradation. For him, such a `new and more complex 
security environment requires a much more democratic, empathetic, and cooperative 
approach to problem solving' (Cheesman, 2005, p. 82). As with many Welsh School 
orientated studies the author is strong on utilising critical theoretical insights to 
critique the status quo but fails to address the issues of reconstruction and 
engagement with the silenced beyond restating the need for more democracy, for 
empathy, more good things. 
Another empirical study in the same volume, on the gendered nature of 
peacekeeping and the role of Canadian troops in Somalia, highlights the importance 
of understanding that soldiers are products of a specific, highly masculinised cultural 
process and are usually not immediately able to adjust to peacekeeping roles 
(Whitworth, 2005). This is an important point in itself, and certainly a necessary one 
for the more emancipatory politics favoured by Booth and his followers. However, 
the author does not problematise the nature of peacekeeping itself which may already 
be complicit in the production of the realist, state-driven international system which 
the Welsh School seek to transform. Furthermore, although Whitworth does raise 
the concerns of those real people in real places who suffered at the hands of the 
Canadian soldiers under whom they were supposed to have been protected, more 
could be said on the implications of their suffering for thinking about security and 
emancipation. 
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In a similar vein Jan Jindy Pettman raises the issue of how dominant 
theories of IR and security studies have maintained silences around the matter of 
colonisation without presenting any form of substantive engagement with those who 
have been silenced (Pettman, 2005). All the Welsh School empirical studies 
discussed here follow this pattern of stating that silences need to be addressed 
without actually addressing them, an approach that risks rendering the security as 
emancipation move open to the charge that it is little more than a new manifestation 
of the old and superficial liberal cry that pronounces, `something must be done'. 
Other empirical studies follow the trend. Paul Williams applied Welsh 
School thought to a case study of South African politics (Williams, 2000). Williams 
begins by expressing the benefits of a critical theoretical approach as opposed to a 
problem solving approach in relation to foreign policy, and proceeds to outline how 
such an approach can illuminate new understandings of foreign policy. Williams 
attempts to tie `external' security problems with `internal' socio-economic problems 
(Williams, 2000, p, 78). A critical security perspective therefore suggests that 
development is a crucial part of providing security, a position which builds upon 
Buzan's position regarding the importance of the economic sector of security. He 
argues that 
`the government should prioritise poverty alleviation including a renewed 
commitment to electrification, housing, sanitation, affordable healthcare, 
education and employment schemes. This will mean rejecting the neo-liberal 
principles embodied in GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
scheme) and concentration instead on devising innovative ways to deal with 
the problems of poverty, unemployment and growing inequality (Williams, 
2000, p. 83). 
What his analysis ultimately comes down to is a call for South Africans to `struggle 
for a more just and democratic world order' (Williams, 2000, p. 88). As with 
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previous empirical studies it is difficult to see what is distinctive about these 
proposals. What Williams is asking for is the transformation of the state into one 
which sees human security as a necessary component of national security, and which 
involves its own citizens in the formulation of foreign policy. The security as 
emancipation can go further than this, as subsequent chapters will show. 
In a study of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland undertaken by Joseph 
Ruane and Jennifer Todd, they describe the process of conflict resolution in 
emancipatory terms as `a process by which the participants in a system which 
determines, distorts and limits their potentialities come together actively to transform 
it, and in the process transform themselves' (Ruane and Todd, 2005, p. 238). An 
emancipatory approach to the Northern Ireland conflict would address the underlying 
causes of the conflict rather than seek to manage it, as a realist approach would 
suggest (Ruane and Todd, 2005, p. 251). This understanding of emancipation 
suggests that dialogue and understanding are central to it. However, once again the 
voices of those who live that process of emancipation are absent. 
One way of understanding these limitations is in the context of a useful paper 
that outlines the potential pitfalls of approaches to security informed by the concept 
of emancipation. Mark Neufeld argued that it would be essential for any critical 
security approach to avoid the dangers of utopianism and elitism (Neufeld, 20(4). 
The Welsh School, he argued, would need to 
`be attentive to the way in which the meanings and practices of security never 
float unattached, but are always embedded and embodied, always dependent 
on context for their content'. 
The Welsh School would also need to guard against elitism as well, by 
42 
`helping us to remain cognizant of the way meanings are created and changed 
through a process of real people acting to make history, though, of course, 
not necessarily in the circumstances in their own choosing' (Neufeld, 2004, 
p. 22). 
The argument made in this section can be summarised by stating that the empirical 
studies undertaken by the Welsh School have not sufficiently heeded this warning, 
and that the nature of the engagement undertaken by the Welsh School has been 
highly limited. This has several causes. One cause is that, as Stuart Croft highlights, 
the Welsh School is relatively small in scale and only a handful of scholars have 
dedicated substantial research projects to it (Croft, 2008). Another reason is that 
Welsh School scholars have, despite their appeal for greater engagement with `real 
people in real places', been essentially theory driven. Indeed, Booth recognises that 
`to date, students of security from critical perspectives have been more familiar with 
engaging with critics at the theoretical than the empirical level' (Booth, 2007, p. 
265). When it comes to the matter of `real people in real places', there has been a 
deafening silence within the Welsh School. 
Conclusion 
This opening chapter has attempted to assert a critical reading of the Welsh School 
of security studies. It has argued that the Welsh School has orientated the security as 
emancipation move towards closure, and that this is to the detriment of the approach 
as a whole. The security as emancipation move promised to be genuinely open- 
ended, yet the Welsh School has conditioned the move into an approach to the study 
of security which is not as inclusive or radical as it initially claimed. 
In contrast to what these studies attempt it would be preferable to use the 
theory as a guide to identifying locations where emancipatory practices might be 
evident and then to understand such practices in their own context, rather than using 
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them to support the theory or to use theory to prescribe remedies. Such an approach 
would require a re-emphasis on the politics of long process rather than the politics of 
immediate crisis, because empathy requires patient engagement rather than a frantic 
call to action. It may also involve a more open standpoint towards other approaches 
to security. 
This would involve moving beyond the Welsh School, as the thesis will seek 
to show, because the tendencies towards closure identified above are due in large 
part to the perceived need to define what the Welsh School stands for. From being a 
body of critical knowledge about security, the Welsh School has evolved into a 
programme for security, for which `a checklist for critical thinking about security' is 
provided (see Booth, 2007, pp. 277-8). In doing so the unpredictability and 
dynamism of open engagement is lost. 
The security as emancipation move is most radical when it is seen through 
Linklater's interpretation of emancipation as dialogic communities. This view is 
implied in Booth too, but is not explicitly argued. It is most radical because it 
promises the enabling of a future without harm to be built which embraces the 
contingency and open-endedness of practice. The signs of this are evident within 
some civil society groups, as future chapters will show. The point however is not to 
capture these practices as somehow belonging to the Welsh School, but to try to 
understand them on their own terms and in their own context. 
This raises the issue of the extent to which the security as emancipation move 
should be housed within any particular `school of thought', a question which will 
become more prominent in the empirical chapters of the thesis. An approach to the 
44 
security emancipation move which embraces security and insecurity as lived 
experience is required. This will be outlined further in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Beyond the Welsh School: A Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined a critique of the Welsh School and argued that the 
security as emancipation move has been orientated towards closure in three ways: 
from process to crisis, from compatibility to difference, and towards an unspoken 
acceptance of the absence of voice. This chapter proposes a move beyond these 
limitations which understands the security as emancipation move in the context of 
Andrew Linklater's adaptation of Habermasian discourse ethics. The purpose of the 
chapter is to outline an approach which sees security as emancipation through lived 
experiences of security and insecurity. 
Contextualising the security as emancipation move explicitly within 
discourse ethics allows for the more radical and open-ended tendencies of that move 
to be developed, because the discourse ethic, and its practical-political manifestation 
- the dialogic community - embrace by their nature the idea of openness. The idea 
of openness promises a perpetual dialogue between participants in which nobody can 
presuppose outcomes and nobody can know for certain who will learn what and from 
whom. The discourse ethic is also explicitly concerned with the harm done by and to 
others, and challenges the assumptions upon which human beings are excluded. 
Dialogic communities embrace sensitivity to difference and encourage empathetic 
engagement, sentiments which can inform research strategies as well as normative 
goals. 
The contextualisation of the security as emancipation move within discourse 
ethics seeks to reclaim a quality which, as was argued in chapter 1, has been pushed 
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away as the Welsh School was orientated more towards the forms of closure 
discussed previously. That quality, which was described in Booth's account of the 
importance of engaging with Amnesty International in explaining his eventual 
rejection of traditional security thinking, can be understood as an attempt to 
understand the predicament of the insecure other. Because any conception of 
security as emancipation is also concerned with a notion of progress, the transition 
from insecurity to security is also important. Subsequently therefore, attempting to 
understand the predicament of the insecure other, how humans experiencing 
insecurity in different forms struggle within their specific, local contexts, and how 
they attempt to move towards a life of greater security, is the key characteristic of an 
approach that attempts to understand security as emancipation through lived 
experiences. 
In this way, therefore, the engagement with the insecure other to which Booth 
testifies is held up as an example of how the security as emancipation move should 
go forward, but it is in the context of Linklater's work on discourse ethics and world 
politics that such progress should be made, thus pulling Booth in a slightly different 
direction to the one outlined in Theory of World Security. Moreover, although 
Linklater's work is embraced in this way, it is also twisted in a different empirical 
direction from that which he intends; from a focus on macro-dialogic arrangements 
which sees the discourse ethic as embodied in large institutions such as the European 
Union, to a focus on dialogic practices in localised contexts. At times, such practices 
take the form of what are termed in this thesis as micro-dialogic communities. 
This approach extends and develops some strands of thought within critical 
IR theory which emphasise the need to ground notions of emancipation in embodied 
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actors (Patomäki, 2003; Eckersley, 2007). Scholars sympathetic to the critical turn 
in IR have raised the concern that unless concepts developed by critical theory are 
rooted in concrete practices they risk appearing utopian (Diez and Steans, 2005, p. 
128). It also recognises that key contributors to critical IR theory have been 
disappointed that the critical turn in IR, which occurred in conjunction with the 
development of critical approaches in security studies, has not led to a growth of 
emphatic understandings of those who are studied. Indeed, `greater attention to the 
self-understanding of the world's least advantaged' is required by critically minded 
scholars, it has been argued (Murphy, 2007, p. 118). 
Furthermore, it develops a theme discussed elsewhere regarding the `question 
of how IR is communicated and experienced through the intersubjectivities of 
everyday life for people normally hidden or thought of as insignificant and powerless 
in traditional IR' (Constantinou et al, 2008, p. 9). Such an approach is developing in 
other fields of IR, such as postcolonialism, where it has been noted that the 
embodied experiences of indigenous practices reveal new, critical discourses on `the 
international' (Shani, 2008, p. 724). It also continues previous discussions, also 
prompted by Linklater's work, regarding the appropriate response to `voices from 
below' (Bühler, 2002). The turn to Linklater therefore opens a path to wider debates 
in the discipline to which scholars sympathetic to the security as emancipation move 
can contribute and draw from. 
In keeping with the sentiments expressed above individuals are placed at the 
centre of security analysis, as Booth argues they should. This is done in the context 
of a framework of meaning provided by Linklater. In making these arguments an 
engagement between the work of Booth and Linklater is opened which runs 
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throughout the thesis, and which challenges and supports aspects of their work in 
equal measure, thus creating a dynamic through which different shades of the 
security as emancipation move can be explored. 
The chapter begins with that engagement, making the case for the 
contextualisation of the security as emancipation within discourse ethics by showing 
how dialogue - Linklater's central theoretical building block - is already central to 
Booth's theory of security. The chapter then proceeds to the specifics of the 
theoretical framework itself, recognising that a move to understand security as 
emancipation through lived experience still requires a theoretical framework. Two 
key concepts from Linklater's scholarship, the dialogic community and the totalising 
project, which frame the empirical analysis to follow, are introduced. The 
relationship between these two forms of political arrangements highlights the 
importance of political struggle within processes of emancipation, which returns the 
discussion to Booth's emphasis on global civil society and the role of individuals. 
Attempting to understand how such practices play out in specific contexts is 
the essence of engaging the discourse ethic as a research strategy. This move helps 
to counter some of the criticisms made of Linklater's work which are also discussed 
in this chapter. The chapter then links the theoretical discussions to the actual 
empirical focus of this thesis by discussing what is meant by the notion of utilising 
the discourse ethic as a research strategy and outlining the methods used. Finally, 
and as a way of closing the opening part of the thesis, the chapter discusses how the 
approach outlined here manages to orientate the thesis away from the closures 
discussed in chapter 1 and towards a more open-ended form of scholarship. 
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Opening an Engagement between Booth and Linklater 
The contextualisation of the security as emancipation move within discourse ethics, 
which is a product of an engagement between the work of Booth and Linklater, starts 
here by outlining the ways in which their works overlap. Dialogue and interaction 
between the members of different communities is a central element to Booth's theory 
of security, and subsequently Booth draws heavily upon Linklater in making his 
arguments. Booth describes Linklater's work on discourse ethics as `theorising for 
common humanity, and as such (it) is basic to any theory of world security' (Booth, 
2007, p. 57). `Discourse ethics', argues Booth, `are a key feature of emancipatory 
politics' (Booth, 2007, p. 58). 
Given the emphasis Booth places on the threats and crises discussed in 
chapter 1, there is a long journey to be had from the starting point of a threefold 
framework of emancipation, through tackling the current state of global politics and 
towards the vision Booth outlines of world security underpinned by overlapping 
emancipatory communities. Clearly dialogue plays a key role here in the negotiation 
of that process, a point Booth recognises by arguing that `there will be no 
emancipatory community without dialogue' (Booth, 2007, p. 272). 
Despite the major role played by dialogue in his theory, the Perlenfischerei 
method, which draws together a very wide range of literature both within and beyond 
security studies, does not allow him to explore this aspect of the theory in depth. 
This is not necessarily a problem because scholars sympathetic to Booth's security as 
emancipation move can probe the depths of his theory and/or develop his arguments 
in new ways. As Booth argues, `our work as academics, like ourselves, should never 
be regarded as finished. Our books and articles should be seen as explorations not 
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destinations, and so should our own individual lives' (Booth, 1997a, p. 101-2). 
Theory of World Security may not offer a comprehensive theory in itself, but it is a 
genuine exploration of the relationship between emancipation and security in the 
context of empirical realities, informed not only by great learning but also profound 
concern for the future of humanity. 
Even so, if Booth's work is to be built upon, as this thesis seeks to, it may be 
necessary to move beneath the Perlenfischerei method and to explore the specific 
ideas from which Booth draws inspiration. Given that dialogue is central to Booth's 
theory, and by extension to the Welsh School, it seems appropriate to build future 
explorations of the security as emancipation move not only upon Booth's scholarship 
but also upon the work of the scholar who has arguably done more than any other 
contemporary thinker within the discipline of IR to consider the nature and 
significance of dialogue in relation to world politics: Andrew Linklater. The 
argument being made here is that it is better to explore Booth's security as 
emancipation move in the context of Linklater's adaptation of Habermasian 
discourse ethics, which has the added benefit of moving away from the tendency to 
close down some of the openings made possible by Booth's security emancipation 
move which occurred as the Welsh School evolved, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
This added benefit is made possible because of Booth's own approach to 
practice. In remarks about the relationship between ends and means, he argues that 
`some end might be very distant, but the means that are its equivalent are not; they 
can be employed at once' (Booth, 2007, p. 256). Booth also uses Gandhi's 
aphorism, `be the change you wish to see in the world', to describe his view on the 
relationship between means and ends (Booth, 2007, p. 455). The implication of 
51 
dialogue being central to Booth's emancipatory process, coupled with Gandhi's 
sentiment, is that academic research itself should also be informed by dialogic 
principles. This opens a door to the notion of understanding the security as 
emancipation move through lived experience. This point will be returned to later in 
the chapter, but it is first necessary to outline's Linklater's discourse ethics so that its 
key aspects can be taken forward into the empirical analysis to follow in parts 2 and 
3 of the thesis. Two specific concepts stand out, the dialogic community and the 
totalising project, and will be utilised to frame the empirical analysis to follow in 
subsequent chapters. 
The dialogic community 
This section describes the idea of the dialogic community, drawing upon the work of 
Linklater in The Transformation of Political Community (Linklater, 1998). 
Linklater's work takes place within a broader context of what has been termed 
`emancipatory international relations', in recognition of the growing impact of 
critical social theory upon the discipline (Spegele, 2002). His work has made an 
important contribution to the integration of later Frankfurt School critical theory into 
IR, along with that of other scholars. (For an overview of the Frankfurt School, see 
Held, 1980. See also Devetak, 2007, and Weber, 2007, for recent examples of the 
uses of this particular strand of thought in IR theory). 
As was made clear in the previous section, dialogue is central to Booth's 
conception of emancipation. The aim of this section is to capture a deeper 
understanding of dialogue and of the nature of dialogue in political contexts. Once 
these understandings have been established a conception of emancipation as practice 
is enabled, which places the thesis in a stronger position to explore the security as 
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emancipation move through lived experiences. Following Linklater, then, the 
essence of the dialogic community can be defined in these terms: 
`The willingness to engage wildly different human beings qua human beings, 
in a dialogue which assesses the rationality of the practices of exclusion, is 
the hallmark of the communication (dialogic) community' (Linklater, 1998, 
p. 87). 
Linklater's comments here build upon arguments made by Richard Rorty (see for 
example Rorty, 1989; Rorty, 1990, Rorty, 1991). This enthusiasm for interaction 
would rest upon the belief that the only criteria for inclusion would simply be the 
status of being human. The dialogic community is thus radically open, but this also 
involves - as a guard against ethnocentrism - participants accepting that they may be 
convinced by an opposing argument (Linklater, 1998, p. 87). It is within this site that 
humans would be able to deal with the differences between competing ethical codes. 
Dialogue is obviously central to these arguments and Linklater utilises the 
procedures set out by Jürgen Habermas to define authentic dialogue. Three points 
stand out here: 
i. By convention no person or ethical position can be excluded from 
dialogue in advance. 
ii. True dialogue only exists when participants accept that there is no a priori 
certainty about who will learn from whom, and subsequently all 
participants must accept reciprocal criticism. 
iii. Participants must be prepared to question their own truth claims, to 
accept the claims of others and to be prepared to be moved by the force of 
the better argument (adapted from Linklater, 1998, p. 92). 
The purpose of these procedures is not to offer solutions to debates, but to enable 
individuals to express their ethical claims freely and equally and with the promise of 
compromise or consensus (Linklater, 1998, p. 92). Dialogic relations would ensure 
that norms would not be valid `unless they can command the consent of everyone 
whose interests stand to be affected by them (Linklater, 1998, p. 91). 
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The dialogic community does not offer solutions to all conflict as dialogue 
`may never come to an end' (Linklater, 1998, p. 96). Dialogue provides the 
opportunity to discover whether the ethical beliefs of one social group have 
transcultural validity, yet groups holding certain beliefs may fail to persuade other 
groups that such beliefs are valid. Indeed, `dialogue may result in an intersocietal 
consensus that there is a duty to rescue all human beings (an example of an ethical 
belief) but it may reveal irreconcilable disputes about the moral significance of 
differences' (Linklater, 1998, pp. 86-87). 
Dialogic communities however do offer the possibility of moral progress, 
which can be defined as 
`the widening of the circle of those who have rights to participate in dialogue 
and the commitment that norms cannot be regarded as universally valid 
unless they have, or could command, the consent of all those who stand to be 
affected by them. Moral progress involves a movement beyond provincial 
forms of life to a thin universalism in which discourse is the means by which 
the radically different employ in their efforts to explore the possibility of an 
engagement about the principles of coexistence' (Linklater, 1998, p. 96). 
One implication of this statement is that dialogic communities may start as very 
small units of social arrangement which can expand over time. This will have an 
important bearing on the empirical analysis to follow. For Linklater, examples of 
this process include the abolition of slavery and the evolution of norms regarding the 
protection of civilians in war (Linklater, 1998, p. 87). 
As such the expansion of dialogic communities is closely associated with 
what Linklater terms moral-practical learning, drawing again upon Habermas. There 
are three stages of such learning: 
`At the level of pre-conventional morality, subjects obey norms fearing that 
non-compliance will lead to sanctions imposed by a higher authority; at the 
level of conventional morality, they obey norms from a sense of loyalty to 
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existing social groups or peers; at the level of post-conventional morality, 
subjects stand back from authority structures and group loyalties and ask 
whether they are complying with principles which have universal validity' 
(Linklater, 1998, p. 91). 
It is this latter state of moral-practical learning which involves 'levels of critical 
disengagement from authority patterns or group norms and unqualified openness to 
the perspectives of others'. Discourse ethics emerges from these complicated 
processes of learning, indeed; 'discourse ethics is the apex of post-conventional 
moral reasoning' (Linklater, 1998, p. 91). The dialogic community not only results 
from transformation but facilitates it also. 
As well as describing the nature of dialogic communities Linklater also 
discusses the interpersonal skills that would be required in such arrangements. 
Using Habermas, Linklater asserts that `at the level of practice, discourse ethics 
requires hermeneutic insights into the nuanced relationships between abstract moral 
principles, specific social contexts and particular human needs'. The ethics of care 
and justice are `two sides of the same moral coin' in this sense, `by bringing finely- 
tuned hermeneutic moral skills and interpersonal sensibilities to bear on the 
implementation of public norms' (Linklater, 1998, p. 94). For Linklater discourse 
ethics should be committed to engaging such hermeneutic skills; indeed, `empathetic 
cooperation between individuals with all their particularities, and the search for 
mutual comprehension of their respective needs and contexts, is the starting-point of 
discourse ethics' (Linklater, 1998, p. 95). 
This discussion of dialogic communities above has focused on their internal 
characteristics, their relationship to moral learning and the interpersonal skills that 
they require in practice. The aim has been to present the dialogic community as a 
central concept in the thesis and dialogic relations as a central theme. The next stage 
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in the chapter involves outlining what Linklater, after Corrigan and Sayer, terms the 
totalising project (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985). As the antithesis of the dialogic 
community, it is important to understand the totalising project and the relationship 
between these two distinct forms of political arrangements, as subsequent analysis 
will show. 
The totalising project 
The totalising project can be understood as `the efforts made by central governments 
to mould homogenous national communities and to accentuate the differences 
between citizens and aliens in order to meet the challenges of inter-state war' 
(Linklater, 1998, p. 6). The process marries citizenship, nationality, territoriality and 
sovereignty (Linklater, 1998, pp. 50-1). One consequence of the totalising project is 
the emergence of social hierarchies within societies (Linklater, 1998, p. 26). 
Another is the estrangement between societies (Linklater, 1998, p. 25). Neo-realism 
has accepted the totalising project and only allows for alternatives to the modem 
state as a consequence of fate or chance (Linklater, 1998, p. 27). 
For Linklater, the modern idea of citizenship emerged out of the struggle 
against unjust exclusion which the totalising project caused (see Linklater, 1998, ch. 
4). The idea of citizenship can be broadened to encompass non-nationals, Linklater 
argues, as a means to expanding dialogic communities. Such a move `encourages 
the emergence of new forms of political community in which the potential for higher 
levels of universality and difference is realised, and in so doing, transcends the 
limitations of the Westphalian era' (Linklater, 1998, p. 45). The most effective way 
of achieving this, he argues, is by institutionalising broader conceptions of 
citizenship in bodies such as the European Union. 
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The evidence to be discussed in chapters 6 and 8 suggests that it is not only 
the idea of citizenship that can enable the expansion of dialogic communities. 
Interview material from Vukovar suggests that the experience of war can also lead to 
concern about unjust exclusion and the development of emancipatory, dialogic 
practices. This is to suggest that the emergence of the modem idea of citizenship as 
a reaction to the totalising project is just one resource that can be harnessed to 
expand the realm of dialogic communities. Additional moral and practical resources 
emerge from struggles against the totalising project and exist in efforts to facilitate 
dialogue between opposing sides in the aftermath of war. 
The totalising project reached its high point in the early twentieth century, 
Linklater asserts (Linklater, 1998, p. 157). As chapters 3-5 suggest, however, 
important aspects of the totalising project can be seen in contemporary post-war 
states, such as Croatia. Linklater also argues that globalisation presents new 
challenges for the totalising project (Linklater, 1998, p. 34). Such challenges, 
however, can also be seen within as well as above the state, as chapters 6 and 8 
suggest. Although the totalising project is still a key concept in this thesis, 
subsequent chapters therefore offer a different interpretation of the relationship 
between the totalising project and dialogic communities. 
The relationship between dialogic communities and the totalising project 
For Linklater, the relationship between the totalising project and the expansion of 
dialogic communities hinges on citizenship. The idea of citizenship emerged as a 
response to the totalising project and is now the most significant moral resource 
within existing social arrangements, and can be harnessed by agents to make 
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political communities more open to discourse ethics, he argues. The idea of 
citizenship allows for the further expansion of dialogic communities. 
This thesis does not deviate from Linklater's proposition that one outcome of 
the totalising project are efforts to transform it. However, rather than locating the 
site of transformation in institutions, this thesis places emphasis on civil society as a 
site of change. Furthermore, this thesis suggests that in the immediate aftermath of 
war - in this case a violent expression of the totalising project - the moral and 
practical resources needed for challenging existing social arrangements through the 
expansion of dialogic communities can be witnessed. Chapters 6 and 8 present this 
evidence. 
It is important to note that Linklater does provide for such a view to an 
extent, even if his work does not elaborate much upon it. Linklater states that 
`sensitivity to unjust forms of exclusion and the normative attachment to dialogue 
are historical products' (Linklater, 1998, p. 110). The crucial matter here is the 
nature of the processes which led to the production of challenges to unjust forms of 
exclusion. Linklater offers some direction as to their character, asserting that 
`societies which question the moral significance of racial, cultural, ethnic and 
gender differences are the result of complex processes of social change which have 
been influenced by various forms of political struggle and resistance' (Linklater, 
1998, p. 110; emphasis added). 
The point here is to underline that dialogic communities are the result of 
human action against the totalising project. To emphasise the point further, Linklater 
argues that `no cunning of reason oversees the development of dialogic 
communities; no teleology has steered them to this point, guarantees their future 
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development or underwrites their survival' (Linklater, 1998, p. 110). Dialogic 
communities, then, result from the actions of human beings in a struggle for more 
inclusive and just social and political arrangements. In this way, although he does 
not elaborate upon the point in much depth, Linklater allows space for actions within 
civil society to contribute to emancipatory processes through their political 
struggles. 
Linklater, however, does not provide much more guidance as to the nature of 
these political struggles. As critics have noted, his work remains highly abstract and 
lacking in empirical focus (Chan, 1999; Elshtain, 1999; Bühler, 2002; Brassett and 
Higgott, 2003). This thesis takes note of these criticisms in arguing for a move 
towards a focus on security and emancipation as lived experience. In order to 
conceptualise those forms of struggle which can produce more dialogic 
arrangements, it is to the idea of global civil society and also to Booth that the 
discussion can return. 
Global civil society as a site of local struggle 
As the previous chapter made clear there are various problems with Booth's work, 
however, one specific aspect of that body of scholarship is very useful at this point. 
Whereas Linklater offers only an implicit affirmation of the values of civil society, 
Booth explicitly highlights civil society as being a site of new thinking and practices 
with regards to security -a site of struggle and change (Booth, 2007, pp. 455-8). 
Other scholars have also noted the centrality of civil society and social movements to 
emancipatory practices (Pieterse, 1992). 
This thesis takes this claim seriously; however, it does not replicate Booth's 
understanding of civil society as being the arena in which NGOs always pursue 
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cosmopolitan values. Certainly these values are pursued by NGOs, as chapters 6 and 
8 show. Yet chapter 7 will illustrate the ways in which civil society is also an arena 
in which the some values more associated with the totalising project are upheld and 
accepted as well as contested. Civil society is thus a site of struggle in itself as well 
as a site of struggle against the totalising project. 
In this light Brassett and Smith provide a useful understanding of global civil 
society. Global civil society is more ambiguous than those who emphasise the role 
of `progressive' social movements and NGOs suggest, they claim. They emphasise 
the diversity and disagreement within global civil society over aims, strategies and 
the absence of solidarity, and characterise global civil society as a space of debate 
and activity, or an `affective arena' (Brassett and Smith, 2010). As chapters 6,7 and 
8 suggest, global civil society is a site of contestation, a proposition which becomes 
clearer when the emphasis turns to local manifestations of struggles against the 
totalising project. Dialogic struggles emerge within the affective arena of global 
civil society as reactions against the totalising project. One manifestation of this can 
be seen in the post-war environment of Vukovar, as will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters. 
Answering the Critics of Discourse Ethics 
It can be argued that Linklater's theory of political transformation offers a more 
coherent approach to the concept of emancipation than any other theorist 
sympathetic to the security as emancipation move, as Linklater is (see Linklater, 
2005a). The strength of Linklater's arguments have been noted by scholars. For 
Chris Brown, Linklater has satisfied the ambition of progressivist scholars to 
develop a critical international theory. This ambition, Brown argues, has existed at 
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least since Robert Cox made the distinction between `problem solving theory' and 
`critical theory', which Linklater accomplishes by presenting a more sophisticated 
analysis than the `warmed-up Marxism' of many critical theorists, bringing the post- 
Marxist critical theory of Habermas into the centre of discussions in IR and moving 
beyond the critique of positivism that characterised much critical scholarship 
(Brown, 1998, pp. 224-5. ) 
Linklater's work has however brought on criticism (see Jahn, 1998; Chan, 
1999; Franke, 1999; Geras, 1999; Schweller, 1999; Walker, 1999; Diez and Steans, 
2005; Vaughan-Williams, 2005; Shani, 2008). A consistent critique of the 
praxeological dimension of Linklater's work regarding the relationship between 
theory and practice has been that he plays insufficient attention to the relationship 
between knowledge and action; that the normative and sociological insights he 
develops do not translate into political practice. In this sense, the criticism is that 
Linklater pays insufficient attention to scholars such as Booth whose work is infused 
with a number of empirical observations and analysis. 
Jean Bethke Elshtain, arguing in this vein, asserts that Linklater ignores the 
Hobbesian world of pain, suffering and violence, and hence the question of 
implementation is left open (Elshtain, 1999. ) Linklater is too abstract, she argues, 
asserting that 'the language of "universality and difference" becomes, after a time, 
something of a slogan rather than a tough-minded imperative based on an equally 
tough-minded analysis', adding that Linklater's abstractions leave an open canvass 
which beg the question of `what would non-hierarchical conceptions of race, gender, 
and ethnicity look like? ' (Elshtain, 1999, p. 143). 
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This underpins what for Elshtain is the biggest problem, which is that `it is 
nearly impossible to discern what this international dialogue is going to be about' 
(Elshtain, 1999, p. 143. ) She also argues that `there are millions of people in the 
world, unnoticed by Linklater, who have already widened "the moral boundaries of 
political community" in light of the universalistic communities in and through which 
they were formed', people who already have `dual citizenship', and it is this 
recognition which informs her assertion that `any compelling account of the whys 
and wherefores of a universalistic ethic must take account of such existing ethics and 
whether they do or do not do at least part of the heavy lifting Linklater calls for' 
(Elshtain, 1999. p. 144. ) 
This raises a key point which will be addressed in further detail below, which 
is that Linklater ignores a vast amount of already existing praxeological potential in 
the form of the citizens Elshtain points toward. It is a point which raises key issues 
relating to the type of praxeological approach Linklater advocates and to the nature 
of engagement that critical theory has with actually existing political situations. To 
remain with Elshtain a little more, however, she argues that many people in the 
world are barely surviving, and to them new conceptions of citizenship matter less 
than simple matters of life or death. In this way it is possible to argue that Linklater 
is neglecting both suffering and emancipatory potential. Ile is certainly, in 
Elshtain's opinion, ignoring the nature of institution-building that would have to take 
place in order to embody a global discourse ethic. The climax of Elshtain's brief yet 
penetrating critique is particularly useful for this discussion and should be quoted at 
length: 
`He just doesn't take account of the rough realities of our fragile globe at 
century's end. His book is remarkably sanitised from conflict and torment 
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and fratricidal or suicidal struggle. I would urge him to consider what his 
hope for a universal dialogical community looks like if you put that in. I do 
not believe it would require that he give up on his basic commitments; 
indeed, I for one, would not want him to do that because the basic 
recognitions imbedded in his argument are keen and vital. The problem is 
that his overall unpacking of those themes wind up being terribly abstract, 
too thin by far to do the necessary conceptual, historical, and concrete 
political work he embraces. Concrete attention to how concrete communities 
have tried to work out particular and universalistic commitments would help' 
(Elshtain, 1999, p. 145. ) 
This passage will be returned to below, but before this it could be interesting to note 
Linklater's reaction: 
`Examples of how the ideas of citizenship and sovereignty, national identity 
and political community are being rethought in Europe and elsewhere are all 
too numerous, and they are noted in the last sections of my book. This may 
not be the detailed empirical analysis of actual structures and institutions 
which Elshtain seeks but it is one way of forging the connections between the 
more abstract discussion of universality and difference in social theory and 
changing conceptions of citizenship in actual states and in international law' 
(Linklater, 1999, p. 172. ) 
Most curiously, Linklater then argues that, 
`I appreciate the merits of an approach which starts with, or offers a more 
detailed analysis of, political structures and institutions. However, Elshtain's 
empirical observations about the universal and the particular lead me to doubt 
whether this alternative starting-point or emphasis would yield radically 
different normative results' (Linklater, 1999, p. 172. ) 
This is an intriguing response for three reasons. Firstly, Linklater seems to miss the 
point of Elshtain's criticism, which was to say that if his normative aspirations are to 
become reality then he should pay more attention to political practice. Secondly, and 
following on from this, scholars working in critical IR theory have long called for 
empirical studies not because they might produce different normative results, but 
because they might lead to practical political changes. Thirdly, such a response 
seems to deviate from the principle that participants in a dialogue will not know what 
the outcome of an engagement will be. 
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The issue of how a philosophical defence of the dialogic community can or 
should relate to the `real world' was later taken up by Ute Bühler. Taking the 
comments made by Jean Bethke Elshtain as a starting point he argues that the issue 
is not only how to listen to `voices from below' but how to respond to them (Bühler, 
2002. ) He argues that Elshtain's comments that discourse ethics grows too abstract 
is a view held by many, but as he sees it is a problem built into the structure of 
discourse itself. In order to avoid the potential of replacing one totalising project 
with another, proponents of discourse ethics must not pre judge the outcome of 
dialogue, and norms must be searched for by participants of that dialogue rather than 
philosophers, he argues. 
This emphasis on procedure over substance is supposed to emphasise the 
respect for the voices of participants in engaged in real processes of moral 
augmentation. As Linklater argues, discourse ethics does not offer political 
blueprints, nor is it interested in strategy or tactics as much as uncovering the moral 
resources within existing social arrangements; it is primarily concerned with setting 
out the procedures to be followed enabling individuals to freely express competing 
moral claims, and to allow participants the possibility of resolving their moral 
differences through compromise or consensus. There is no attempt to pre-judge the 
outcome of such discursive practices, nor to refer to the supposed `higher authority' 
of intellectual reasoning, rather, the decisions about substantive moral issues are left 
to agents themselves (Linklater, 1998, p. 92. ) 
Even so, there remains a problem when it comes to political practice, as 
discourse ethics offers no substantive guidance. BUhler draws on another theorist of 
democracy to argue that there must be a shift to `the everyday world of ordinary 
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people' if scholars are interested in what the idea of a dialogic community will 
actually mean in practice (Blaug, 1998, p. 134 [cited in Bühler, 2002, p. 193. ) This 
entails reflecting on what it would mean to include 'voices from below' in 
Linklater's project, not just in the form of listening to those voices or representing 
them in an academic context, but actively listening and talking. 
This is where the real challenge lies, as talking to people who have been 
excluded from the communication communities of academia is difficult. Voices 
from below ask whether the idea of discourse ethics is more than an idea. Because 
dialogic politics involves the participants themselves reaching solutions, moving 
beyond abstract declarations will involve a dialogue between scholars sympathetic to 
the dialogic ideal and `voices from below'. This is essential for addressing the 
problem of how the normative vision might be transformed into practice, and if this 
cannot be achieved then such visions risk becoming irrelevant (Bühler, 2002, p. 196- 
7. ) 
The critique might be summarised in the following way: `high modern IR 
does not do fieldwork. It is possible to do IR from a library armchair. Not all the 
world's emancipations arise, however, from texts' (Chan, 1999, p. 367-8. ) A similar 
sentiment has been echoed elsewhere in relation to Linklater's theorising. Brassett 
and Higgott, for example, have argued that although such theories are `laudable' they 
`may be more exemplary of the limitations of normative theorising for the global 
polity than the possibilities that it could be built... (f)oundationalist arguments may 
simply waste too much intellectual energy attempting to define `what is' in order to 
legitimise their arguments for `what should be' (Brassett and Higgott, 2003, p. 31. ) 
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These criticisms are particularly valid for the task of this chapter, but it might 
be said in Linklater's defence that it would be impossible for him to match his 
theoretical work with empirical studies of the same depth and quality; he has, after 
all, only one academic life. Nevertheless their criticisms must be taken seriously, 
and it is the task of other scholars to attempt to bring in the `voices from below' into 
academic discourses about the nature of dialogic communities. 
The comments made by the scholars mentioned above inadvertently open a 
path between Booth and Linklater. One of the criticisms of Booth's work 
highlighted in chapter 1 was that Perlenfischerei method resulted in a lack of 
theoretical cohesiveness. Linklater's approach is much more methodical and 
systematic than Booth's, yet as the criticisms above suggest the nature of the 
empirical engagement presented in Linklater's work leads to a sense of detachment 
in the analysis. The emphasis on history rather than contemporary praxis in 
Linklater's work has led some to characterise his contribution as historical sociology 
(Hobson and Lawson, 2008, pp. 432-3). Indeed, Linklater's later focus on `civilising 
processes' and 'process sociology' over long stretches of time make it reasonable to 
assume that thoughts regarding the historical sociological dimension of his project 
occupy his mind more than the praxeological dimension (see Linklater, 2005b). It 
has been noted by observers that the praxeological dimension of Linklater's theory is 
underdeveloped, and that for an approach `that is ultimately concerned with 
changing the world and not just understanding it, more clearly needs to be done' 
(Shapcott, 2010, p. 334). 
The same cannot be said of Booth, however, whose work has always been 
primarily led by empirical observations in the present. In this way, Linklater can add 
a theoretical robustness to Booth's work, and Booth can provide a praxeological 
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focus on the contemporary impact of insecurity upon `real people in real places' to 
Linklater's work. This dichotomy animates much of the analysis to follow, and 
ultimately finds expression in the notion of a micro-dialogic community which is 
discussed in chapter 8. 
The discourse ethic as research strategy 
It is at this point that a bridge between this discussion of theory and the following 
chapters which offer empirical analysis needs to be built. The discussions above do 
not necessarily lead on to a study of the Croatian city of Vukovar. There is a missing 
link between well known arguments made by scholars like Booth and Linklater 
within the discipline of IR and the subdiscipline of security studies and the chapters 
that follow. This may well be the case for many studies which seek to discuss theory 
and empirical analysis together, although it is often not said as openly as it could be. 
That link is, of course, the individual researcher. It is necessary to offer a brief 
explanation of how that link was made. What follows is in essence a Boothian 
inspired attempt to see the personal and the political as one, an approach to academic 
study which has been central to the security as emancipation move (Booth, 1991a; 
1997; 2007). 
If there is going to be some form of engagement with `real people in real 
places' as Booth and other Welsh School proponents suggest, it does not necessarily 
follow that the academic relinquishes his or her position of power. There are still 
choices to be made about which people to engage with, how, and for what purpose. 
The researcher has to make choices about the nature of the engagement. Such 
choices are in part informed by practicality - who can I get access to? They are also 
informed by interest - what do I want to study? There is an ethical dimension here. 
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Although practical constraints and individual interests may shape the boundaries of 
these ethical concerns, the researcher has to decide at some point what the nature of 
the engagement will be. 
With regards to the thesis, this underscores the importance of having a 
comprehensive understanding of emancipation, as the previous sections in the 
chapter made clear. It is necessary to have such an understanding in order to be able 
to make the ethical choices about how to engage with those outside academia. 
Discourse ethics, especially the notion of the dialogic community, provides an 
ethical framework for making such choices. 
However, the ethical framework which helps decide the nature of the 
engagement is also shaped by practicality and interests. This is where the link 
between the empirical analysis and the theory becomes clearer. To take the first 
issue, practicality, any researcher is limited by time, money and various personal 
circumstances. The production of this thesis owes a great deal to the fact that 
fieldwork had to be undertaken in separate trips each lasting around a month and 
organised around the university term times. Clearly this imposed limitations upon 
the nature of the engagement. 
In conjunction with these practical restrictions are individual interests. The 
research presented here owes a great deal to the work of the author's father, a 
Methodist Minister based in the UK, who has since 1995 been involved with NGOs 
in eastern Croatia working in the field of peacebuilding. As the author developed an 
interest in critical approaches to security studies in general and the security as 
emancipation move in particular, the network which was brought to him through his 
father presented an accessible and intriguing line for research. 
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In this way the individual researcher became the link between a number of 
theoretical discussions which pointed to the role of discourse ethics and civil society 
on the one hand, and an avenue for empirical research which had not been explored 
from such a perspective on the other. Ethical reasoning in Booth and Linklater, 
personal interest and political practice in Croatia were brought together. It is the 
relationship between these three pillars which shape the thesis. 
One further point should be made here. Earlier in the chapter Booth's 
remarks about the relationship between means and ends were highlighted, in which 
he says that `some end might be very distant, but the means that are its equivalent are 
not; they can be employed at once' (Booth, 2007, p. 256). The Gandhian mantra, `be 
the change you wish to see in the world', is also used by Booth as a way of 
informing the relationship between means and ends (Booth, 2007, p. 455). If 
discourse ethics is to inform the normative dimension of the approach being pursued 
in this thesis - which is to say that the dialogic community is a desirable endpoint - 
then it should also inform the way in which the thesis proceeds. Indeed, the research 
strategy pursued in this thesis is informed by dialogic principles, in the sense that not 
only is the dialogic community held up as part of a theory of emancipation, it also 
provides a way of thinking about the appropriate way to conduct empirical research 
in the context of the security as emancipation move. 
If, as is the case in a dialogic community, no participant can presuppose the 
outcome of dialogue, then it could also be said that in trying to understand the 
predicament of the insecure other, which is the essence of understanding security as 
emancipation through lived experiences, the researcher should not presuppose or 
predict the outcome of such an engagement. Furthermore, the emphasis on 
empathetic engagement within discourse ethics, coupled with the Boothian aspiration 
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to live out one's desirable endpoint, suggests that a genuine attempt to empathise 
with the subjects of research should also characterise empirical study. This thesis 
therefore attempts to adopt the discourse ethic as a research strategy in the course of 
the empirical analysis to be conducted in parts 2 and 3, a point which will be 
returned to throughout the remainder of the thesis. With this important point noted, 
more can be said about the methods adopted for this study and which are informed 
by discourse ethics. 
Methods 
The aim of this discussion is to inform the reader of how the research was conducted 
in Vukovar. The main method used was a series of semi-structured interviews, but 
observations of the physical cityscape of Vukovar and analysis of written testimonies 
also play a key part in the empirical analysis to follow. Each will be dealt with in 
turn. These methods were supplemented with a number of secondary sources read in 
the UK, as well as primary sources describing the war, translated from Croatian, read 
in the public library in Vukovar. 
This thesis seeks to make a contribution to security studies primarily through 
the analysis of empirical material gathered during three fieldwork trips to the 
Croatian city of Vukovar, to make the case for an approach to the security as 
emancipation move which embraces security and insecurity as lived experience. The 
fieldwork trips took place in July 2008, April 2009 and September 2009, each trip 
lasting for three weeks. The trips to Vukovar were staggered in this way to allow the 
fieldwork to take place during university vacations, enabling the author to continue 
other important commitments during the university year. The fieldwork therefore 
lasted a total of nine weeks. 
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Although this may seem a short time compared to other empirical studies, 
which might last months or years, two points should be raised. The first is that the 
pressure of completing the thesis in three years (to coincide with funding restrictions 
as much as formal university registration periods) meant that fieldwork trips had to 
be restricted in order to limit the amount of material being analysed. The second is 
that even the relatively short period of time spent in Vukovar produced substantial 
findings in the form of interviews and observations which required careful analysis. 
Each of the trips were saturated with data gathering excursions as the small size of 
the city reduced travel time between appointments and site visits, which coupled 
with the success of the `snowball' approach (to be discussed below) provided an 
intense and invigorating research environment. Given these factors the nine weeks 
of fieldwork provided ample material for the aim of the thesis. 
The interview process followed an approach which can accurately be called 
`snowballing'. For the initial research trip in July 2008, the author travelled to 
Vukovar with one contact, a local NGO worker who has been based in Vukovar for 
over ten years. The author was allowed to use office space provided by the contact, 
who then arranged interviews with his network of NGO workers and other local 
people. The author was then able to use this network to collect material from 
interviews. It should be noted that the kindness of strangers often plays a crucial role 
in any successful fieldwork trip. The interviews were semi-structured, and recorded 
on the record with the permission of all the participants. In roughly half the 
interviews a translator was used to overcome the language barrier. 
The total number of formal interviewees is 37. Out of this number, 18 are 
individuals who work or have worked for small NGOs involved in peacebuilding 
efforts in Vukovar. The other interviewees include religious leaders, members of 
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other NGOs either not directly involved in peacebuilding or involved in 
peacebuilding but not in Vukovar, local and national politicians, the local tourist 
office, a journalist, a librarian, a prominent hospital director, students, youths and 
parents. Several of the interviewees were interviewed more than once according to 
their availability. A total of 51 separate interviews were recorded. 
The purpose of the analysis to follow is not to present anything that should be 
seen as `scientific', `explanatory' or `objective'. On the contrary, interpretation and 
subjectivity are embraced in this thesis. This is not to place interpretative methods 
on a pedestal above explanatory methods; there is a place for a broad range of 
methodological approaches in political analysis. However, for the purposes of 
understanding emancipation through lived experiences an interpretative approach 
allows a greater degree of flexibility in the analysis. 
This interpretative approach extends to non-verbal sources. During the 
fieldwork trip a diary was filled with observations and thoughts. Many photographs 
were also taken, the author's own unless otherwise stated, and will be particularly 
useful in chapter 4. It is important to understand the context in which emancipatory 
practices take place in order to make the point that although there may be a universal 
quality to the idea of emancipation, in the sense that each individual has a right to 
engage in a dialogue about anything which may affect their lives, the exact nature of 
the emancipatory act will always be unique to the specific context. The approach 
used in this thesis demonstrates this. 
One useful outcome of conducting the fieldwork in three stages was that on 
each return visit to Vukovar the peculiarity of the reconstruction process when 
compared to the multiethnic composition of the city became clearer. Living in 
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Vukovar even for a short time, and returning to the city on subsequent occasions, left 
the author with the impression that the multiethnic composition of the city is not 
reflected in dominant modes of memorialisation, a sentiment which informs chapter 
4. 
This conclusion was reached as a result of time spent walking through the 
city to interview research subjects, sitting on public benches writing up fieldwork 
notes, eating lunch and drinking coffee in cafes and restaurants - simply by being a 
foreigner trying to work, make friends and get by in a small city. The point here is 
that it is possible to see the research process either as a long chain of planned 
activities, or in a more intangible sense which would incorporate the unplanned 
thought processes and observations which surround the planned activities. 
Interview coding 
The interviews are used throughout the empirical chapters and referenced 
accordingly. This is done in the following manner. Each of the forty-nine 
transcripts were numbered by the author. When an interview is referred to in the text 
the letter `I' is used to indicate that an interview is being used as the source, followed 
by the number of the interview and the year in took place. For example, the first 
transcript would be referenced as '(Ii, 2008)', the second as `(I2,2008)' and so on. 
A numbered list of interviews is available as an appendix. Off the record comments 
will refer to anonymous sources and will be referenced as `(Off record, 2009a)', with 
the letter referencing undisclosed coding to ensure the comments can be accurately 
traced by the author. 
Towards a genuine openness 
It was discussed in the first chapter how the Welsh School orientates the security as 
emancipation move towards three forms of closure: from process to crisis, from 
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compatibility to difference, and towards a tacit acceptance of the absence of voice. 
The approach outlined in this chapter, by contextualising the security as 
emancipation move within discourse ethics, orientates such concerns in a different 
direction. 
Linklater's historical sociological analysis, which sees emancipatory 
developments as outcomes of long processes of struggle against unjust forms of 
exclusion, explicitly locates emancipation in the politics of long process rather than 
in the context of an impending crisis, as is the case in Booth's later work. The 
politics of process favours a style of analysis which is unhurried and more alert to 
the everyday struggle for security than the politics of crisis. The seeds for coping 
with future insecurity may well be in the present already, and it is grasping that 
notion that the politics of process is concerned with. Discourse ethics is also 
radically inclusive of all perspectives, even if dialogue results in profound 
disagreement between participants. The point is that no perspective should be 
prevented from entering into a dialogic arrangement, even though that could well be 
the outcome of such an encounter. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued for contextualising the security as emancipation move 
explicitly within the discourse ethics espoused by Andrew Linklater. It has 
continued to assert the idea that security as emancipation should be understood 
through lived experiences of security and insecurity, and that the attempt to 
understand the predicament of the insecure other, how humans experiencing 
different forms of insecurity struggle in their specific contexts and attempt to live 
lives of greater security, is the defining characteristic of such an approach. 
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The work of Andrew Linklater has been used to develop a framework of 
understanding which sees the dialogic community as normative ideal. Movements 
towards that ideal, which can take the form of a struggle by agents working within 
global civil society against the totalising project -a marriage of citizenship, 
territoriality, nationality and sovereignty - are an important part of emancipatory 
processes. Booth's remarks regarding the relationship between means and ends 
compels scholars sympathetic to these arguments to pursue research strategies which 
also adopt the discourse ethic, and which seek to understand the situation of human 
beings living lives of insecurity and struggling for greater security. The dialogic 
ideal suggests that to attempt to empathise with other humans in such situations may 
result in unforeseen outcomes, ensuring that such an engagement is truly open- 
ended. 
Contextualising the security as emancipation move within discourse ethics 
not only provides a deeper framework of meaning with which to approach the study 
of world politics. When seen in light of Booth's emphasis on living out one's 
values, the discourse ethic also informs scholarship itself, and implies that research 
should be driven by dialogic principles and the accompanying sentiments of 
sensitivity and empathy. With these comments in mind, the thesis now turns to the 
second part which introduces the the empirical contribution. The analysis to follow 
can be seen as a critical reconstruction of the ideas raised by Booth and Linklater in 
an empirical context. 
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Chapter 3 
Disjuncture and Settlement: War and Peace in Vukovar 
Introduction 
This chapter begins the empirical analysis of the thesis by turning the discussion to 
Vukovar. In doing so it seeks to understand a specific instance of insecurity, 
experienced locally and conveyed through eyewitness testimony as much as 
secondary analysis. Attempting to understand security as emancipation through 
lived experiences necessitates a description of specific cases of insecurity as a 
starting point for trying to understand how individuals in their local contexts struggle 
for more secure ways of living. 
It is important to have an understanding of what happened in Vukovar 
because much of what follows in subsequent chapters refers to local manifestation of 
the impact of the war in the former-Yugoslavia. Without an understanding of how 
the war impacted upon individuals in their local contexts the war remains abstract. It 
may well be impossible to truly empathise with those who were in Vukovar during 
the siege, yet it is possible to present images using primary and secondary material 
through which their experience can be imagined. 
It has also been noted that attempting to reconstruct the events that occurred 
in places like Vukovar, Srebrenica and Sarajevo is an essential part of the process of 
post-war justice (Halpern and Kideckel, 2000, p. 8). As institutions such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and a number of local 
courtrooms have found, however, reconstructing the events of 1991 is a difficult 
process, given the role played by the memory and interpretation of traumatic events. 
Such limitations must be recognised and worked with; indeed, they are an important 
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part of any attempt to understand security and emancipation through lived 
experiences. It was noted in the first chapter that Booth argues for a leap of the 
`empathetic imagination' in order to create a new reality of global citizens (Booth, 
2007, p. 460). Any attempt to understand insecurity as lived experience, such as this 
chapter, also requires such a leap. 
This chapter is important in setting out the context for further chapters, and it 
will seek to present a narrative of violent disjuncture with the past, followed by the 
imposition of a peace settlement. It proceeds in three parts. The first section will 
outline Vukovar before the outbreak of war in 1991. The second will use primary 
and secondary material to paint a picture of what happened in Vukovar from late 
1991. The third will describe the period from late 1991 onwards and outlines the 
nature of the peace settlement which was agreed in late 1995 and which permitted a 
form of finality. Subsequent chapters will problematise the nature of this settlement 
in a Boothian move to switch the subject of security from the state to the individual. 
The focus here, then, is partly on constructing a narrative of events which 
will help to inform subsequent chapters, but it is also the beginning of the 
engagement with the insecure other - the equivalent of Booth's reading about 
political prisoners through his involvement with Amnesty International. Attempting 
to understand how the experience of insecurity played out in Vukovar is therefore 
the explicit focus of the chapter. A large number of firsthand accounts and 
secondary analyses of Vukovar have been published in Croatian; one sourcebook 
produced by Vukovar library lists over seven hundred such items (Gradska knjiinica 
Vukovar, 2006). This chapter makes use of available sources published in English. 
This includes a large collection of primary documents translated from Croatian and 
not widely available outside the country, entitled Hrvatsko Ratno Pismo 1991/92, or 
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Croatian War Writing 1991/92, which the author was able to access at the public 
library in Vukovar (Oraia-Tolid, 1992). 
Peace and Prosperity: Vukovar pre-1991 
Vukovar is a city with a long history located on the Danube River in eastern Croatia, 
in an area known as eastern Slavonia, and bordering Serbia. One of the most 
important archaeological sites in Europe, VUedol, is located a few kilometres away 
and dates back to 6000 BC. The settlement was culturally active and produced 
ceramic objects, as visitors can see for themselves in the city museum. One of these, 
a ceramic dove from 3000 BC, which was found in 1938, now appears as an image 
on banknotes and advertising boards, and cheap wooden replicas can be brought 
from souvenir shops in Vukovar and throughout eastern Slavonia. Other discoveries 
include the VUedol Orion, said to be Europe's oldest calendar, as well as other 
ceramic artefacts. 
Since those ancient times a number of ethnic groups have passed through or 
settled in Vukovar and the surrounding area. The River Danube and an abundance 
of farmland have made the region an attractive place to settle, with Romans and, in 
the 7th century, Slavic peoples migrating there. By the 12th century Hungary had 
grown into a significant power in the region and for the next eight centuries Croatia 
was ruled as part of the kingdom of Hungary (Habsburgs from 1527). In the 
northern part of the country, including Vukovar, the Hungarian architecture and 
administrative systems were adopted and the term `Slavonia' - land of Slavs - used 
more frequently. This did not stop Vukovar becoming a Muslim market city 
following the 16th century Ottoman invasion. The Ottomans were eventually driven 
out and many travelled south to Bosnia where they would settle. 
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Image A: Postcard of Vukovar, with River Danube in the foreground, early 20th century. 
In the 18`h century, Habsburg Empress Maria Theresa settled other ethnic groups in 
Vukovar and the surrounding region. Germans formed a substantial minority among 
the Slavs. There were also Slovakians, Ruthenians, Jews, Hungarians and 
Albanians. 
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Image B: Postcard of Vukovar, the Grand Hotel. early 20"' century. 
These developments made Vukovar and the region of eastern Slavonia one of the 
most ethnically diverse places in Europe by the twentieth century. Even the Second 
World War, which saw horrifically violent clashes between the Nazi backed 
`Ustashe' regime of Ante Pavelic and Josip Broz Tito's Partisans, did not impact 
greatly upon this diversity. Indeed, Vukovar had been one of the more peaceful 
regions during the Second World War (Glenny, 1993, p. 80). Small wonder that the 
idea of Yugoslavia, meaning `Land of the South Slavs', was well received in 
Vukovar. 
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Image C: Postcard of Vukovar, Eltz Manor, early 20`ß' century. 
Image D: Shopping in Vukovar, c. 1980. Courtesy of Charles Tauber. 
By 1991 Vukovar was a truly multi-cultural city. The population stretched to 
50,000, not including the nearby villages, with 43% Croat, 37% Serb and 20% 
'others' including Hungarians, Ruthenians and Slovakians among others (MagaA, 
1993, p. 356). People were aware of these differences because of different churches 
supporting Catholic and Orthodox communities, linguistic variations and certain 
areas of the city sometimes housing particular ethnicities. Ethnic differences were 
not morally important at that time, indeed, for many such differences did not matter 
at all. More Serb and Montenegrin immigrants had moved to the villages between 
Osijek and Vukovar, and also to the suburbs of Vukovar, after the Second World 
War (Bennett, 1995, p. 62). Vukovar subsequently had one of the highest 
percentages of mixed marriages in the whole of Yugoslavia, with 34% of all 
marriages being between partners of different ethnic backgrounds compared with 
28% in cosmopolitan Sarajevo (Allcock, 2000, p. 376). No ethnic conflicts had ever 
been recorded in Vukovar (Stevanovic, 2004, p. 70). Communists, not nationalists, 
had been elected in the 1990 local elections in Vukovar, a city which 'had never 
been a centre of Croat nationalism' (Tanner, 1997, p. 244). 
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Image E: Central Vukovar, view towards the Workers' Club from park. Courtesy of ('hartes Tauber. 
This may have been because Vukovar was an economically prosperous city. The 
economy in Vukovar was based on trade, viticulture, farming and livestock 
breeding. Tourism also played a part, as surviving postcards portraying an attractive 
city on the Danube addressed to bourgeois households in Vienna suggest. During 
the Yugoslavian period, however, the heartbeat of the city had been provided by the 
shoe factory in the suburb of Borovo which had employed much of the city and 
produced footwear for the rest of the country. 
Violent Disjuncture: Vukovar 1991 
It might be said therefore that Vukovar, for the reasons outlined above, was by the 
end of the twentieth century a city characterised by various forms of security for the 
citizens who lived there. It is at this point in the thesis that the notion of the 
international in the local, introduced at the beginning of the thesis, begins to find 
purchase. By the middle of 1991 the future of Yugoslavia as a whole was looking 
uncertain. A decade had passed since the death of Broz Josip Tito, a Second Word 
War hero and the leader of post-war Yugoslavia. Nationalist rhetoric from Serbia, 
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one of six constituent republics in the federation along with Croatia, Bosnia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia and Slovenia, had stirred up tensions throughout the country 
during the 1980s. There is a substantial literature on the fragmentation of 
Yugoslavia into its constitutive parts and considerable debate surrounding the causes 
and consequences of the wars which accompanied that process (for example Bennett, 
1995; Campbell, 1998; Cohen, 1995; Denitch, 1994; Glenny, 1992,1999; Ramet, 
1999; Schopflin, 1993; Stitkovac, 2000; Woodwood, 1995). 
This thesis is not concerned with contributing to the literature on what caused 
the conflict in the first instance; it is more concerned with the consequences of the 
violence upon social and political relationships in Vukovar - the international in the 
local. 1991 represents a severe break with the past life of the city described in the 
first section. The multicultural and prosperous city was transformed by a wider 
regional conflict into a shell of its former self, and with its destruction came new 
symbolic meanings. 
Although Vukovar lay on the border with Serbia the situation there remained 
relatively quiet until the May that year. As a result of local ethnic tensions the Police 
Chief was murdered, which acted as a catalyst for further violence. Two policemen 
were kidnapped in Borovo Selo on May 1. On May 2a busload of their colleagues, 
many young and inexperienced, were sent to rescue them. Serbs ambushed the bus 
and fifteen policemen were killed. Rumours that the bodies had been mutilated 
spread throughout Croatia; the Croatian representative on the federal presidency said 
they had been decapitated. The Borovo Selo massacre also gave the Yugoslavian 
army a reason to move closer to Vukovar in order to `keep the peace', virtually 
cutting off the city from the rest of Croatia (Tanner, 1997, pp. 244-7). The 
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multiethnic composition of the city, however, made it more difficult for Serbia to stir 
up ethnic tension. Furthermore, the balance of casualties caused by the Borovo Selo 
massacre made the Belgrade narrative of protecting vulnerable Serbs difficult, 
although this did not stop Serbia making that argument (Almond, 1994, p. 217). 
Serbian propaganda claimed that there was once a Serbian majority in 
Vukovar and that Serbia had a historical right to the city. Croatian propaganda 
claimed the opposite. Belgrade replied by arguing that the borders between Croatia 
and Serbia were `unnatural' and had been imposed by Tito to the detriment of Serbs 
(Stevanovic, 2004, p. 69-70). 
July and August 1991 have been characterised by one scholar as `a form of 
low-casualty shadow boxing' in eastern Slavonia (Almond, 1994, p. 217). During 
that time Serbia asserted itself by forcing out Croatian policemen in key areas, as 
well as taking control of important supply points along the Danube, although Serb 
politicians remained wary of European responses to their implied aggression 
(Almond, 1994, p. 220). The Mayor of Vukovar, Slavko Dokmanovic, was a Serb 
and fearing for his life had left the city before the situation worsened. Indeed, by late 
August only 15,000 of the 50,000 who had lived in the city remained. Those who 
stayed in Vukovar retained the ethnic mix that had always characterised the city 
(Silber and Little, 1996, p. 176). 
On August 20 the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) base in Vukovar was 
blockaded by Croatian territorial defence units, reinforced by Croatian 
paramilitaries. In retaliation the JNA began to build up its forces around the city. 
Some commentators in Croatia called for a UN intervention to prevent Serbian 
aggression at this time, but to no avail (Denitch, 1997, p. 233). On September 24, 
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390 trucks carrying JNA reservists, 400 tanks and 280 other vehicles moved in on 
Vukovar. 6 days later, on September 30, Operation Vukovar began by air and land 
(Sikavica, 2000, p. 144). 
The city faced a heavy onslaught from the JNA/paramilitary forces and 
Croatian forces were outnumbered by between thirty and fifty to one (Sikavica, 
2000, p. 144). The main method of attack, the siege by means of artillery, would 
become one of the key characteristic features of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, as 
Sarajevo would later witness (Allcock, 2000, p. 408). The Serbs avoided close 
combat and relied instead upon a slow battering of the city with canon and mortar 
(Almond, 1994, p. 226). In September journalists were still able to get in and out of 
Vukovar. By the end of October hardly a building had been left intact. Croat forces 
were only able to get supplies into the city across the cornfields by night (Glenny, 
1993, p. 160). One eyewitness recorded the following on October 18: 
'An artillery attack on the city centre is taking place at this very moment. I 
dare not imagine the situation on the outskirts of the city. The war being 
waged here is meant to continue until extermination. Genocide. The fire is so 
intense that sometimes the dead he in the streets for days. The infrastructure 
of the city has been completely devastated. 
'NOTHING HAS BEEN IMAGINED OR ADDED IN THE REPORTS WE 
ARE SENDING. MOREOVER, THERE ARE NO WORDS THAT CAN 
ADEQUATELY DESCRIBE THE SITUATION AND THE PLIGHT OF 
THE PEOPLE IN THIS CITY' (Oraib-Tolio, 1992, p. 366). 
The experience of witnessing the bombardment of Vukovar as it unfolded was 
clearly too shocking to be described in full by this contemporary. It is important to 
reflect on this matter briefly because it suggests that the emphasis placed on voice by 
scholars such as Linklater and upheld by this thesis has limits. The opening chapter 
made the point that the Welsh School has suffered from an absence of voice and that 
this should be rectified. The second chapter argued that one way of achieving this 
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would be to adopt an approach to the security as emancipation move which embraces 
the discourse ethic much more vigorously. 
Yet in the passage above, which details the experience of insecurity as 
recorded by a witness, the crisis of war seen through the eyes of one individual 
causes a crisis of expression also. When words fail, the role of dialogue has to be 
challenged, because in such instances it is silence rather than expression which 
assumes greater political significance. The opening chapter also discussed Booth's 
claim that the world had to orientate political action towards a set of oncoming 
crises, and that dialogue would be central to this. 
The extract above presents an alternative understanding of the relationship 
between crisis and dialogue. Booth sees dialogue as a response to future crises. Yet 
crisis can silence dialogue. The danger for Booth's model then is that if many forms 
of crisis exist in world politics their cumulative impact may well be to hinder 
attempts which seek to entrench dialogue as a norm. The point here, which is 
enforced by this account of insecurity as lived experience, is to understand that 
expression and therefore discourse ethics has limits, which makes the application of 
the discourse ethic to questions about security inherently problematic. This is a 
challenge that scholars sympathetic to the security as emancipation move must 
consider, rather than a permanent stumbling block. 
The silence of some contemporaries was one reaction to the violence; 
resistance was another. The land war in Vukovar proved unexpectedly difficult for 
the JNA and Serbian paramilitary forces, who had not anticipated the rise of a force 
of at least 1000 fighters led by We Dedakovid (Tanner, 1997, p. 256). One estimate 
puts the figure at 5000 fighters (Almond, 1994, p. 225). The Croatian National 
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Guard and the civilian defence force - who became known as the `Defenders of 
Vukovar' - were joined by Croatian paramilitary groups such as Hos, short for 
Hrvatske Obrambene Snage or the Croatian Defence Force (Tanner, 1997, p. 265). 
Hos sided with the Croatian forces in Vukovar and used the media to broadcast 
complaints against the Croat government that Vukovar was being starved of 
weapons (Tanner, 1997, p. 266). Ethnic Croats also came from Bosnia to fight in 
Vukovar (Bennett, 1995, p. 185). A crisis headquarters was set up in the hospital 
basement, where most of the sick and wounded were being treated (Silber and Little, 
1996, p. 173). The civilian population of the city were not evacuated (Sikavica, 
2000, p. 144). As the battle intensified those who had not already fled were forced 
underground to their cellars and shelters. One Croatian fighter provides a picture of 
what life was like in Vukovar for the `Defenders': 
'I wanted to go on describing what it is like here, but I have given up because 
there are no words to describe the despair, the sorrow and the madness going 
on around me... We have all died as people. When I say people I mean the 
layer of habits and civilisation which we all put on during our lives over the 
nakedness we were born with. All this has died in this city. We kill and are 
killed. The roots of our existence are being cut away... I hate you because you 
have bathrooms and your children go to school and you watch television and 
the only thing we still need is for you to let us die in peace without pomp and 
circumstance'. (Oraib-Toli6,1992 p. 377. ) 
The letter was written by an unknown Croatian soldier, sent at 8.56 pm on the 
October 23 1991. The author was killed the following morning. It is useful here to 
recall Elshtain's critique of Linklater, referred to in the previous chapter, which 
stated that Linklater did not engage with the I-Iobbesian world of suffering. In this 
extract that world confronts the reader directly. Once again there is a failure of 
expression to describe the setting of war. It is important to note this because the 
experience of great suffering in Vukovar conditioned the emancipatory practices to 
be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
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Other contemporaries at this time were able to hold out for help. The 
following appeal was entitled 'Give Vukovar a Chance! Two Thousand Children 
Living Underground', and was sent anonymously by email in late October 1991: 
What would be the reaction of Europe, if somewhere in the West someone 
rounded up two thousand children (from newborn babies to high school 
youngsters) and shut them up underground, threatened by death the instant 
they came for a breath of fresh air, getting just one warm (and very frugal) 
meal a day - not knowing how long this condition would continue? Is there 
anyone is Berlin, Vienna, London, Paris, Washington who can picture this? ' 
'Some of you are thousands of kilometres away, but shouldn't your hearts be 
closer? We want negotiators to come now. We cannot imagine anyone who, 
seeing the war faces of our children, could find one single justification for 
this war! Vukovar is not just an agglomeration of buildings, it is a living, 
breathing organism. Vukovar has a bloodstream, it has a life which is 
threatened. This message is addressed to all those who respect life. To all 
those to whom the joyous laughter of a child means something. To all those 
who care. 
STOP THE WAR IN CROATIA! GIVE VUKOVAR A CHANCE! ' (Oraic5- 
ToliE, 1992, pp. 392-3). 
In this way the international played out in the locality of Vukovar. The outside 
world impacted upon the city in this way, but in keeping with the assertion raised in 
the introduction to this thesis that the local and the international constitute one 
another, the local impacted upon the international also. As the battle grew Vukovar 
became hugely symbolic for Croats and Serbs (Tanner, 1997, p. 256). To Croatia, 
Vukovar became their `Stalingrad', as described by the Croatian representative on 
the federal presidency (Silber and Little, 1996, p. 176). Military historians would 
later declare this to be an accurate depiction (Sadkovich, 2006, p. 191). 
The following sources provide some indication of how contemporaries 
reacted. Tanja Tarbarina, a Zagreb based columnist, wrote the following on 31 
October 1991: 
'I wonder who you are sleeping with. I am sleeping with Vukovar. It wakes 
me up. Everybody there is a God to me and I believe in him. And each 
precious house is a church to me. Each kitchen table an altar. Each cow a 
sacred cow. Each meadow the most beautiful painting. And I don't care from 
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which century. And whether it has been catalogued in books. It will be 
catalogued in me'. (Globus, 31 October, 1991, cited in Oraid-Tolid, 1992, p. 
393). 
Another contemporary wrote simply, 
'And whether we like it or not, today's Guernica is called Vukovar'. 
(Annie Le Brun, Paris, from Today's Guernica is called Vukovar', Merceder, 
13 November, 1991, cited in Oraid-Tolie, 1992, p. 432). 
A French journalist Yves Debay, who had befriended a child in the city, was 
humbled by what he saw in Vukovar as local people struggled to defend themselves. 
His descriptions also reveal the complexity of civil war: 
'One day, Marko asked me to take him home to get some fresh ammunition. 
A typical adolescents' room with posters of rock stars and a little pennant of 
the local soccer team next to a picture of a Harley Davidson. Under his bed 
there was a box full of bullets for his Kalashnikov. Marko was sitting on his 
bed changing his magazines when another youngster in civilian clothes 
appeared in the doorstep. They hugged and joked for some 10 minutes. 
Marko showed him his gun. While returning I asked Marko how come his 
friend was in civilian clothing and not in camouflage uniform like the rest of 
his peers. 
Marko answered, 'He's a Serb". 
('I haven't seen such a battle anywhere', Figaro Magazine, Yves Debay, 7 
December, 1991, cited in Oraie-Tolie, 1992, p. 482). 
It is micro-interactions such as these that reveal a key characteristic of ethnic conflict 
- that it is as much a political exchange between the familiar as it is between the 
radically different. An approach which seeks to understand the security as 
emancipation move through actual experiences of insecurity and security would 
embrace such accounts, revealing as they do a human quality to macro political 
developments. A local radio journalist, Sini3a Glavagevic, broadcast updates from 
Vukovar throughout the siege until the city fell. Below is one such report, broadcast 
during the siege but published after Vukovar had already fallen, which continues the 
theme: 
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Who will look after my city, my friends, who will rescue Vukovar from 
darkness? There are no shoulders stronger than mine and yours; therefore, if 
you do not find it too hard, if something is left of the whispers you heard in 
your youth, please join us. Someone has touched our parks, the benches with 
your names still carved in the wood, the shadows where you gave and 
received your first kiss - someone has stolen it all, for how can one explain 
the fact that even the shadow has disappeared? The shop-window where you 
admired the reflections of your own delight is gone, the cinema where you 
used to watch the saddest of films is gone, your past has been simply 
destroyed and now you have nothing. ' 
Yet Glavagevic finds some hope despite the destruction of place and memory he saw 
before him: 
'You must start building from scratch. First your past, looking for your roots, 
then your present, and if there is still any energy left, invest it in the future. 
And so not stay alone in the future. As to the city, do not worry, it has been 
inside you all the time. Only hidden. So that the executioner cannot find it. 
The city - that's you! ' (Oraib-Tolid, 1992, p. 452). 
If the international is being played out in the local, it is also taking something 
precious away from the individual. Loss has been a constant theme running through 
this chapter, but the extract above explicitly lays bare that which is taken from the 
physical structure of the locality. What is also important to take from this extract is 
the identification of the self as a site of resistance against what is termed here as `the 
executioner', but which is really a reference to war in general. This theme will be 
developed throughout the thesis but particularly in chapter 8. The final line, 
revealing the city to be the people, is vitally important in asserting an understanding 
of how the city changed during the post-war, to be discussed in the next two 
chapters. As the people changed, so did the city, and in ways that were not easily 
contained within the settlement that some attempted to build. 
Those changes were due to the extraordinary experiences of insecurity 
endured by the people of the city in late 1991. In November that year Dr Vesna 
Bosanac, the Director of Vukovar Hospital, sent the following appeal: 
90 
'Vukovar is undergoing a particularly severe attack. The enemy is attacking 
intensively with bombers, tanks, rocket launchers, as well as heavy-calibre 
machine guns. Yesterday (2°d November 1991) the hospital admitted 87 new 
wounded, and 18 new wounded were admitted this morning (3 November 
1991), so that the number of wounded, consisting mostly of civilians, 
including large numbers of woman and children, has now risen to 350. The 
situation is critical in the extreme; stocks of medicines are running out. 
In desperation, we appeal for help to all those who can help us while it is not 
too late'. (Oraio-Tolio, 1992, p. 410). 
By mid-November Vukovar had been levelled, street by street, house by house 
(Glenny, 1993, p. 123). On 17 November the remaining fighters surrendered. 
Elderly civilians were permitted to leave the city, carrying whatever possessions they 
could. Others were less fortunate. On 18 November, the Red Cross were expelled 
from Vukovar hospital by the Yugoslav army. All but 60 of the 420 patients, many 
injured, as well as a number of hospital staff, were taken from the city to Ovcara, a 
farm some 6km away, killed and buried in a mass grave (Tanner, 1997, p. 267). 
The newly formed Croatian Medical Journal would play a vital role in 
recording the testimonies of those who survived the ordeal suffered by Vukovar 
hospital (Marugic et al, 2002, p. 1). The graves would later be discovered and the 
process of identifying the bodies remains an essential component of the `post-war' 
(Stover and Peress, 1998). The UN Security Council would demand that Yugoslavia 
transfer the suspected war criminals to The Hague (UNSCR 1207,1998). The UN 
war crimes tribunal later convicted two former Yugoslavian Army officers for the 
crime. Mile Mrksic was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for murder and 
torture, while Veselin Sljivancanin was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for 
torture, but was acquitted on charges of extermination (BBC News, online resource, 
2007). 
Croatian Prime Minister No Sanader would express his disappointment with 
the UN for what many Croatians considered to be lenient sentences (Southeast 
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European Times, 2007a). Speaking at the UN General Assembly he said that the 
sentence were `a mockery of post-conflict justice' and that Croatia 'feels hurt' by the 
verdict. In return, the president of the UN war crimes tribunal accused Croatia of 
applying pressure to the court (Southeast European Times, 2007b). In this way 
Booth's `human wrongs' become part of the marketplace of international political 
behaviour (Booth, 1995). Acts of political violence create acts of political mourning. 
Vukovar now lay under the control of the Serb dominated Yugoslav army. Of the 
13,700 people reported `missing' during the 1991-95 war, Vukovar accounted for 
2,642 of them. 2,300 people died during the siege and thousands more were 
wounded. When the survivors were forced out of their shelters they found their city 
destroyed. Vukovar had become a ghost city (Stitkovac, 2000, p. 164-5). One 
scholar described the siege as `one of the most merciless bombardments of modem 
history (Glenny, 1993, p. 19). 
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The fall of Vukovar was a spectacular loss for Croatia and the worst case of 
destruction in Europe since 1945 (Thompson, 1994, p. 164). The symbolic 
importance of Vukovar for the Croatian side had been strengthened by Croatian 
commanders in the city refusing television access because they feared the Serbs 
would be able to gain information that might aid their attack. Few Croatian media 
outlets discussed the multi-ethnic composition of the city; Vukovar was presented as 
a pure Croatian martyr (Thompson, 1994, p. 165). Vukovar became a symbol of 
their own suffering (Bennett, 1995, p. 168). One observer noted, 
'A shot up statue of Christ on a demolished building in Vukovar testifies to 
the suffering of the Croatian nation'. 
(Vecernji List, 24 November, 1991, cited in Oraic-Tolic, 1992, p. 46). 
Television pictures emerged once the city had fallen. For western audiences, the 
images of long lines of dishevelled civilians carry their few possessions to an 
unknown destination showed that the battle of Vukovar had not just been about 
military strategy, it was also about ethnic cleansing (Almond, 1994, p. 226). 
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In Serbia, images of Vukovar after it had fallen were broadcast along with 
commentary describing the city as 'liberated' (Milo evic, 20(X), p. 120). Vukovar 
had been described in Serbia as the backbone of the Croatian army' and even as a 
base for `German military penetration down the Danube'. Soldiers from the 
Yugoslavian National Army (JNA) returned to Belgrade as heroes, and soldiers were 
decorated accordingly (Sikavica, 2000, p. 144-5). Some Serbian writers and artists 
aided the Belgrade propaganda machine, one well known artist, Milic Stankovic, 
portrayed a Serbian woman whose baby had been cut from her womb by her 
Croatian husband to prevent the birth of a half-breed. (Stevanovic, 2(X)4, p. 72). 
Some Serbian soldiers who had experienced combat in Vukovar, however, 
were disillusioned with their war efforts and questioned whether or not the sacrifice 
had been worth it. Some Serbs were unsure as to why they had been fighting in 
Vukovar at all, especially when there was no national consensus, clear aim or moral 
justification (Denitch, 1997, p. 192). Indeed, Misha Glenny has argued that the 
destruction of Vukovar occurred for no apparent purpose (Glenny, 1993, p. 115). As 
the siege went on Serbian reservists had been called up, many of whom refused to 
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Image H: Central Vukovar, 1991. Courtesy of Charles "Tauher. 
fight and returned home to organize anti-war demonstrations (Judah, 1997, p. 185; 
Stevanovic, 2004, p. 70). Desertion, particularly among non-Serb soldiers in the 
JNA was high and many disobeyed orders (Silber and Little, 1996, p. 177). Not all 
Serbs, then, joined in with the nationalist celebrations. 
It is hard to obtain definitive figures to determine the numbers of those killed 
in Vukovar in 1991, however, it is certain that a high number of people, many 
civilians, of Croat, Serb or another ethnic background, were killed along with a 
number of soldiers, many of whom were young and untrained (Sikavica, 2000, p. 
144). Silber and Little provide some figures which help present a picture of the 
impact of the three-month long siege. The hospital treated 1,850 wounded people, 
mostly civilians but not including those with light wounds who were advised to 
shelter at home. Vukovar police registered 520 dead bodies for transportation to the 
one available burial ground, of whom 156 were Croatian national guardsmen, 24 
policemen, and the rest civilians, including 8 children. 
Those numbers do not include the hundreds of bodies that could not be collected as 
the bombardment became more severe. One aid convoy was received in Vukovar 
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Image l: Hotel Dunav, 1991. Courtesy of Charles Tauber. 
carrying medicine and which evacuated 114 of the wounded (Silber and Little, 1996, 
p. 181). 
Some saw the destruction of Vukovar - followed soon after with the declaration of a 
ceasefire brokered by Lord Carrington - as evidence of the inadequacy, or even of 
the complicity, of the international response (Magag, 1993, p. 356). The siege of 
Vukovar made headlines around the world and caused many to bemoan the idea of a 
unified Slavic state which Yugoslavia had stood for (Bennett, 1995, p. 6). Yet no 
international action followed. 
By the end of 1991 the thoughts of some had turned to justice. This poem 
was originally told to a Zagreb based writer, Antun ýiljan, by 'an uneducated, simple 
man from Vukovar, a Croat of remote Moslem descent'. Although the man did not 
realise it, ýiljan noticed that chanting and rhythmic nature of the oral delivery was in 
the style of a form of Croatian poetry from the 17`h and 18`h centuries, written using 
Arabic script. Writing up the poem for publication, ýiljan entitled it The Vukovar 
Arzuhal, or The Vukovar Memorandum, a reference to the so called Memorandum of 
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Image J: Central Vukovar, 1991. Courtesy of Charles Tauber. 
the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences written in 1986 which had advocated the 
notion of a Greater Serbia, fueling and legitimating Milosevic's nationalist policies.: 
I am a peaceloving man 
and besides a bit too old, 
but I'm telling you, gentlemen, 
you'll pay for Vukovar. 
You've pounded down the whole city, 
you've done tremendous harm, 
that's why I tell you gentlemen, 
you'll pay for Vukovar. 
That in my own house a guest 
wants to be master - 
it is not right, gentlemen, 
you'll pay for Vukovar. 
What you wanted, it was evil 
and it'll never come to pass - 
remember what I tell you gentlemen, 
you'll pay for Vukovar. 
The Danube will flow for a long time, 
everything shall be paid for - 
I warrant you gentlemen, 
You'll pay for Vukovar. 
(Vecernji List, 1 December, 1991, cited in Oraid-Tolid, 1992, p. 474). 
Closure and Settlement: Vukovar post-1991 
The previous chapters have discussed the need for understanding the security as 
emancipation move through lived experiences. The section above has introduced an 
empirical setting of insecurity in Vukovar using a number of secondary sources but 
which also engages with firsthand accounts that portray insecurity through 
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experience. A number of different responses to that insecurity emerged over time. 
One response was to move the macro political situation towards closure and 
settlement - towards security at the level of the state. 
Vukovar remained under Serbian control from November 1991 until the end 
of the war in 1995. After 1991, eastern Slavonia was home to 95,000 Serb refugees 
from others parts of Croatia, out of a total population of 160,000. GNP fell to 12% 
of what it had been in 1990, and Vukovar ground almost to a standstill. As well as 
the thriving factory in Borovo, Vukovar had also been the largest transport harbour 
city on the Danube. Years after 1991, however, rusting cranes dotted the river bank. 
Only the Dunav Hotel, the hospital, police station, city hall and a handful of cafes 
were repaired. A private crematorium was opened, and a tourist agency began 
offering trips to the `liberated Serbian Vukovar', an offer many from Serbia took up 
(Stevanovic, 2004, p. 73). 
Into the surviving houses of Croats who had been killed or who had left 
moved refugee Serbs from eastern Croatia who had been expelled by Croatian 
forces. A year after the `liberation' of Vukovar by Serbia, these people were still 
pushing wheelbarrows around the city looking for anything in the rubble they might 
use to get by (9titkovac, 2000, p. 165-6). The movement of people and the scarcity 
of resources would prove to be ongoing challenges for the city, as subsequent 
chapters discuss. 
During the 1995 Dayton Agreements, which brought an end to the conflict, 
Vukovar became a key talking point between Tudjman and Milosevic. Although 
Croatian troops had regained many of the areas that had been under Serbian control 
in Operation Flash and Operation Storm in 1995, Sector East, including Vukovar, 
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still lay under Serbian command. Tudjman could easily have pushed into Sector 
East through the UN ceasefire lines, as by this point Croatia had built a strong 
military presence, yet the possibility of re-igniting the war in Sector East remained 
and so Tudjman sought a deal with Milosevic, who was also in favour of a deal over 
Sector East, encouraged by the prospect of sanctions against Serbian being lifted if 
he cooperated in the talks. Just as they had reached a deal over how Bosnia should 
be distributed between Croatia and Serbia in early 1991, Tudjman and Milosevic 
reached a deal over Sector East. The area would return to Croatia following a two 
year period of UN administration, and the human rights of Serbs who wished to 
remain part of Croatia would be secured. Sector East thus returned to Croatia 
without a single gunshot (LeBor, 2003, pp. 252-3). 
The Erdut Agreement which formally set out the deal between Tudjman and 
Milosevic was signed on November 12 1995 and established that a UN transitional 
force would oversee the process of returning Sector East to Croatia. The settlement 
ensured the demilitarisation of the region, the return of refugees, the reestablishment 
of public services, including a police force which was to gain the confidence of all 
ethnic groups, the protection of human rights, the right to freely return to places of 
residence and to compensation for lost property. 
The agreement did not calm the fears of all those living in Sector East 
though. After 1995, Serb refugees living in Vukovar braced themselves for a speedy 
departure, transporting belongings across the border to Serbia and storing them with 
friends (UdoviLki, 2000, p. 288). The conduct of Croatian troops in other parts of 
Croatia and in Bosnia during the war, which had seen thousands of Serbian civilians 
forcibly displaced, resulted in Croatia losing much of the international sympathy that 
had arisen following the fall of Vukovar (Denitch, 1997, p. 192). The notion of 
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Vukovar returning to Croatia was therefore not appealing to some Serbs who had 
heard of how Croatian soldiers had treated Serbian civilians in other parts of the 
country. 
Once the agreement was signed the UN Security Council authorised the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and 
Western Sirmium (UNTAES) to be deployed on 15 January 1996 with the American 
Jacques Paul Klein as Transitional Administrator and consisting of 4,849 troops, 99 
military observers and 401 civilian police. The headquarters of the mission was to 
be Vukovar itself. The terms of the Erdut Agreement were put into place; the region 
was demilitarised and local elections were called for April 1997, with the newly 
former Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS) winning 11 of the 28 
municipalities. Although the United Nations did raise concerns regarding the 
bureaucratic loopholes Serb families had to jump through to get documentation, as 
well as arbitrary arrests of Serbs, the demilitarisation of the region, the elections and 
the exhumation of the Ovcara grave site led the UN to state `reintegration was 
peaceful' and that UNTAES provided a `positive precedent for peace throughout the 
former Yugoslavia'. Having accomplished its key objective of `peacefully 
reintegrating' Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium into Croatia, and 
entrusting the protection of human rights for all citizens to the government of 
Croatia, UNTAES concluded its mandate on 15 January 1998 (UN, online resource, 
2008). 
Jacques Paul Klein, the head of the UN mission in eastern Croatia, regarded 
the operation as exemplary (Klein, 1997). Scholars who followed the process noted 
that, although minority rights would have to continue to be protected, `the example 
of UNTAES and Eastern Slavonia (the region in which Vukovar is located) can 
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rightfully serve as a model for future peacebuilding endeavours' (Bloom and 
Sondorp, 2006, p. 126. See also Simunovi6,1999). 
Updated versions of the Croatian constitution which had originally been 
drafted in 1990 proclaimed that 
'as basic provisions for peace and stability of the international order, the 
Republic of Croatia is established as the national state of the Croatian nation 
and the state of members of autochthonous national minorities: Serbs, 
Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians 
and Ruthenians and the others who are citizens, and who are guaranteed 
equality with citizens of Croatian nationality and realisation of national rights 
in accordance with the democratic norms of the United Nations Organisation 
and the countries of the free world' (ICL, online resource, 2004). 
The acceptance by Europe of the new Croatian state is significant because it shows 
the extent to which the Croatian state is seen as `secure' and `stable'. Late 1991 saw 
the destruction of the city, but by 1998 a peace settlement had been put in place with 
the support of the United Nations. Under a new constitution, human rights were 
guaranteed for all citizens regardless of ethnicity. Observers have noted that Croatia 
developed no strategy for post-war peacebuilding (9krabalo, 2003). This is 
presumably because policy-makers saw no reason for such a programme, given the 
assumption that settlement had been achieved. 
The process of Croatia joining the European Union was set in motion, with 
membership looking increasingly likely. The Prime Minister of Croatia, No 
Sanader, wrote that `Croatia in the twenty-first century sees itself firmly anchored in 
the Euro-Atlantic community' (Sanader, 2005, p. 10). Croatia's journey towards 
post-Westphalian European society seems inevitable. In these ways a form of 
settlement has been reached. Supporters of that settlement, such as Sanader, argue it 
allows Croatia to pursue a political, social and cultural future characterised by the 
promise of Europe. 
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Conclusion 
The chapter had attempted to show the impact of the war in the former Yugoslavia in 
Vukovar, and as such it has painted a picture of a peaceful city, drawn not only into 
conflict but into an extreme rupture with its past, before arriving at a form of 
settlement. The following two chapters seek to show the partial nature of that 
settlement, a partiality which manifests itself in the architecture of remembrance and 
through human relationships. The void created in the gap between the formal 
settlement of the war and its partial nature is the space in which NGOs operate. 
What is striking about the narrative of events presented in this chapter is how 
the international can be seen in the local. The discipline of International Relations 
has not always been well suited to focusing on the micro, and Linklater's work is 
one important example of this tendency. As the thesis progresses this theme will be 
developed further. This chapter has also sought to introduce the voices of those who 
were there to witness the destruction of Vukovar as a means of portraying what 
happened in the city, and also as a way of constructing an academic argument which 
also has form and feeling. In such a way the gap between the act of study and the 
subject of study, discussed in the thesis introduction, is made real. 
It has been noted that silence was often a response to the crisis of war when 
expression failed, and that is a challenge for any approach to security as 
emancipation which embraces discourse ethics. Chapter 1 highlighted the fact that 
Booth seeks to orientate the security as emancipation move towards future crises. 
Chapters 6,7 and 8 take a different approach, orientating such reflections towards 
the emancipatory processes that followed crisis discussed in this chapter. 
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This chapter portrays a city drawn into war, transformed by the conflict and 
then enveloped in a formal peace settlement. The following chapter seeks to 
problematise this settlement by discussing forms of memorialisation in Vukovar 
which suggest the imposition of a mono-ethnic understanding of the war. The 
implication of this is that the settlement in Vukovar is more ambiguous and 
problematic than the settlement itself implies. It may well be the case that the 
violence of the war continues and that the aims of the war are being enshrined - in 
this sense the totalising project -a marriage of territoriality, sovereignty, citizenship 
and nationalism - can be seen. This suggests that Linklater's emphasis on the 
significance of entrenching dialogic norms within institutions could overlook 
important aspects of emancipation as practice. Croatian institutions reflect 
emancipatory principles, yet the institutional settlement may mask continuing forms 
of violence. The following chapter explores the partial nature of the settlement. The 
thesis claims that security and emancipation must be understood through lived 
experiences. This chapter and subsequent chapters seek to explore that proposition. 
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Chapter 4 
A Partial Settlement I: Memorialisation and Reconstruction 
Introduction 
The previous chapter detailed the transition from insecurity to security in Vukovar. 
Yet in important ways the post-war peace can be seen as only a partial settlement. 
Understanding emancipation through lived experiences reveals this partiality and 
challenges the state-centric notion of Croatia having achieved post-war security 
through the implementation of a peace settlement. This chapter seeks to take the 
reader into the city as it stands in the present and as it is experienced by those who 
live there. As such it develops the theme, explored in the previous chapter, of 
understanding security as emancipation through lived experiences. It explores the 
physical architecture of memorials to the dead and of the reconstructed city itself, 
taking into consideration flags, posters and graffiti. By doing so the chapter suggests 
that the processes of memorialisation and reconstruction uphold an ethnically- 
particularist understanding of the war in Croatia, which tells a story of Croatian 
sacrifice, Croatian heroism and Croatian victory. 
This particularist understanding of the war runs contrary to the fact that 
suffering throughout Croatia and in Vukovar especially was experienced by all 
ethnic groups, and that remembering the war in this way risks undermining the 
sensitivity to other ethnic groups which the constitution is supposed to uphold. The 
partial nature of the settlement therefore becomes clearer when the particularist 
nature of memorialisation and reconstruction is taken into account. As subsequent 
chapters will explore one implication of this partiality is that citizens have created 
alternative public spaces in which this dominant, state-sanctioned, particularist 
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understanding of the war can be challenged. The task here then is to outline how this 
particularist understanding of the war is now projected through the city. 
The work of Jenny Edkins is useful for this task, and the first section outlines 
how this is so. It is significant that Edkins informs this chapter because such an 
approach helps to overcome what was identified in chapter 1 as a key weakness of 
the Welsh School, that it had turned the security as emancipation move away from 
compatibility towards an emphasis on the differences between approaches to 
understanding security. The remainder of the chapter investigates the projection of 
the pro-Croatian ethnically particularist view of the war throughout the city in light 
of her work. The final section of the chapter relates these discussions to the previous 
chapter in order to affirm the partiality of the settlement. 
Trauma Time and Memory 
The arguments made in this chapter go beyond the realm of the Welsh School and of 
Linklater. The work of Jenny Edkins in Trauma and the Memory of Politics (2003) 
is useful for helping scholars understand how traumatic memories are captured by 
public spaces and the political implications of this. 
Edkins argues that there is a difference between the `normal', linear 
understanding of time favoured by the state, and what she terms `trauma time'. 
Trauma time arises when something happens which disrupts linear time, when events 
`upset, or escape, the straightforward linear temporality associated with the 
regularity of so-called `politics' and appear to occupy another form of time' (Edkins, 
2003, p. xiv). The everyday political process operates within the linear notion of 
time in which events are part of a well known narrative; events are often put into the 
story in advance. In trauma time, however, there is a disruption to this linearity 
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because something happens which is totally unexpected, something which does not 
fit into the narrative, compelling agents to construct a new account of what happened 
so as to make it meaningful. 
Edkins argues that when a traumatic event has occurred there is a competition 
to define what has happened, to provide that which has broken the linear temporality 
with meaning. In Vukovar, it is possible to see how the state has succeeded in 
providing meaning to the traumatic events which consumed the city in 1991 and the 
period afterwards. For this meaning to take hold however, the art of verbal 
communication is again put aside, for the meaning of the war is projected as much 
through silence as in words. The way in which Vukovar has been rebuilt impacts 
upon the social functioning of the peace settlement because public space serves to 
uphold a particular understanding of the war in Croatia. A tour of important 
memorial sites in Vukovar which also takes into account a number of other symbolic 
displays such as graffiti, flags and posters reveals a narrative of the war in Vukovar 
which makes the events of 1991 described in the previous chapter meaningful. 
Because of the ambiguity involved in the relationship between the state and 
the production of trauma time, which poses the danger of the state being seen by its 
citizens as less a guarantor of their rights and more a contingent political 
organisation designed to protect vested interests, the state prefers to `conceal its 
involvement (in trauma time) and claiming to be a provider not a destroyer of 
security' (Edkins, 2003, xv. ) The state accomplishes this in a number of ways; by 
propagating discourses of security which centre upon the state as the key actor; 
claiming to provide security for its citizens; and, crucially for this chapter, through 
the ways in which it commemorates wars and other traumatic events. Edkins writes, 
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`by rewriting these traumas into a linear narrative of national heroism ... the state 
conceals the trauma that it has, necessarily, produced (Edkins, 2003, xv. ) 
The process of reconstruction and memorialisation is helpful in this regard. 
Most memorials attempt to absorb the trauma into narratives revolving around 
national heroism and sacrifice (Edkins, 2003, p. 57. ) Rather than dwelling upon the 
trauma itself, memorials try to characterise the traumatic event as part of the existing 
narrative of the nation, or in the case of Croatia, making trauma central to the 
emergence of the nation itself. As Edkins points out, the literature on memory and 
commemoration splits between those who see memorials as response to the need for 
mourning and those who see them as a tool for nation building (Edkins, 2003, p. 
92. ) As this chapter makes clear it is possible to satisfy both needs. 
This discussion of public space in Vukovar takes the reader to the city itself 
and attempts to illustrate how a view from the ground enables a reading of the 
political context in which the city is situated and situates itself. The way in which 
the chapter proceeds is by describing some of the most important and noticeable 
features of the physical landscape of the city as interpreted by the author in light of 
insights drawn from authors such as Edkins. It is important to briefly reflect upon 
this approach before proceeding as the method here if far from those which have 
dominated the subdiscipline of security studies. 
The analysis below rests upon a number of observations made during the 
three fieldwork periods. These observations were not originally planned as part of 
the research, but as the fieldwork progressed it became harder to ignore the specific 
Croatian character of the physical surroundings. When compared to the narrative of 
settlement agreed upon by the Croatian state, the UN and the EU, the nature of the 
reconstructed city becomes not only peculiar but highly politicised, because it seems 
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to contradict the multiethnic composition of the city and the multiethnic tone of 
international agreements regarding the country and region. 
The reconstructed city, itself a product of the peace settlement, problematises 
the multiethnic terms upon which that settlement rests. In deep contrast to the 
settlement discussed in the previous chapter, the building of contemporary Vukovar 
appears to have given away to a particular understanding of the war which rests not 
upon multiethnic experiences of suffering but upon false dichotomies of victory and 
defeat, aggressor and defender, which are also characterised by ethnic difference. 
The settlement therefore, which exists in law, is challenged by the everyday physical 
surroundings of lived experiences. 
This is not the first such account of the ethnically particularist and 
exclusionary nature of physical reconstruction in Vukovar. Britt Baillee, for 
example, has assessed the extent to which Vukovar has been rebuilt in accordance 
with those who wish to reconstruct the Croatian heritage of the city (Baillee, 
forthcoming). Whilst offering an important account of heritage management in 
Vukovar, Baillee does not go far enough in developing an understanding of trauma 
and politics as seen through the reconstruction/memorialisation process. Edkins can 
be helpful here. It is also possible to compare the exclusionary tendency of urban 
living in Vukovar to the inclusive norms promised by the emancipatory process. 
The politics of reconstruction is the issue here then, and the extent to which that form 
of politics impacts upon everyday lived experience is the key question. 
Projecting the nation: Public Space as Symbolic Space 
This section will detail the various ways in which public space has been transformed 
into symbolic space, the result of which is that a powerful narrative of the war is 
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projected throughout the city, capturing the debate about what the war in Croatia 
meant and how it should be remembered. The argument to be made here is that the 
nationalist narrative - that the war in Croatia was fought by Croatians for a free 
Croatia against an aggressor in the name of self defence, in which Croatians died for 
the good of their nation - is upheld first by the key projector, in this case the cross on 
the Danube, and then carried throughout the city in a number of ways, further 
projecting the narrative. 
The state conceals its role in the production of trauma by infusing a powerful 
narrative of the war into daily life, linking the state to the dead so that both are held 
to be untouchable. The state entrenches itself by capturing the sense of loss and 
vulnerability felt by the survivors and weaving their emotions into a narrative which 
portrays the state simultaneously as means and end; the free state is presented as the 
ultimate cause worth dying for, and also as the means of security. The trauma of 
war, which the state actually had an important role in producing, is thus captured by 
the state itself. The pain of loss is subsumed by the state which seeks to use the 
profound moments of grief to build a national myth. 
Standing in the centre of city can be seen a large white cross commemorating 
those who died during the Battle of Vukovar. The cross is approximately six metres 
high and sits atop a piece of rubble taken from what remained of the city following 
its destruction. The site of the cross is a purpose built platform situated at the end of 
a pathway running between the city square and the small port, and as such the cross 
is clearly visible to anyone who comes into the middle of the city. The cross is in 
pristine condition and is surrounded by a number of benches. Flanking the cross are 
three flags - those of country, county and city. In many respects the cross can be 
seen as standard war memorial. 
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In important ways however, the cross expresses something more than the 
need to remember the dead. We can begin by thinking about its position in the city. 
Vukovar stands on the eastern perimeter of Croatia. The trees that can be seen on 
the bottom left hand side of the image below, just across the River Danube, are in 
Serbia. The cross has been positioned facing Croatia but with its back to the old 
enemy. To a certain extent the cross speaks for itself; as a symbol of Christianity, 
built upon a piece of rubble from what was left of the city, facing Croatia with its 
back to Serbia and with an inscription about the Croatian fallen. It is hard for these 
meanings to be taken away as they are built into the cross itself; they are part of its 
being. 
Image K: War memorial on the Danube, Vukovar, 2008. 
The inscription on the cross reads `ZRTVAMA ZA SLOBODNU HRVATSKU', or, 
`Sacrificed for the Freedom of Croatia'. This inscription pulls those who were killed 
in the war, the dead, the speechless, into a powerful narrative which interprets the 
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war and provides an answer to the question, `what happened'. The dead are made 
sacred and are captured in a particular meaning, regardless of how they died and for 
what reasons. The cross therefore falls into a common narrative - the dead sacrifice 
themselves for the good of the nation. By linking the purpose of the war, Croatian 
liberty, to the memory of the sacred dead the cross cements an ethnically particularist 
understanding of the war and projects such an understanding outwards to the city by 
virtue of its central position. Pocket sized city maps provided to visitors show the 
cross out of scale, larger than its surroundings, drawing the eye. This cartographic 
representation matches the spatial and figurative placement of the cross as the 
geographic centre and the symbolic heart of the Croatian nationalist interpretation of 
the war. 
The cross seeks to capture a total interpretation of the war, which is then 
projected not as interpretation but as truth. This fulfils an important role by settling 
the disruption caused by the war to the linear notion of time underpinning social life, 
plugging the cognitive space created by the trauma. Built upon a piece of rubble 
from the demolition of the city the cross stands as an act of defiance to those who 
had sought to destroy it, yet this too is telling. The sacred symbol of the cross stands 
atop the rubble, and as such the nationalist interpretation of the war is built upon 
what remained, subsuming it into its narrative. The rubble is thus not an object but 
is given meaning; it too is embraced by nationalism. The rubble is not cast aside and 
left to the periphery of memory but kept central to the interpretation of the war. The 
rubble, the destruction, is what makes modem day Vukovar and Croatia, the cross 
suggests, and the nation will stand atop what remained and build upon it something 
new. Like the core meanings of the cross the ways in which the flags are interpreted 
might also be seen as concrete. Their presence provides additional meaning to the 
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cross-that it is the Croatian dead who are to be mourned, to be remembered in the 
space provided for that purpose. 
Overlooking the city is one of the most iconic images of Vukovar, the water 
tower. During the siege of the city in 1991 the tower, an important source of fresh 
water standing high above the cityscape, was an easy target for JNA attacks. 
Although the tower, as can be seen in figure B, suffered extensive damage and is no 
longer in use, it still stands and is today an image of Croatian defiance in the face of 
destruction. Looking closely at the image of the tower below the Croatian flag can 
be seen atop the tower, marking what was once functional as an emotive symbol of 
nationhood forged in war. The water tower can be seen in souvenir shops in 
Vukovar, where tourists can buy postcards with its image and handmade wooden 
miniature towers to take away. The tower was built not for aesthetics but for a 
practical and necessary reason; to supply Vukovar with water. It no longer functions 
in this capacity, and stands today for no practical reason. Although it remains 
standing, when inspected from close range the tower looks frail: 
. 
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Image L: Water tower with Croatian flag, Vukovar, 2008. 
The site upon which it stands is strewn with small pieces of debris which have, over 
time, fallen from the tower. Graffiti has been scrawled around the lower part of the 
tower, and birds have made their nests in the gaping holes in the upper sections 
sustained during the war. 
Observers standing at the bottom of the tower and looking upwards would 
see little more than a tall, rotting lump of concrete, a shell of a building that had once 
served some purpose but is now awaiting demolition. Standing from this position, 
all that can be seen are the holes blasted open by bombs and the lack of care 
thereafter. A possible health and safety threat might even be detected, given its 
precarious appearance. The tower would be seen as a bombed out building, nothing 
more. 
The flag secured upon the very top of the tower would not be visible. Given 
the height of the structure this can only be clearly seen from a distance, when 
observers are too far away to see the frailty of the edifice. When one views the 
tower from a distance, with the Croatian flag billowing in the wind, then the tower 
becomes a symbol of nationhood and resistance, but only from a distance. Walking 
closer to the tower the flag slowly disappears from view and its fragility becomes 
more obvious. 
The meaning of the tower changes according to the perspective of the viewer, 
yet this is unproblematic for the state because few people inspect the tower in any 
great detail. It has not been preserved for tourists, and most people travelling 
through Vukovar will either pass by on the main road or on the Danube, where the 
tower can be viewed most spectacularly. It is not a site for walkers, it is not meant to 
be inspected close up, it is supposed to be viewed from a distance. 
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One conclusion of this interpretation is that this is not a coincidence, it did 
not happen by chance, but that the tower is not supposed to be inspected closely 
because it suits the interests of the state. If the state puts a flag upon a war damaged 
building and deters people from seeing it at close range it becomes sacred; if visitors 
are encouraged to view it closely it becomes a liability. The tower is not a tourist 
attraction, but it confers meaning upon the city to any visitor and to local people 
themselves. 
The symbolic nature of the tower is beneficial to the state in important ways. 
It allows the state to continue avoiding the extent to which Vukovar remains as it 
was in the immediate aftermath of the war by making selected sites sacred. The idea 
seems to be that some places should remain as they were and should not change with 
the times. Thus the trauma of war is captured in selected places. Alongside other 
important buildings which remain as they were in December 1991, in ruins, the 
tower performs an important function not only by capturing the moment of 
destruction but by imprisoning the city itself in that moment. 
There is an important difference between the cross and the tower. The cross 
was built after the war to commemorate the dead and as such as was built to secure 
the immediate feeling that the dead should not only be remembered but also a 
particular understanding of why they died. It is a manmade construction inspired by 
the desire of the state to impose meaning upon the trauma of violence, and by 
seeking to objectify the dead, to make them sacred and thus untouchable, the state is 
able to distance itself from its own role in producing the trauma, as Edkins outlines, 
whilst simultaneously entrenching itself in the memory of their supposed honour. 
The building of the cross arose out of the need for the new form of power, in the 
form of the nascent Croatian state, to force an acceptance of its inherent goodness. 
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The point here is that the cross was built partly to meet the human need for 
remembrance, but also to politicise that remembrance by linking the memory of the 
dead to the founding of the new state. The dead could have been remembered in 
other ways, and no doubt they are remembered in other ways by those who knew and 
loved them, but the state seeks to rival and displace such memories with its own 
narrative which may or may not be true. It may well be the case that some who 
fought and died in Vukovar did so for the idea of a free Croatia, and the state would 
legitimately be able to claim that this was the case for those professional soldiers and 
policemen who had sworn allegiance to Croatia. The elderly man killed in his 
garden by a grenade, or the mother shot by a sniper when searching for firewood, 
may have died for reasons other than a love of nation and liberty. The cross does not 
account for these differences and is unequivocal in its interpretation of death. It 
seeks to own those deaths by imposing a constructed notion of the inalienable right 
to state sovereignty, and by doing so it displaces the personal with the impersonal. 
The state hopes that this impersonal narrative of events will come to feel natural, that 
over time the impersonal will feel personal. 
This creates a tension with which the state is unable to cope. The state seeks 
to own the deaths of those who were killed during the war by capturing the memory 
of them into a narrative of new beginnings and hope, perhaps the most politically 
seductive and intoxicating idea of the twentieth century, that of self determination. 
By imposing such a positive narrative of the past it struggles to deal with the pain 
and vulnerability caused by the war and strongly felt by many. 
Thus the meaning of the tower becomes clearer; as the state struggles to 
impose memory it has to find ways of countering alternative narratives of the war. 
One way of achieving this is to keep the ruins rather than to build over them and to 
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strike them with the mark of the state, such as a flag. The flag links the object to the 
constructed memory of the past, in this case enshrined by the cross, which has the 
flag not only standing next to it but engraved upon it. The object then ceases to be a 
ruin of war but a crucial part of the state-imposed narrative. It says, `look at what 
they did to us. We are still here'. The tower is therefore an instrument of the state 
because it serves to project the nationalist narrative to the city; it takes the 
vulnerability of the city, seeks to capture its meaning and projects it as truth. 
The symbols in Vukovar supporting the nationalist narrative of war thus 
work by encapsulating the key tenets of the story in the cross - the sacrifice for the 
nation, the sacred and sanctified dead, the facing down of an enemy - and then 
projecting them throughout the city using a range of carriers. The cross is thus at the 
heart of the nationalist narrative projection, with the tower the most prominent 
carrier of the narrative. There are other smaller but no less important carriers. 
The statue of Tudjman is key in this regard. A short walk from the cross is the 
square, and standing in the middle of the square is a statue of the first Croatian 
President, Franjo Tudjman. The statue was erected in 1998 following the ending of 
the UN transitional administration period and at the beginning of the formal political 
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Image M: Statue of Tudjman, with cross in background, Vukovar, 2009. 
and legal settlement. The statue is the only one of its kind in the spacious square, 
and replaced a statue dedicated to the dead of the Second World War which was 
pulled down after the 1991-95 war. In this way the symbolism of past conflict is 
supplanted by that of the recent war, and thus memory is reshaped not only for a new 
generation, but for a new style of politics. The memory of the past conflict which 
led to the foundation of Yugoslavia is confined to the dustbin of history, and in its 
place a new focal point for remembering political violence in the image of the new 
state and its totalising project is built. 
When the debris was cleared and the city established as Croatian territory, 
this is what was chosen to mark the centrepiece of public space in Vukovar, a statue 
of a war leader and first national President. This is one example of how the state is 
able to conceal its own involvement in the production of trauma. Placing the war 
leader in such a prominent position, in a space which had been destroyed and rebuilt 
above the rubble, entrenches the memory of Tudjman in a positive light. The dead 
are rendered sacred but anonymous, but the war leader is held up in personal glory as 
a hero. He is the one who delivered an independent Croatia from the hand of 
tyranny, led the nation to safety through its time of strife. He will be commemorated 
as such. 
Every year on November 18th the statue of Tudjman is one of the focal 
points, along with the cross and the hospital, of the Memorial Day which 
commemorates the day Vukovar fell. Former Croatian soldiers, politicians and 
relatives of the dead and missing line up in front of the statue to salute their war 
leader. This is one of the great victories, not for Croatia or Vukovar, but for the state 
itself, for the state has successfully woven a narrative interpreting the war which 
places the Croatian state as the victim, and Tudjman as the heroic defender. 
117 
The statue fulfils it most important function on behalf of the totalising project 
once a year, but it projects the nationalist narrative continuously not so much 
because of who it depicts, but the fact it is located in the centre of Vukovar and is 
thus deemed centrally important to the city itself. The statue establishes the square 
not only as a Croatian space but also as a place won by Croatians. Furthermore, it 
personalises the struggle, not outwardly by asking citizens to consider their own 
grief in their own way, but inwardly by asking citizens to turn their memory of the 
war towards the leader himself. 
The city square itself is primarily a place of recreation, it is a truly public 
space; there are no barriers, no guarded entrances, it is open to all to sit or walk 
through, to meet and to talk. The statue is now an established part of the city rather 
than a novelty. On Memorial Day the state attempts to ensure that Tudjman's place 
in the nationalist narrative is re-established. As with the cross this is partly a 
component of the process known as remembrance by which people come together to 
remember the dead whom they knew and loved, but it is also political because the 
state is seeking to impose its own narrative upon events. 
The square becomes a natural place to gather because, given its emptiness, it 
is a practical space for the large numbers. The statue however deepens the meaning 
of remembrance in the interests of the totalising project, because it re-establishes 
each year the hierarchy needed to wage war. As the veterans lower their hand- 
carried flags and salute the war leader, they are no longer standing in the city square; 
they are on a parade ground. Once it becomes a parade ground citizens are 
encouraged to offer thanks to the leader. The day of remembrance not only allows 
the survivors to remember the dead collectively, it serves to remind veterans that 
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they were once soldiers, that Tudjman was their leader and that he ultimately led 
them to victory. This does not necessary favour the HDZ, Tudjman's party; in the 
2009 local elections the HDZ mayoral candidate was defeated by the Social 
Democratic Party. What this style of remembrance really seeks to achieve is to 
entrench the nationalist narrative of the war in the public consciousness to such an 
extent that it appears `above politics' and thus untouchable, as sacred as the dead 
enshrined by the cross. 
The square is situated between a road named V. Nazora and a pedestrian 
walkway to the cross, flanked by the Danube to the east and the main road to Osijek 
and Vojvodina in Serbia named Dr F. Tudmana, after Tudjman himself, to the west. 
The square is generally regarded as the centre of the city, a natural meeting place and 
a space for occasional public gatherings; celebratory, cultural and political. The 
square itself takes up about half an acre of space. 
Image N: Rebuilt square with partially renovated Workers' Club in background, Vukovar, 2009. 
There are benches for sitting, some flowers planted in purpose built basins, an 
unimposing clock in one corner, but little else on the square itself. Indeed, the 
square seems to exist in Vukovar not because it performs a specific daily role, such 
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as accommodating a market or providing a thoroughfare for passers-by, cyclists and 
trams, but because it honours a longstanding European tradition of urban planning; 
that a city is not a city unless it has a square. The square offers a place of rest, a 
quiet spot to pontificate in a quiet city; more significantly however, the statue serves 
as a constant supporter of Tudjman's role as a hero. 
In important ways the square performs another political role, as it is not only 
as a place for congregating every once in a while, but a space in which meanings 
about the war in Vukovar specifically and Croatia as a nation are transmitted and 
upheld. An individual seated on a bench in the square would be able to see a great 
deal of the city, for unlike many squares which are closed off on all sides by shops 
and cafes, the square in Vukovar is open on two sides, and one of the closed sides is 
bordered only by the narrow and slow moving River Vuka, allowing views to the 
north of the city. The openness of the square itself allows the observer to take into 
consideration many views; the new banks, showing Croatia's movement away from 
the old state-run economy of Yugoslavia; coffee-bar culture; the river as a source of 
life and leisure. The observer might also take into account the view of the ruined 
former Workers' Building, which once housed the local branch of the Communist 
Party and then became a reputable hotel, now a shell of a bombed out building, 
windowless and skeletal. Across the Vuka one would see another ruin from the war, 
next to a convenience store and a newspaper seller, and looking towards the mighty 
Danube, impossible to neglect, is the brilliant white of the cross and the three flags 
billowing in the breeze. 
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Image 0: View across the harbour showing ongoing rebuilding work, Vukovar, 2009. 
It is tempting to characterise these views from the square in terms of old and new, 
yet this would be a mistake. In a city where everything was touched by the 
onslaught of war, everything in Vukovar is new. Even in the many cases where 
buildings have been left untouched since the war they mark the point at which the 
city was changed from a prosperous Danube settlement into a ruin. The buildings, 
roads and pavements which have been reconstructed seek to capture something of 
the past that was taken in 1991, yet the city as a whole has not escaped the fact that 
that year saw its transformation. 
Image P: Disued building showing war damage alongside reconstructed buildings, Vukovar, 2009. 
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Unlike a place such as, for example, Ypres, which has been rebuilt exactly as it was 
prior to the destruction of the Great War, Vukovar is undergoing a process which 
seems to be attempting to both mark the tragedy of the war and capture that which 
was taken away by it. It is this tension within urban design, between remembering 
the war and forgetting it, which is a more accurate characterisation of Vukovar than 
the notion of old and new. Coupled with this tension between remembering and 
forgetting is the growing awareness of Vukovar being situated in a country still 
undergoing a transition from state-planning to the market economy, seen in the 
prominent banks on the square and in the growth of private businesses (some owned 
by war profiteers) in the city. The city is therefore being pushed towards the liberal 
capitalist order, at a time when it is also trying to locate its sense of history and also 
attempting to immortalise its recent history into a coherent, ethnically particularist 
narrative. Scholars who have noted the emergence of liberal economic thinking as 
well as increasing attachments to ethnicity have characterised the dominant ideology 
in Croatia as liberal nationalism (Massey et al, 2003). 
For these reasons Vukovar is in some sense an unsettled place, a city in 
which people know `something happened' in 1991, a city which is looking to find 
(or create) its history amid the ruins, and a city which is trying to look towards future 
prosperity and contentment which might come through the market. For a city which 
had been assured of its history, identity and prosperity until 1991, the sense of 
trauma transmitted through the changed and changing cityscape must be profound. 
Although much reconstruction work has been done since Vukovar was 
returned to Croatia in 1998 there still remain many destroyed buildings throughout 
the city, and it is common to see a semi-destroyed or ruined building next to a brand 
new one. 
122 
Image Q: Old and new houses, Vukovar, 2009. 
The centre of city is slowly being returned to its Baroque glory, yet some of the 
largest and most significant buildings remain empty shells, such as the former 
Workers' Building on the city square. The result of this is that Vukovar appears as a 
city in transition, unsettled, somewhere between the trauma of war and the successful 
reattachment of its present self to history. 
In the centre there remain two eyesores from the war, reminders of the trauma: as 
well as the Workers' Building on the square, there is the old cinema. A city can be 
rebuilt and as it changes shape and appearance the visible scars of war disappear, and 
with it the perception of the city by visitors and residents alike change too. Yet war 
changes society as a whole, and such changes in collective thought become 
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Image R: Disused houses awaiting demolition, Vukovar, 2(X)9. 
naturalised over time. Such changes can be just as visible - for example in the 
symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, but they can also be hidden and more 
ambiguous; they might exist in attitudes to foreign cultures, in attitudes towards what 
it means to be a Croatian, in how the country sees itself. A place can be rebuilt so 
that nobody would ever know that it had once been destroyed, but that destruction 
leaves an indelible mark upon those who were unfortunate enough to experience it 
firsthand, and upon the society they inhabit and construct. 
This sense of being lost in time aids the daily carriers of the nationalist narrative 
because it keeps open the unsettling vacuum of memory which the totalising project 
can appear to fill with the comforting knowledge of the war being worthwhile. The 
transformation of public space into symbolic space does not just occur at the macro 
level but also filters through to the level of smaller sites of public interaction such as 
cafes, bars and restaurants. One student of Serbian nationality living in Vukovar 
pointed out how the very spaces used for leisure time are themselves divided 
according to ethnicity; `we still feel divided', he explains, even though the divisions 
are not as explicit are they were in the immediate aftermath of the war (148,2008). 
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Image S: Restored courthouse, Vukovar, 2009. 
Image T: Restored central Vukovar, 2009. 
Throughout Vukovar such sites are often infused with nationalist sentiments by 
virtue of Croatian flags being clearly visible in many establishments. It is also not 
uncommon to find flags supplemented by more explicit images of nationalism and 
war. Posters of Vukovar as it lay in ruins in 1991 can be seen in some 
establishments. In at least one bar an image of Ante Pavelic, the leader of the Nazi 
supporting Ustashe regime which led Croatia during the Second World War, can be 
seen alongside photographs of dead soldiers from the 1991-95 conflict, draped in a 
ribbon showing the colours of the national flag. 
Images of Pavelic are rare in Croatia, yet it is important to note that some 
Croatians draw parallels between the Nazi supporting regime of World War Two and 
the recent war. Despite the well documented history of Croatia's wartime 
collaboration with the Nazis, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of Serbs and 
Roma being sent to the notorious concentration camp at Jasenovac, it seems that 
some Croatians feel comfortable making public displays of the perceived positive 
link between the Ustashe leader and those killed in the recent war. The ribbon 
literary and figuratively links the recent conflict to the experience of a past war. 
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All public buildings and the majority of cafes, bars, restaurants and shops 
display the Croatian flag in prominent places, often a framed version fixed to the 
wall behind the counter. The image of the flag is not necessarily a carrier of the 
nationalist narrative; it is a nation symbol certainly, but its meaning is not fixed. It 
can be argued that in Vukovar the proximity to powerful carriers of the nationalist 
narrative such as the cross and the tower mean that flags also act as carriers of this 
specific meaning. The flags transmit a powerful message to citizens and visitors 
alike, the notion that `this is Croatia'. When seen in conjunction with the cross, the 
tower and the statue of Tudjman, the flags seem to act as stamps of ownership space, 
not just to say that the property itself is Croatian, although this is an important part of 
the message, but also to say that this place is possible because of the sacrifice made 
by the dead. 
Image U: Restaurant in Vukovar, 2009. Between the freezer of ice-cream and the fridge of beer, note 
the poster of Vukovar in 1991 next to other key nationalist signifiers: the flag and the national football 
team. 
This may not be the case in other Croatian towns and cities, however in Vukovar 
where proximity to death and to the war is self-evident because of prevalence of war 
damage and memorials, the flags affirm the idea of nationhood as being in 
conjunction with sacrifice. Public space is thus infused with meaning which serves 
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the totalising project, ensuring that daily life will always involve multiple encounters 
with the symbols of the state which the state itself has linked to the sacrifice of the 
dead made during war for the good of the nation. 
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Image V: Road sign commemerating a military unit from the war, Vukovar. 2009. 
Street names, such as the one seen in the image above, indicate the extent to which 
nationalisation has impacted upon urban space. These daily encounters with the 
symbols of the totalising project serve to transmit meaning onto the ruins which 
continue to litter the city. Vukovar is full of partly or fully destroyed structures that 
were once houses, shops or larger buildings such as a cinema or the old Eltz Manor, 
a Habsburg era house that was an important regional museum. The ruins mix with 
the reconstruction work, yet their presence is strongly felt. The ruins are often 
exactly as they were during the war, holding the moment of destruction in time. As 
Vukovar changes and new buildings are constructed throughout the city, the ruins 
remain, and as such there is a duel sense of temporality occurring. 
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Image W: Uerilict house, Vuko%ar. 2009. 
On the one hand the city runs according to `normal' linear time; the clocks keep 
going forward, new buildings are erected and the totalising project is able to make 
the claim that progress is being made as gradually the ruins are cleared. On the other 
hand, trauma time is at work here, as the ruins capture the exact moment in linear 
time that Vukovar was transformed from prosperous Danube city to a city of ruins. 
The ruins are stuck in time, unmoved by `progress', and as such they convey not a 
memory of the war but the war itself. Unlike the tower, most ruins in Vukovar do 
not have the explicit mark of the totalising project. They are simply objects that 
once served a purpose. This is not to say that they are not emotionally connected to 
citizens, indeed, it is likely that many of the ruins do have significant meaning to at 
least some of the survivors who perhaps lived, worked or played there before the 
war. 
It is important however to see the ruins in conjunction with the symbols 
discussed above - the cross, the flags and particularly the tower. These symbols also 
provide meaning to the ruins because they bring the ruins into the nationalist 
narrative. The tower is especially important in this regard because it is itself a ruin, 
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and thus the city can be portrayed as a living memorial. There is tension here, 
because the ruins can both support and resist attempts by the state to incorporate 
them into the nationalist narrative. The ruins can support the state because they 
serve as a daily reminder of what happened to the city, of what was lost, which is 
useful for the state because it uses these images to reinforce the notion that it 
defended the Croatian people. 
However, as the state seeks to embrace progress the ruins become more an 
embarrassment because they imply the state is unable to develop further. In these 
ways the ruins have an ambiguous relationship with the totalising project, as the state 
seems unsure where to preserve or to forget the destruction. Keep them and the 
memory of war can be easily kept alive because trauma time will always be 
explicitly in the present which the state will be able to use in the production of the 
national myth; build over the ruins and portray a story of 'progress', but lose an 
overt symbol of the nationalist narrative, the symbol of the loss. 
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Image X: Derilict buildings, Vukovar, 2009. 
The state is torn between the need to remind people of the trauma of war, 
necessary because it reminds the generation of survivors of what the 'other' did to 
them, which serves to reinforce the totalising project as saviour, and the need to 
show people the benefits of self determination. The direction the state has taken has 
been to rebuild the city slowly, and it is likely that within a decade there will be few 
ruins left in Vukovar. It does seem likely that it will be in the interest of the state to 
retain at least some ruins exactly as they were, and this may well be the long term 
importance of the tower. 
A different option is to further remove the memory of the war from the 
explicit location of the ruins as they stand to the contained and ordered location of 
the museum. The hospital offers one such site, where visitors are guided through 
displays of the wards as they were during the siege in late-1991. Mannequins take 
the place of the humans who sheltered there, and the names of those who were taken 
to Ovcara and killed line one of the walls. Visitors can take away different objects to 
remind them of their encounter with the museum. One is a poster of a bold red cross 
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Image Y: War damaged building, Vukovar, 2009. 
with holes through, symbolising the fact that the hospital was a target. Below the 
cross, the poster reads 'Mjesto Sjecanja Vukovarska Bolnica 1991', which translates 
as 'Place of Memory Vukovar Hospital 1991'. 
Vukovar City Museum also seeks to manage the memory of the war within 
exhibitions which contrast the pre-war and the post-war cityscapes and which 
preserve various artefacts from centuries past. Concerns about these artefacts among 
those involved in the cultural heritage of the region within the Council of Europe 
were registered while the war in Croatia was still ongoing (see Von Imhoff, 1995). 
Centuries old objects found within the rubble are now safely preserved within the 
walls of the city museum; something of the past protected amid the trauma and 
destruction of the present. What is particularly interesting about the museum is that 
not only is there an attempt to present the past through objects, but to make a 
declaration about the future. Upon leaving the museum visitors can purchase 
inexpensive paper white doves with the words Vukovarska Bijela Golubica (Vukovar 
White Dove) written on the side. Thus the journey to the constructed past facilitated 
by the museum is infused with moral meaning also. 
The impact of the developments discussed so far upon how Vukovar is seen 
by outsiders both foreign and domestic has been profound. In conjunction with the 
movement towards managing memory in museums there has been an attempt to 
show the city as a place of history and culture rather than of war. This is no easy 
task, as according to officials at the Vukovar tourist office, the main motive for 
visiting the city is to honour the war dead (147,2009). 
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An observer standing in sight of the cross on the Danube in spring and summer 
would see large groups of all ages, sometimes one group per hour, being guided 
around the memorial before travelling in buses out to Ovcara to see the memorials to 
the two hundred found there. 
Most such groups come to Vukovar only for a day, paying their respects to 
the dead, eating lunch and then leaving. The tourist office try to encourage more 
people to stay in the city for a night, but few do; as one official put it, people don't 
come to Vukovar to relax, just to pay their respects to the victims of war before 
leaving to have fun somewhere else. It is a similar scenario with school children 
throughout Croatia, for whom it has become an obligation to visit Vukovar at some 
point during their education. The tourist official however wants to try and 'sell' 
Vukovar as being more than a city devastated by war; 'we want to show that 
Vukovar is famous not only for the war but for its 5000 years of history' (147,2009). 
Pamphlets available for visitors, some of which were produced before the 
war and actually talk about Yugoslavia, detail the cultural heritage of the region and 
carry photographs of traditional dress, fine Baroque buildings and picturesque spots 
by the Danube. One such pamphlet, published in 1973, was found by the author at a 
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Image Z: Guided tour party, Vukovar, 2009. 
tourist outlet in Vukovar, entitled 'Jugoslavija, Hrvatska, Slavonija - Kulturno - 
Historijski - Spomenici - Folklor', which translates as 'Yugoslavia, Croatia, 
Slavonia - Cultural - Historical - Monuments - Folklore'. Tourists are encouraged 
to see this heritage, regardless of the political implications of invoking Yugoslavia 
from which Croatia was created. 
Those who work in the tourist industry in Vukovar may well make their daily 
living through war tourism, but they have long term aims to present the city as it 
was. As one official put it, `we want to present Vukovar as an old Croatian city on 
the Danube with a rich culture, tradition and history' (147,2009). This is the image 
they are trying to present to the growing number of tourists from Austria and 
Germany who stop in Vukovar for a day during their Danube cruises. It is also the 
image invoked by individual institutions in Vukovar, such as the Catholic church of 
St Philip and Jacob, which produces pamphlets for visitors recalling the long history 
of Christian worship in the city and the continuity of the church from its foundation 
in the early eighteenth century to the present (see Franjeva'ki Samostan Crkva Sv. 
Filipa I Jakova, Vukovar, 1723-2003, author and date of publication unknown. The 
pamphlet is available at the church). 
There have been recent discussions within the tourist industry in Vukovar 
concerning the developments the city could pursue to make it more attractive to 
outsiders. These have included a viewing station on the river so that visitors would 
be able to view the city in profile, but with the addition of the ruined water tower and 
the white cross. Another idea is for a campsite, although the continued presence of 
landmines is a potential problem here, and plans for an amusement park to attract 
more young people have also been mooted. There have even been plans for a flying 
club which could take visitors up in a hot air balloon to view the flat plains of eastern 
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Slovenia and across the river, Vojvodina in Serbia; however, these plans were halted 
when it was realised there would be a danger of the balloon inadvertently entering 
Serbian airspace (147,2009). 
Landmines remain a constant concern in the surrounding area, and the above 
photograph depicts a scene common along the roads leading in and out of the city. 
One innovative civil society programme which developed in California. called Roots 
of Peace, involved removing mines and planting vines in their place (Roots of Peace, 
online resource, 2007). 
The development of tourism in Vukovar will clearly take time, and it is not 
certain that a move away from war tourism will happen. Interestingly, one tourist 
industry official makes a link between the development of tourism and ethnic 
relations; `the development of tourism is connected to the development of inter- 
personal relations. We need time for normalisation. . . we 
don't want to talk about 
politics'. Talking about politics would risk the dominant narrative of the war being 
openly challenged, so as Vukovar seeks to attract more people it will only do so in 
the context created for it by the totalising project. Of course, discussions about how 
best to present Vukovar to the outside world are in themselves political insofar as the 
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Image Zi: Mined field, Vukovar, 2009. 
thought processes which drive them are formed in part by power relations, but for 
many people the realm of politics is too ethnically sensitive and divisive to warrant 
attention. 
Thus the tourist industry has sought to depoliticise itself, preferring to 
concentrate on attempting to regain something of the past which is understood as 
being neutral territory far removed from the traumatic events of 1991. Yet the 
following passage from a tourist brochure, Vukovar, Turistiaka Zajednica Grada 
Vukovara, introducing Vukovar to the visitor, complete with attractive photos of the 
reconstructed city and of daily life, suggests that the politics of the present is 
intricately bound with understandings of the past and with public image: 
`In 1991, the city was destroyed and occupied by Serbian aggressor and all 
non-Serbian population was expelled and captured in concentration camps. 
Since 1997, when the process of peaceful reintegration started, the city has 
been reconstructing and nowadays is gradually regaining the look of a 
European city; the look it once used to have. Therefore, the hearts and faces 
of the young are needed; the hearts of healthy keen and educated young 
people' (Tourist Board Vukovar, 2006a, p. 14). 
A passage from a different publication intended for tourists makes the connection 
between past and present more explicit: 
`Vukovar is a miraculous town. Vukovar is pride. Vukovar is defiance. It's 
a tear in one's eye, sorrow at one's heart, and a smile on one's lips. Vukovar 
is both past and future' (Vukovar Tourist Board, 2006b, p. 3). 
It has been noted by scholars that both Croatia and Slovenia have attempted to frame 
a so-called 'exit from the Balkans' and a `return to Europe' following the wars in the 
former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, by defining their national identities against 
Balkan or Yugoslav ones; such a desire to establish a European identity, however, 
occurs in conjunction with a tacit acknowledgement that such a status is 
ontologically unstable (Lindstrom, 2003). Unstable though it may be, it is a reaction 
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to what scholars have understood as centuries of Orientalism as applied to the 
Balkans - to `Balkanism' (Todorova, 1994; Bakic-Hayden, 1995; Dupcsik, 2001; 
Ruazsa and Lindstrom, 2004; Hammond, 2005; Hammond, 2006). 
Even so, the narrative which describes Croatian war heroism in the name of 
political independence which allowed the country to `return to Europe' has helped 
Vukovar to become the defining symbol of the war in Croatia for many Croats, a 
symbol of sacrifice and their own sense of victimhood. This is evident in the fact 
that the Croatian President routinely visits Vukovar on 18th November each year to 
commemorate its fall, in the naming of a `Vukovar Street' in every Croatian city, the 
fact that hugely popular (and right wing) Croatian bands such as Thompson (the 
name deriving from the lead singer favouring a machine gun of the same name 
during the war) began their nationwide tour in Vukovar, and the numerous videos 
available in outlets such as YouTube depicting the city as a place of heroes. A film 
called The Trinity of Vukovar, which focuses on the experience of the hospital, the 
`defenders' and the Catholic church, starring the Oscar nominee Toni Collette and 
directed by Sydney based Croat Jaz Spelic, is in production (For further information 
see www. thetrinityofvukovar. com). 
Vukovar provides an outlet through which the nation can direct its trauma, 
the city designated as the appropriate site for soaking up the grief and anger of the 
country as a whole. The attempt to reconstruct the past is infused with the politics of 
the present in these ways, and the notion of reclaiming the `look of a European city' 
from history cannot be value free because the face of the city was scarred by the 
Serbian other. The emphasis on the European identity of Vukovar relates to the 
wider strategy of the Croatian Tourist Board, which seeks to present Croatia as 'a 
European parliamentary state and part of European political and cultural history' 
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(Croatian National Tourist Board, 2008, p. 1). Another publication produced for 
tourists states confidently that 
`the people of Vukovar will again make their city a place of comfortable 
living, an oasis of peaceful life in the east of the great and hurried Europe, to 
which the city and the whole of Croatia has always belonged' (Tourist Board 
Vukovar-Srijem County, 2004, p. 9). 
Public Space and Discrimination 
It is significant that some of those engaged in peacebuilding in Vukovar have noted 
how public space impacts upon personal relations in the city. The impact of the 
partial settlement upon relationships will be explored further in the next chapter, but 
several insights from the interviews are particularly relevant here. 
One NGO worker, Ljiljana Gehrecke, recounts a story regarding the impact 
of mono-ethnic forms of memorialisation. She remembers being asked by two 
German reporters in 2009 whether or not it was possible that no Serbs died during 
the war, and replying that `there is not a war where only one side dies'. The two 
reporters had visited Ovcara and Vukovar hospital and found no mention of Serbs, 
but only of Croats. Gehrecke wants to have both sides of the story told, so that Serbs 
and other non-Croats are able to publicly remember their dead. She believes that 
'until that happens, this peace is not stable, because the side that is not mentioned 
feels discriminated. It's tense' (12,2009). 
The feeling of divisiveness is important and not intangible to Ljiljana 
Gehrecke and acts as a counterweight to the silences of everyday life; `if you are a 
Croat you are dominant and that's not something you can say, but you can feel it (12, 
2009; emphasis added). There is a connection here between the feeling of 
divisiveness and the discussions regarding public space in the previous chapter. 
Consider the following passage: 
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`Everything is Croatian, you can see that everywhere. In the theatre, on the 
curtains it reads "Croatian Women's Organisation to the People of Vukovar", 
and it says everywhere, "Croats". I understand that and it doesn't bother me, 
but it bothers a lot of people. Because Serbians don't want to go to the 
theatre then because they don't feel welcome, and that's not good' (12,2009). 
An external organisation presents a gift in the way of a theatre curtain to the city, an 
act of civil society imbued with political meaning, and as a result another public 
place is claimed by the state. Lifestyles adapt to the new meaning imposed on such 
places because they do not feel a sense of ownership, it is not theirs, and one avenue 
of artistic exposure and expression is closed off to the minority which further 
exacerbates the feeling of division. 
Another NGO staff member makes the link between public space and the 
everyday. Asked if public space reminded people of the war, he replied 
`Yes. The space in the parks and everything is for healing people. It depends 
what you will do with this space. If you create something that reminds you 
of war people will immediately think about it and they just walk around 
thinking of the war' (19,2009). 
Not all public space in Vukovar can be seen in this way. In recent years, for 
example, an annual international film festival has been hosted by Vukovar, with 
films being shown on a riverboat moored on the Danube. Symbolically, the move 
towards cultural openness takes place literally on the border with Serbia. On the 
basis of what has been presented in this chapter, it may take more than a few years 
for such developments to establish a firmer foothold within the cultural life of the 
city, and even if they do they would have to coexist with the ethnically particularist 
understanding of the war discussed in this chapter. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to problematise the peace settlement described in the 
previous chapter by taking the reader to Vukovar itself. It has described a physical 
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space in which a narrative of the war in Croatia and in Vukovar specifically is 
projected. In contrast to the multiethnic norms espoused by the settlement supported 
by politicians such as No Sanader, the narrative projected throughout Vukovar is one 
which favours a particular Croatian perspective. 
Through such physical memorials as the cross, the tower and the statue of 
Tudjman a narrative is constructed and projected through the reconstructed city 
which portrays Croatian victimhood and Croatian victory, but which silenced non- 
Croatian memories. This narrative is supported by a range of smaller symbols such 
as flags, graffiti and posters which carry the nationalist message into cafes, shops 
and official buildings. A Boothian move to understand security not at the level of 
the state but at the level of the individual, coupled with an emphasis on experiences 
of insecurity and security as they are lived, suggests that public space has been 
transformed into symbolic space in Vukovar. 
The arguments presented in this chapter suggest that everyday life in 
Vukovar is infused with a constant projection of a constructed memory of the war 
which does not favour dialogic principles. This has important consequences. 
Firstly, public space is no longer truly public because of powerful ethnically- 
particularist symbols which exclude non-Croatian citizens. Secondly, the ethnically- 
particularist nature of the symbols discussed in this chapter suggests the post-war 
peace to be only a partial settlement. 
The use of Edkins is crucial in framing the physical cityscape in Vukovar as a 
response to the traumatic events described in the previous chapter. Vukovar exists as 
an unsettled space because a number of competing temporal frameworks exist there. 
The final section of the chapter suggests that this impacts upon social relations in the 
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city, primarily because physical space serves to promote a narrative that unjustly 
excludes non-Croats. 
The following chapter continues this theme by taking into consideration the 
nature of inter-ethnic relations in Vukovar. By understanding the everyday 
experiences of insecurity in Vukovar, theoretical debates about security and 
emancipation are animated in a way that reveals their human characteristics. The 
wider purpose here is to show the utility of understanding security and emancipation 
through lived experiences. 
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Chapter 5 
A Partial Settlement II: Division and Contestation 
Introduction 
The previous chapter problematised the peace settlement in Vukovar by showing 
how the process of post-war reconstruction and memorialisation favours one 
ethnicity above others, which runs contrary to the multiethnic composition of the city 
and to the fact that suffering was not confined to one ethnic group. This chapter 
continues the theme of problematising the settlement but takes a different form. 
The chapter focuses on interview material from Vukovar which suggests the 
post-war peace remains only a partial settlement. The purpose of the chapter is to 
show that when personal experiences and opinions are taken into account the 
divisions and ambiguities of living in the `post-war' period are revealed. Difference 
and contestation, rather than settlement, emerge as characteristic of the 'post-war'. 
Ultimately, it is the nature of these contestations which provide the impetus for 
much civil society activity, to be discussed in the following chapter. The task here 
then is to show the politics of the `post-war' period which further reveal the partial 
nature of the settlement. 
The chapter falls short of describing Vukovar as a divided city, as other 
scholars have done (see Baillie, forthcoming). Although there are divisions within 
the city it would be too simplistic to interpret those divisions in binary form, as Croat 
vs Serb, Catholic vs Orthodox, winner vs loser. The divisions and tensions 
highlighted here are far from unambiguous, and instead suggest a high degree of 
ongoing contestation. The sources discussed here imply a continuing debate about 
what the war meant and how people in Vukovar should now live, and it is a debate 
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formed in large part by various individual and collective reactions to the war which 
are themselves unsettled. Whereas the state attempts to find closure with regards to 
the past, to define a new beginning and to lend these new visions of past and future 
physicality in memorials and statues, the people who have to live surrounded by 
these material and metaphysical structures are still living with the war in the present. 
The chapter proceeds in three sections. The first part deals directly with the 
structures and institutions discussed in chapter 3, such as the legal framework, the 
economy, the UN and the EU, which were supposed to deliver the `post-war' 
settlement. Interview material reveals an ongoing process of contestation regarding 
these factors, calling into question the dominant narrative which presents Croatia as 
having completed a successful transition from 'war-torn' to European accession. 
The second section traces the contested legacy of the war to a local level by 
exploring understandings of Vukovar as a `divided' place and analysing apparent 
manifestations of the `division' in key settings such as local politics, schools and 
churches. This section further challenges the notion of the 'post-war' settlement by 
showing how some individuals understand Vukovar as profoundly unsettled in terms 
of social and political relations. 
The third section further challenges the notion of settlement but in less 
tangible ways. It explores the continuing human impact of the war by addressing 
themes such as forgiveness, trust, victimhood, war crimes, memory and loss. The 
purpose of this section will be to attempt an understanding of how the experience of 
insecurity in the past shapes living in the present long after apparent settlements have 
been drawn up. This raises questions about the linkage between institutions and 
security made by Linklater, as well as upholding Booth's scepticism towards the 
state as an agent of security. 
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The Partial Deliverance of Settlement 
In challenging the notion of a settlement in Vukovar it is appropriate to begin with 
the very structures and institutions which were tasked with delivering the `post-war' 
settlement and which consider Croatia to have completed a successful transition 
from insecurity to security. One such structure was the legal framework which was 
supposed to guarantee liberal democratic rights for every citizen. For many in 
Vukovar, however, there is an apparent distance between that framework and actual 
implementation. 
One NGO, Peace Centre Vukovar, has been heavily engaged with the legal 
dimensions of the partial settlement since the end of the war. They argue that there 
has not been very much progress in the application of human rights in Croatia since 
the war. `We think that they are very often on the edge of the law', says one staff 
member regarding the Croatian government. They are concerned also with the 
instruments of state action, he says, stating `we still don't have stable institutions' 
(120,2008). The problem is not the law itself, but its application. `There's a good 
law, a good framework, but it's a question of whether it is enforced or not', explains 
another Peace Centre Vukovar worker. Rights continue to be fought for in Croatia, 
and especially in places such as Vukovar which suffered more than most and 
subsequently has a more troublesome legacy to deal with. `The legal system and 
framework is good but the problem is that it's not enforced the way it should be. But 
the system is good', she explains (121,2009). The application of the law, of the 
settlement itself, remains a great challenge. 
In other areas, however, the framework itself is the problem. One NGO 
volunteer living in Vukovar, a Serb from Serbia who married another Serb from 
Vukovar, found that she would have to live in Croatia for seven years before being 
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granted full citizenship; `I will be a foreigner', she says, `so the only thing I have is a 
working license'. This limits the jobs she is able to apply for as most require full 
citizenship, hence her decision to volunteer at a Vukovar based NGO, Europe 
House. This suggests that areas of the law do not account for these forms of mixed 
marriage very easily, indeed, in this case the law seems to incentivise movement 
outside of the country for couples such as these. The result is a perception of ethnic 
division; `I heard a lot of stories about how Vukovar is divided, but didn't believe 
them until I came here', she recalls (14,2009). 
It is precisely this legal framework that was supposed to be set in place by the 
United Nations as part of the `peaceful reintegration' period. The concerns with the 
framework raised above are matched by concerns regarding the role of the UN 
mission itself in Vukovar among other NGO workers. Srdan Antic, a project leader 
with the Nansen Dialogue Centre based in the nearby city of Osijek, was not 
impressed by the work of the United Nations during the peaceful reintegration 
period, describing them as `peacekeepers, not peacebuilders' (110,2008). The 
implication is that the UN only succeeded in limiting forms of open violence, the 
manifestations of conflict described by Lilek as `subjective violence', as violence 
performed by a directly identifiable agent (Liiek, 2008, p. 1). Understanding the 
underlying systemic factors which lead to those of violence is left to civil society 
actors. 
Charles Tauber, Head of Mission for Southeast Europe for the Coalition for 
Work with Psychotrauma and Peace (CWWPP), is particularly scathing of the UN 
operation in Vukovar. Having been in Vukovar throughout the UN transitional 
period he has firsthand experience of the `peaceful reintegration' process. They were 
hypocritical, he argues, elitist, `top-down' and ignorant of the very processes they 
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sought to facilitate; one `Democratisation Officer' asked him what democratisation 
meant. UN troops threw lavish parties, used prostitutes and showed little respect for 
anybody else. The UN were also too short-termist and thought that everything in 
Vukovar could be solved within a matter of months. Tauber also asserts that the UN 
altered reports in favour of Croatia many times, although he refused to elaborate 
upon this in interviews. He was also frustrated by the acceptance by the UN of 
Croatia's `elitist' view of psychology and scepticism of alternative methods (126, 
2008). 'You really can't excuse the UN', he says, `they should have the 
experience'. Having said this, however, Tauber also reveals he wrote to senior UN 
officials in the region requesting them not to leave so soon (127,2008). Yet he 
maintains he has little respect for what they did in Vukovar, and he does not approve 
of the UN painting the mission as a success (131,2009). 
These levels of disapproval and doubt not only apply to past involvement 
with international institutions, but also to future engagement. Indeed, there is a level 
of fear present when Croatia's involvement with the `international community' is 
considered. Srdan Antic, for example, believes that the Croatian government is 
misleading the European Union by covering up local tensions in places like 
Vukovar. `The government say one thing at the European level and another at the 
local level' he argues (I10,2008). Inter-ethnic relations are presented as far more 
settled and unproblematic than they are at a local level, but at the same time local 
politicians adopt the war rhetoric of 1991 to win elections by manipulating war 
trauma. Serbs and Croats are guilty of this, he believes, 'selling a story to Europe 
that everything is perfect in Croatia' whilst asking their constituents to consider what 
might happen to ethnic relations if they do not vote for them. The danger is that 
Croatia will end up entering the EU as an ethnically cleansed state, he believes, as a 
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xenophobic nation, intolerant, and unprepared for the prospect of open migration and 
multiculturalism which membership of the European Union would bring (I11,2009). 
Charles Tauber also sees an international narrative which gives Croatia all 
the credit for winning the peace and being on the `right side' (128,2008). There is a 
sense here that an image of a harmonious nation is being sold to the international 
community by Croatia. Although there is truth in this to a degree, with the UN 
peacekeeping mission in Vukovar being seen as successful, commentators such as 
Paddy Ashdown and Richard Holbrooke, both with deep experience of international 
affairs in the region, have noted the rise of post-war nationalism in Croatia which 
suggests that not all outsiders see the country as being on the path to stable 
government (Ashdown and Holdbrooke, 2008). 
Two prominent Serbs based in Vukovar echo the sentiments expressed by the 
NGO workers above with regards to the relationship between Croatia, the EU and 
the `international community'. Vojislav Stanimirovid, the leader of the Independent 
Serbian Democratic Party (SDSS) which claims to represent Croatian Serbs and 
which has its headquarters in Vukovar, agrees that Croatia represents itself in ways 
very different to the actual situation. When asked if the Croatian national 
government is deliberately attempting to mislead the international community, 
replies, `yes, absolutely. Croatia is a Catholic country and they have lots of support 
from the Vatican and Germany' (135,2008). 
A Serbian Orthodox priest in Vukovar, Jovan Radivojevic states, 'my 
message to you and your country and to the EU is that the Serbs are not as they are 
shown to be'. Serbs are totally misrepresented, he says. `We only want peace, and 
to work in peace'. Against the tide of misrepresentation he asks for genuine 
communication: 
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'I want you to take my message to the organisation you're coming from and 
not take out any quotes. I wish a peaceful life for all the people of the world, 
regardless of ethnicity. What caused all those problems is that love faded, 
love for God and love for people' (137,2008). 
The problem identified by these individuals is that a narrative has been developed 
which portrays Croatia as a country which has successfully managed a complex and 
bloody transition from war to peace, from communist to capitalist, from authoritarian 
to democratic, but which fails to adequately address the continuation of minority 
discrimination in places like Vukovar. The point raised by the Orthodox priest 
Radivojevic is key here; Croatia is presented as `perfect' whilst the Serbs - in Serbia 
rather than in Croatia - remain international pariahs. This is why he speaks so 
passionately in favour of reassessing accepted opinions regarding Serbs. 
Scepticism towards the international community is not confined to those who 
are fearful of ethnic tensions being obscured. The same fear is apparent in those who 
have greater concerns: 
`We think that if we join the EU like this it will all just disappear, no one will 
talk about that, and if they do talk about that it won't be their primary work. 
I talked to one doctor in `92 and she said, do you remember the Vietnam war, 
it was 20 years ago and we are still looking for 20,000 people, so don't 
expect anything' (144,2009). 
The passage comes from Manda Potko, a leading member of an NGO called the 
Mothers of Vukovar, who focus on finding the bodies of missing persons. Her 
concern is that membership of the European Union may overshadow the work of her 
organisation as new items come onto the policy agenda. The finding of missing 
persons is a highly politicised issue in Croatia, but like all political issues it is subject 
to public attention. 
For individuals like Manda Potko the EU represents not an emancipatory 
ideal, as Linklater suggest, but a danger to the work of her organisation. The threat 
is that as `Europe' becomes the new obsession in Croatia attempts will be made to 
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move the past ever further away from the present. For individuals still looking for 
the bodies of their loved ones, therefore, the EU does not represent the promise of 
security. The changing political landscape represents a threat to the peace of mind of 
individuals such as Manda Potko, and thousands like her, and so in this sense the 
European Union can be seen as a source of insecurity. Such a view supports 
critiques of Linklater's reliance on institutional frameworks for emancipatory 
processes which have been made elsewhere (Kveinen, 2002). 
Yet there is tension here. Stanimirovid concedes that the international 
community is the best hope for the Serbian minority cause in Croatia (135,2008). 
Charles Tauber believes the international community should have pushed Croatia 
harder to deal with its traumatized population, which suggest for all his dismay 
regarding the conduct of UN forces he too believes in the capacity of `the 
international' to bring about change (128,2008). One NGO mentioned above, 
Europe House, was founded by a Serbian activist to prepare Vukovar for European 
integration, believing that Europe carried with it the hope of progress for the local 
population and for the country as a whole (I1,2008). 
One final core aspect of the settlement to consider is the economy. The 
settlement was built upon Croatia becoming a liberal democratic state, as chapter 
three argued, and part entails the development of a capitalist market economy. Here 
too, many challenges remain. The shoe factory in Borovo, just outside Vukovar but 
pivotal to the city's economy, was everything to those who worked there, according 
to an Evangelical pastor in Vukovar, Laszlo Nemeth. The factory gave people 
meaning to their lives, he adds (138,2008). The destruction of the factory and the 
lack of industry in the city is a major source of local dissatisfaction with the `post- 
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war'. The ruins of the factory serve as a constant reminder of what had been a 
thriving city. 
One NGO worker from another Vukovar based NGO, Youth Peace Group 
Danube (YPGD) argues that Vukovar is too expensive, that unemployment is too 
high and that, crucially, there has been no overall economic strategy (15,2008). The 
emphasis here then is not so much on the economic situation itself but more on the 
lack of government action. Nena Arvaj of Centre for Peace Osijek argues that more 
jobs are needed for the economy to develop, but that the local population in Vukovar 
were so traumatised the government were too afraid to invest in the area (115,2008). 
The new mayor of Vukovar took office in the spring of 2009 to inherit no investment 
plans and a sizable budget deficit (133,2009). 
Regarding unemployment, Charles Tauber argues there are no reliable 
figures. Official reports suggest it stands at 30%, although he believes it could be as 
high as 60% (123,2008). Furthermore, substantial economic opportunities for 
Vukovar were lost when potential investors saw how corrupt local politics were (124, 
2008). The industry is no longer in Vukovar to provide jobs, argues Tauber, and the 
political condition of the city will continue to dissuade investors (125,2008). 
Radivojevic, the Serbian Orthodox priest in Vukovar, describes how the youth in the 
city have little to do each day except sit in cafes; for him, this is a bigger problem for 
the city than any ethnic divisions (137,2008). It is important to note, however, that 
studies investigating the link between the economic development programmes and 
reconciliation in Vukovar have raised doubts over the extent to which economic 
recovery equates social harmony, arguing that `community reconciliation is an 
essential element of sustainable development' in the local area (Singer, 2005, p. 
220). 
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What this section has attempted to do is to challenge the idea of `settlement' 
in Vukovar by addressing the core means through which the settlement was to be 
delivered. The legal framework instilled by the settlement has not prevented 
continued cases of discrimination against minorities, or forms of `unjust exclusion' 
to use Linklater's terms. For example, Amnesty International have identified 
Vukovar as a priority area for addressing the lack of progress made in the 
prosecution of war crimes committed by Croatian soldiers against Serbian civilians 
(Amnesty International, 2008). 
Challenges have also been made to the UN, which considers the region 
around Vukovar to be an example of successful peacebuilding. The idea of Europe 
and the role of the EU can be seen as contested and problematical to many. 
Economic growth which was supposed to partner liberal democratic norms has not 
emerged. The settlement can be seen as partial in these ways, which raises questions 
regarding the relationship between emancipatory norms and actual practices. The 
implication is that the settlement has failed Vukovar in important ways which raised 
questions regarding the emergence of `top-down' emancipatory processes which rely 
on the institutionalisation of dialogic principles. 
Division in Vukovar 
This section will trace the contested legacy of the war to a local level by exploring 
understandings of Vukovar as a `divided' place and analysing apparent 
manifestations of the `division' in key settings such as local politics, schools and 
churches. This section further challenges the notion of the `post-war' settlement by 
showing how some individuals understand Vukovar as profoundly unsettled in terms 
of social and political relations. 
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There are people who live and work in Vukovar for whom the city is a 
divided place. Ljiljana Gehrecke, the President of Vukovar based NGO Europe 
House, sees at least two communities in the city, Croat and Serb, and although she 
sees the situation in Vukovar as having improved, for her it is still divided (I1, 
2008). Gehrecke asserts that many people in Vukovar believe the problems of the 
city would disappear if the Serbian population left, although for her, 'that wouldn't 
solve anything - the problems are inside' (12,2009). 
The problems Gehrecke speaks of are not merely about finance. She makes a 
more ambiguous claim that the Croatian government `made from Vukovar a symbol 
of being a victim, suffering, war crimes, and there is that kind of atmosphere here 
and it's not letting us go forward, so finance is no good then'. Vukovar needs to be 
released from the burden of the past, she argues. Nor is the divisiveness in Vukovar 
an outcome of law as Gehrecke believes that the laws in Croatia are good for all 
citizens including minorities. In practice, however, she believes that emotions have 
an important role to play in discriminating against the Serbian minority; 'in practice 
the Serbian minority is discriminated (against) although they have more rights than 
any other minority, but in practice they can't fight emotions' (13,2009). The nature 
of ethnic division in Vukovar is characterised by Srdan Antic as follows: 
`It seems like I don't belong anywhere because there are only two options, to 
be Serb or Croat. If you want to be neutral you are a traitor of your own 
national group' (I10,2008). 
Division is bound to identity which rests upon ethnic differences. The powerful 
moral force attached to ethnic identity makes any formulation of alternative 
identities difficult because ethnicity is seen to be the key factor in determining other 
identity traits. In this environment `people who work in the NGO sector are marked 
as some kind of traitor', he believes. He has heard that despite his parents living in 
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Vukovar and having grown up in the city he is seen as an `Ustashe' by fellow Serbs, 
a reference to the murderous Second World War regime in Croatia led by a Croat, 
Ante Pavelib. To some fellow Serbs, then, his working for an NGO is considered a 
betrayal of his ethnic group. To Croats, however, the fact he is Serbian implies he is 
also a Serbian nationalist (I11,2009). 
Antic's view of ethnicity and division is that there are two distinct 
communities within Vukovar which are based upon ethnicity. He sees everything as 
being divided in the city: cafes, beaches on the Danube river; schools, recreational 
clubs, sports events, in hospital and in associations for disabled people. This is 
linked to the framework of rights instilled after the war, he believes, which by 
ensuring minority rights also institutionalised ethnic difference. Such conflicts are 
everyday, he believes, and occur `in every point of social meeting'. Crimes which 
are unrelated to ethnicity, such as those involving drug smuggling across the border, 
are presented through the media as ethnic conflicts also. `When you have a divided 
community everything can be presented like this', Antic remarks (I11,2009). 
Another NGO worker, Snjeiana Kova6evi6 of Centre for Peace, Osijek, 
replies when asked if Vukovar is a divided city, `totally, completely... one would 
think that as time passes things would change... for instance the secondary schools, 
and you see the professors in the staff room are totally divided' (114,2008). filer 
colleague, Nena Arvaj, describes the situation in the city as 'two worlds' who are 
both opposed to reconciliation. For the reconciliation programme they run together 
almost all the participants are drawn from Vukovar. People in the city have 
problems sharing there, they observe, because `it's obviously divided'. Nena argues 
that `in Vukovar there is still a struggle for power and influence among Serbs and 
Croats, in politics and in the community' (115,2008). Snjeiana adds, 'once you get 
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into Vukovar you know that the whole city is segregated. If you go to a cafe you just 
know if it's a Serbian cafe and visa-versa' (116,2008). She does not specify exactly 
how it is known that certain places are ethnically divided, but it is possible she could 
have been referring to imagery such as flags and posters which appear in many cafes, 
to the accents of customers or to the reputations of particular establishments. 
The Evangelical pastor in Vukovar, Laszlo Nemeth, confirmed this view, 
describing how coffee shops in Vukovar are ethnically divided. Laszlo Nemeth also 
argues there is too much emphasis on Croatian heroism (138,2008). Another NGO 
worker from a different organisation, Peace Centre Vukovar, observes that the 
divisions in Vukovar are also obvious from any analysis of everyday life and from 
the media. `They succeeded in reconstructing the buildings but not society', says a 
member of Peace Centre Vukovar. Inter-ethnic problems still prevail (120,2008). 
The official definition of identity in Vukovar is disabling argues Charles Tauber, and 
it leads to what he terms `disfunctionality' (123,2008). For Tauber, it is a `tragedy' 
that after 14 years there is still little interaction between ethnic communities (I31, 
2009). 
Srdan Antic is of the view that many people in Vukovar do not speak out in 
public to be critical of their own ethnic group because every part of life in Vukovar 
is connected to ethnicity. There is a great deal of personal and professional risk 
involved, he believes, in being open (110, Srdan). Snjeiana Kova&viE of Centre for 
Peace, Osijek agrees with this analysis, saying that `nobody dares open up the 
conflict, to confront the problems, to sit and talk about it'. The wounds are still there 
from the war, she believes, it is just nobody knows how to deal with them in 
everyday life. What is needed is a place where people could come to discuss their 
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problems relating to the war and to take concrete steps to resolve them, `just a place 
where they could sit down and negotiate' (114,2008). 
One story recounted by Srdan Antic was that of a Croatian soldier who had 
been rescued by a Serbian priest. The man's friends teased him for this supposed 
humiliation. Regardless of this, however, a petition was started to lobby the 
Croatian government in support of providing the Serb with a pension. According to 
Srdan, if you ask locals about this they will say no, even though the story was widely 
reported in newspapers. `The positive things that have survived the war are not 
welcome in our society', he says of the incident (110,2008). 
The term `ghetto' is even used to describe ethnic relations in the city. `I have 
memories of a city which was not divided', says Srdan Antic, `I remember a city 
where 23 registered nations lived in harmony, not in the ghetto' (I11,2009). `I know 
people who say we should be mixed and live like we did before the war, but not yet 
and they send their kids to Serbian schools, like my father in law', says a local 
resident of mixed ethnicity. `My wife is Serb and her sister goes to Serbian school. 
I don't have anything against Serbian culture, Serbian language, anything, but they 
made a ghetto' (148,2009). 
It is not only civil society groups who see Vukovar as a divided place. 
Vojislav Stanimirovie, the leader of the SDSS which represents the Serbian minority 
in Croatia, shares the NGO view of a divided city. He blames the Croats for the 
division of the city because of their reluctance to discuss the future of the city and 
their continued focus on the war (135,2008). Local religious leaders also see the city 
as divided. Zlatko Spehar, a Catholic priest, believes the city remains divided 
because Serbs don't want to send their children to school (136,2008). For the 
Serbian Orthodox priest however Serbs are still marginalised in Vukovar. The 
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media are also a big problem in Croatia according to Jovan Radivojevic, because 
they are always trying to keep the levels of tension high (137,2008). 
Another religious leader in Vukovar, Laszlo Nemeth, remembers that when 
he first came to Vukovar in 2004 he was asked which nation he would reach out to. 
When he replied that he would reach out to all nations in Vukovar, he was told that 
would be impossible (138,2008). Another story illustrates the nature and impact of 
division upon everyday life: 
`When I first came back I was really hurt but I have some relations with the 
Orthodox church now, and I said hi to one lady who I work with for 20 years 
and she said she doesn't know me, as she stayed here in the war, and I was 
really hurt by that' (144,2009). 
A student of Serbian origin states that in Croatia Vukovar is seen as a city of heroes, 
but in Serbia the city is seen as Croatian territory. He does not feel at home in 
Vukovar, although he was born and raised there. `Some people insist on very small 
differences between Serbs and Croats, the language is one example - we understand 
perfectly what we want to say'. Many false divisions have been set up between 
Croats and Serbs, he adds (149,2008). It has also been noted by some that places 
which were deeply damaged during the war such as Vukovar are particularly 
susceptible to hate speech within the press, as editors and journalists are more 
inclined to stress ethnic background regardless of the offence (Southeast European 
Media Journal, online resource, 2010). 
The discussion above supports the notion of Vukovar as a divided city, which 
in turn gives credence to the notion of a partial settlement. The extent to which this 
is true is hotly contested by some. The Mayor of Vukovar, Zeljko Sabo, who was 
elected in 2009, disagrees with much of the analysis above. `What happened here is 
glorious, magnificent', he proclaimed of the successful reintegration of the region 
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into Croatia. `In all the evil that happened this is the best example, peaceful 
reintegration, it didn't happen in Uganda or Rwanda', he argues. Although he 
accepts that it remains an open question as to how long it will take to live as the city 
did before the war, what happened in Vukovar after the war is 'glorious'. Asked if 
Vukovar is as divided as the NGOs suggest, he replies: 
'No, that's nonsense, that person is probably writing such things for the 
sponsors to get money for programmes, the proof of that is when peaceful 
reintegration started, the two sides started living as normal people, and not a 
single incident between them was reported in the papers, there have been no 
big incidents, so there is peace now. So the city of Vukovar proved that we 
deserve to enter the network of cities, cities of peace, and to be a leader not 
only in Croatia but in the wider region, to show people that it is possible to 
live in peace after the war'. 
Vukovar is 'the best example of peace', he argues, and he sees the city as on a par 
with Hiroshima and Dresden in terms of their symbolic status. Only one problem 
remains in Vukovar, he believes, and that is the missing persons (133,2009). 
A member of the local government from the rightwing IIDZ party agrees 
with the view of the mayor, even though they are from separate parties. `Thanks to 
the wisdom of the Croatian government and international community we came back 
peacefully so this part was peacefully reintegrated', he argues, saying of the 
ethnically mixed local government that `cooperation in the council was satisfying 
and there were no difficulties, we always had lots of cooperation, acting in unison in 
the important decisions that were made for the city'. Vukovar is a success story, he 
adds, saying, 'we are proud that Croatia is one of the most peaceful cities in Croatia 
and there are no incidents like there are in other cities'. The fact that political parties 
cooperate in Vukovar shows how tolerant the post-war society is, he suggests. 
Regarding the NGO view of a divided city, he says `that would be a tragedy. I think 
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the reintegration went well and it's still going well. Our task is to not let this city get 
divided' (134,2008). 
Even Jovan Radivojevic, who sees the Serb minority as marginalised, also 
implies that divisiveness is more ambiguous than a simple Croat/Serb split in the 
city: 
`I don't see it that way. If it was ethnically divided there would be something 
in between, Serbs on the left and Croats on the right. There are Croatia 
coffee places where Serbs go and on the other side as well'. 
He recounts that when his father, a Serb, was ill, he was visited in hospital by Croats 
as well as Serbs, and Croats came to the funeral when he died also. `This proves 
they are people', he says, `why should we divide them into Serbs or Croats? ' Even 
so, ethnic relations in Vukovar are `unsettled', he argues (137,2008). For Snjeiana 
Kovatevie, Vukovar is different to other places in Croatia. `Whatever is normal here 
or in the rest of the world is not in Vukovar', she argues, adding, `Vukovar is a 
special case, nobody is really there for awaken it' (114,2008). 
What this points to is that it might not be appropriate to speak of a 'divided 
community', as is the temptation. It is perhaps more accurate to accept that 
alongside narratives and evidence of division, there are also understandings of a 
different kind which, to use Radivojevic's term, sees ethnic relations in the city as 
`unsettled' but not divided. What is clear, however, is that the supposed settlement 
is still open to contestation. This is particularly the case among the NGOs working 
in Vukovar. Having set out the ways in which the nature of `division' in Vukovar is 
understood, this section will proceed to address three concrete areas of city life in 
which the ambiguous nature of division plays out. As with the material presented so 
far, the arguments here are led by the interview material. 
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The first is local politics. Local politics is identified by NGO workers in 
particular as contributing to the problems faced by Vukovar. Pointing to the 500,000 
war veterans in Croatia, staff at the Vukovar based NGO Youth Peace Group 
Danube argue that politicians stay in power by maintaining divisions; `they have to 
keep them happy', one says in relation to how politicians treat veterans (15,2008). 
Veterans provide important political capital to politicians; `they are buying their 
voters'. Government is not seen as being for people, `they don't see that it's for 
local citizens' (19,2009). The political environment makes it difficult to be 
independently minded and efforts by NGOs to contribute towards a strategy for local 
economic growth have been met with derision by local political elites; `you give 
suggestions but they are laughing, because he gets his salary every month, and 
nobody will say' (15,2008). Dogma and points scoring characterise local Vukovar 
politics (19,2009). 
However, what may pass as points scoring in public does not characterise 
politics behind closed doors, argues Srdan Antic of the Nansen Dialogue Centre. 
Local politicians cooperate well there, he believes, 'because they have a common 
interest in keeping power - they need each others'. Keeping citizens divided - 
keeping them in a 'ghetto' - is good for politicians, he argues. He believes a secret 
agreement exists to maintain the notion of division particularly around election times 
in order to mobilise their ethnically determined constituencies. People are hired to 
serve in the local administration in order to satisfy quota regulations ensuring that 
the correct proportion of ethnic groups are employed, yet they have to be members 
of a political party in order to be considered, they have to be 'our Serbs', in his 
words. This does not stop NGOs such as Nansen attempting to work with local 
government, but such attempts tend to fail; `they are always trying to avoid it, not 
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saying yes, not saying no, because of the agreement to keep the divisions. There is 
no ideology', he adds, 'just the need to take power. ' The relationship between local 
politicians is, he believes, `a closed circle'. Within the local government he believes 
`there is no honest interest to support reconciliation; there is only the interest of the 
politicians, not of the ethnic groups who live here' (I11,2009). One interpretation 
by a YPGD worker refers to a loss of identity which makes political manipulation 
easier: 
`The main problem is they (the Croatian government) cannot decide what to 
do with the heritage of the Second World War and this ex-Yugoslav war, this 
story about Partisans and Ustashe, it's all the time in newspapers, somehow I 
think that Croatia is lost a bit after Yugoslavia... they can't find the basic 
thing and where we will build something. Here you still have mess. Then 
it's always easy to play with people, nasty tricks. Like a small child 
searching for its identity' (15,2008). 
For Srdan Antic the divisions within the city and the `nasty tricks' played upon local 
citizens are not inevitable but the product of deliberate political strategies which 
amount to `a democratic form of ethnic cleansing'. The end of the war did not bring 
about the end of ethnic cleansing, but rather a new form of it (110,2008). 'Very 
often Vukovar is considered as an example of reconciliation', says a member of 
Peace Centre Vukovar, `but there is still manipulation' (121,2008). Charles Tauber 
simply sees all local politics in Vukovar as corrupt (12,2008). 
The newly elected mayor of the city, Zeljko Sabo, agrees with the analysis. 
`It's clear now that the Serbian SDSS and Croatian HDZ (two nationalist parties in 
the local administration) were in a secret agreement', he argues, `and in the media 
they say "we the Serbs" and then they make an agreement to fight for a while'. 
Local politicians pursued this approach to deliberatively return the minds of voters to 
the war in order to disguise the lack of planning for the future of Vukovar, he 
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believes. 'If they stop talking about the conflict they have to show their 
programmes, what they did. They have very little to show'. Instead of looking to the 
future, `the only thing they can do is to awaken that hatred and fear. Croats say "we 
defended you" and the Serbian parties say "we defended you against Croats". It's a 
circle. It's also political marketing. They're writing messages on buildings and 
houses' (132,2009). Sabo himself does not think this contributes to the city being 
`divided', however, as is clear from statements made by NGO workers such as Srdan 
Antic others draw different conclusions. 
Jovan Radivojevic, a Serbian Orthodox priest in the Vukovar, replies when 
asked if the national government in Croatia discriminates against Serbs, 'officially 
not, but that's part of it. You can see this, you don't have to be too smart' (137, 
2008). Laszlo Nemeth, the Evangelical pastor, sees Croatian democracy as childlike 
and believes that many people in Croatia see democracy as an opportunity to get 
rich, particularly on a local level (138,2008). Another view of the national scene is 
that some Serbian politicians in Croatia are causing problems by advocating a 
separate state for Croatian Serbs (143,2009). A further view held by one NGO 
worker at YPGD is that the Croatia diaspora contributes to the division in Vukovar. 
`I think nationalism is very strong', she argued, 'you have a little group but they are 
very strong, they get money from outside, Australia' (15,2008). Others doubt the 
capacity of local government to deliver: 
`I think it is imaginary and artificial, what Sabo (the mayor) said. They don't 
have a programme really, they don't have a solution for jobs, they don't have 
anything. I'm not talking about state government, but local government, they 
can't do anything. They don't make decisions locally, only thing they can 
decide is for the parking lot or something. It's a very authoritarian party (the 
HDZ), coming from the centre' (148,2009). 
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A second key site in which the ambiguous nature of division can be seen in Vukovar 
is that of the school system and the experiences of young people in general. 
Education in Vukovar is highly problematic for many civil society actors. Ethnic 
segregation, in which Croats and non-Croats, mainly Serbs, use the same school 
building but at different times and with different teachers, is the main problem (122, 
2008). One employee of YPGD who is a youth worker highlights the central 
problem of the education system in Vukovar which is that because the schools are 
segregated consequently young people do not meet each other very often. Another 
employee points out the lack of government action, saying that `the local 
government are not doing anything for the youth' (16,2009). This feeds into a 
common theme emerging from the sources which is that government is seen as 
contributing to the problems in Vukovar by either propagating division or failing to 
act in ways which promote unity. 
Another opinion from within YPGD is that the younger generation is being 
heavily influenced by growing up in the shadow of their parents who survived the 
war. `Youngsters are even more nationalistic than older generations', he argues, 
adding `kids in primary schools hear stories like we heard about partisans and 
Germans'. The same employee also criticises the education system in Croatia, 
describing it as `terrible, because they don't teach us how to be creative' (19,2009). 
There is not enough focus on youth in Vukovar and little to keep them in the city 
(138,2008). 
The NGO which has most engagement with the local education system in 
Vukovar is the Nansen Dialogue Project, which for several years has advocated the 
founding of a mixed schooling system to replace the existing segregated system. 
According to Srdan Antic, one of the leaders of the project, 
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`the system of education is divided and is based on an agreement between 
Serbian and Croatian (local) politicians' (110,2008). 
In an analysis similar to that made by Ljiljana Gehrecke regarding the legal 
framework for minorities in Croatia, Antic believes that Croatia offers a high 
standard of minority education based upon the European Charter of Human Rights, 
but that this educational framework is not implemented in Vukovar because the city 
is 'different'. During the period of `peaceful reintegration' immediately after the 
war, school segregation seemed logical, he argues, but with years gone by since the 
war it is now time to encourage mixed schools. Research conducted by the Nansen 
Dialogue Centre found that 78% of parents in Vukovar were ready to send their 
children to mixed schools, with only 'those who have had some tragic experience' 
opposing. So, what accounts for the continuation of segregation? 
For Srdan Antic, the answer is straightforward: local politicians who wish to 
perpetuate ethnic divisions in Vukovar in order to cultivate an electoral base to 
maintain their hold on power. As he puts it, 'if you are raising a child to be a Serb, 
not to be a human, then you are raising a voter'. Antic argues that ethnic politics and 
education are intimately bound by the legacy of the war which reproduces the ethnic 
categories of moral difference which the war re-entrenched. 'These kind of schools 
are producing enemies', he argues, 'this kind of divisiveness is unnatural'. Students 
who share the same school building but who take classes according to ethnicity leave 
insulting messages and graffiti for each other, according to Srdan, and there are lots 
of fights and student strikes. Cleaners have to wash away the graffiti before 
journalists see it' (110,2008). In one kindergarten, there are separate entrances for 
Croats and Serbs (I11,2009). 
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Snjeiana Kova6evi6 of Centre for Peace, Osijek, recalls some research 
commissioned by her NGO in conjunction with the University of California, 
Berkley, which found that parents had not been consulted over whether or not the 
schools should be segregated. The research also found that parents in Vukovar 
preferred to have mixed schools, but that Serbian teachers wanted to maintain their 
positions in schools (116,2008). Significantly, one parent who is also the President 
of an NGO tasked with ensuring the memory of the Croatian dead lives on, the 
Widows of Vukovar, agrees. `We want the same schools, no division', she says. 'I 
think we have to cross that barrier. The war doesn't matter, and our kids associate in 
bars anyway' (145,2009). Not all parents take the same view. According to one 
resident: 
`Even the kids who are ten or fifteen now, they were born in 1991, they don't 
have to do with that, even if they are nationalists, they hate Croats or Serbs, 
they didn't do anything, even people my age (25) who have kids, they're 
laying that burden on their kids which is really not fair' (148,2009). 
A third arena in which the ambiguous nature of division can be seen to play out is in 
the religious communities of the city. One perspective which falls outside the 
powerful Croatian Catholic/Serbian Orthodox dichotomy is that of Laszlo Nemeth, a 
Hungarian Evangelical pastor based at a small church in Vukovar. The two larger 
churches are engaged in serious opposition to one another, he argues. 'Let's hate the 
other nation because as long as we have a common enemy you will come to us', is 
how he characterises their position. 'It's kind of like politics, just in church politics. 
They are spreading the hatred. You can touch the hatred' (149,2008). 
Public cooperation is superficial, he argues, saying that 'on the surface they 
are trying to do ecumenical stuff, but at the bottom they don't like each other - they 
don't do anything together'. Mutual hatred is communicated between the two faiths, 
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and those who attempt to articulate alternative understandings are removed. This 
happened to one Catholic priest who wanted Catholic and Orthodox communities to 
cooperate more. Ultimately, Nemeth argues, religious leaders are more important 
than democratically elected politicians in Vukovar among congregations (138,2008). 
His views are confirmed by a young Serbian student living in Vukovar. `Those kind 
of borders, Catholicism and Orthodox', he explains, `are really felt here' (149,2008). 
The Human Impact of War 
This final section explores the continuing human impact of the war by addressing 
themes such as forgiveness, trust, victimhood, war crimes, memory and loss. The 
purpose of this section will be to attempt an understanding of how the experience of 
insecurity in the past shapes living in the present long after apparent settlements have 
been drawn up. This raises questions about the linkage between institutions and 
security made by Linklater, as well as upholding Booth's scepticism towards the 
state as an agent of security. 
This section seeks to develop the point that Linklater's work, and to a certain 
extent Booth's, fails to grasp the human impact of insecurity because their 
engagement with empirical analysis is limited. Linklater's empirical analysis is 
confined to very general, broad statements about `moral resources', whilst Booth's 
empirical engagement, whilst apparently much more involved than Linklater's, is 
limited by the Welsh School framework which reifies the idea of global civil society 
at the expense of the very local voices he seeks to defend. What happens, then, 
when those who have experienced insecurity speak with their own voices? This 
section seeks to probe this issue. 
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At the heart of the issues being addressed here is the act of violence itself. 
Wars and battles are collective efforts, but the actual cause of personal suffering is 
the single impact of the bullet or bomb. To consider the Battle of Vukovar in late 
1991 as an experience of insecurity for the people of Vukovar would be accurate, yet 
the picture remains incomplete if the individual is lost. It is more a matter of 
considering the man who was killed in his garden by a mortar round and could not 
be buried for days because of the heavy shelling, and whose children eventually 
crawled from their cellar to move his body. Or the woman left with only the 
photographs of the home where she raised her children, the house itself in ruins, the 
father looking for the body of his son, or the widow telling her child stories of his 
heroic father. To bury such experiences beneath an ontological category like the 
Battle of Vukovar seems to inflict another act of violence upon them. 
Once the act of violence has taken place the survivors attempt to find 
meaning in the genuine sense of loss they feel. They construct and adopt the notion 
of war crimes and apply it to the violence. They might consider themselves as 
victims. Both are political outcomes which involve a process of othering. In many 
cases the result is a loss of trust in the other, with anger, resentment and a desire for 
revenge or at least justice simmering below the surface of social and political 
relations. Forgiveness for the act of violence becomes an endpoint many feel they 
should reach but cannot. In these ways the impact of war continues long after the 
formal settlement. For individuals the very notion of settlement, of security even, is 
not only intricately bound up with the act of violence in the past, it is also associated 
with a distant understanding of peace in the future. 
Individuals are caught between the violence of the past and the desire for 
security in the future. Bill McSweeney's understanding of security as relational, as 
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each finding security the other - the image of the mother and child - comes to the 
fore here, but the true meaning of security in this sense only becomes apparent when 
the relationship is broken in the act of violence (McSweeney, 1999). The human 
impact of war, then, is to break the relationships to family, home, employment, 
which had until that point been understood as secure. Loss is central to this. 
In Vukovar the sense of loss, and subsequently insecurity, is deeply felt 
among those who are still looking for the bodies of their loved ones. 'I am still 
looking for my husband' says Manda Potko of the Mothers of Vukovar (142,2008). 
She has been looking since late 1991, when he disappeared as the city fell. `Around 
70 people have been found this year (2009), Serbian and Croatian nationalities', she 
says, `and we're still looking for 480 from this county and the city itself is looking 
for 350. From all the country from 1991 we are looking for 1041 and 800 from 
1995' (144,2009). Those who have been found are remembered explicitly, as their 
names are inscribed on tombstones, in museums and in the publications available at 
large memorial sites (leaflets at the Ovcara site carry the names of all those killed 
and buried there). Indictments of suspected war criminals specifically name the 
persons supposedly killed by the accused, so that a direct responsibility for their 
deaths is attributed to them. For example, the list of all 254 persons killed at Ovcara 
are published as an annex attached to the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic. 
It may well be true that as the missing remain so, the distinction between 
missing and dead begins to blur, as was noted by scholars seeking to understand 
another traumatic event, 9/11 (see Miller, 2005). But those who are still missing are 
only remembered as such, and to those who are still looking there is a world of 
difference between missing and found, which makes the notion of settlement - for 
the living and the dead - difficult to attain. Some have speculated that the 2010 
166 
election of a new and moderate Croatian President, No Josipovic, may thaw relations 
with Serbia which could have an impact on the campaign to find missing persons 
(Bancroft, 2010). Yet it is only with the certainty of knowing that settlement can be 
achieved. 
The state supports their work in principle, but affording the complicated 
scientific analysis which accompanies the discovery of a new grave in the area is 
always a problem. One DNA analysis alone costs 8000 Kunas, or £900 (143,2009). 
According to a pamphlet distributed by the Mothers of Vukovar, `this search is sad 
and it hurts, but it does not allow us to give up until we know the truth. However, 
the HOPE has remained. It keeps us alive' (Associations of Families of Missing and 
Violently Detained Persons of Vukovar, date unknown). 
For those who have found their loved ones and who have a grave to mark 
their loss, a degree of finality exits but the security of the living relationship remains 
lost. For some of these people one of the most important duties they feel they have 
is `to keep the memory' alive, as put by Vesna Katie, President of the Widows of 
Vukovar. `Our emotions are still very mixed', she adds. `Everyone has their own 
stories of the war' (145,2009). Staff with YPGD agree that the memory of the war is 
being kept alive: 
`We have so many organisations connected to the war. I go to lots of places 
and they are all there... listen to my story' (19,2009). 
This particular interviewee regards the process of storytelling as important for some, 
such as those who have lost close relatives, but she f inds the frequent retelling of war 
stories by soldiers in the press unnecessary (19,2009). 
167 
Interpretations of the war are informed by the inherent subjectivity of 
violence itself. The subjective nature of the experience leads to disagreements over 
how the war should be interpreted. Debates about the immediate past influence the 
future direction of social relations in Vukovar. One illustrative debate here is that 
between two of the religious leaders, Zlatko Spehar and Jovan Radivojevic, Croatian 
Catholic and Serbian Orthodox priests respectively, concerning the violence of the 
war and the possibility of forgiveness. Spehar, when interviewed, was reluctant to 
forgive those he saw as the perpetrators of violence: 
Who is the aggressor? They attack your house and steal your possessions. 
Who is to blame? The day the Serbs chose to attack was the day Croatian 
children were coming back from school, when the Serb children had already 
left on 23 August, they attacked on 25 August, so they were waiting for the 
Croatian children to come. That's a crime, they planned that'. 
Spehar recalls the infamous 'Memorandum' produced by the Serbian Academy of 
Social Sciences which advocated a greater Serbia, which he sees as clear evidence of 
Serbian intentionality (see Cohen, 1996). 'Those are the facts', he says. `You can't 
forgive someone who doesn't ask for forgiveness'. Such opinions are built upon his 
own experiences of the war as well as those of others - most likely members of his 
own large congregation, given that mass is well attended on a weekly basis and 
particularly during festivals such as Easter (the author attended one such service, 
when approximately five hundred worshipers gathered in the reconstructed interior 
of the Church of St. Philip and Jacob). He recounts one such story: 
`There's an old lady and 7 people were killed in front of her. She had to 
watch her husband and kids die. Her neighbours did that, she said they were 
good neighbours and their children went to school together, then the 
Chetniks... She says she is praying for the strength to forgive them. That's the 
power of the Catholic Church. If the church wasn't here in Vukovar there 
would be a war. One Serbian lady said to Croat returnees, "what kind of 
people are you - if you did to us what we did to you we would kill you". 
We're not murderers - we defended the city. One man was injured by a bomb 
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and he was escaping the city on the last bus in '91, a priest asked him "do 
you hate? " He said no. He was 19. The priest said, "do you forgive", he said, 
"I can't father. I can't. I can't forgive them. They destroyed my city, 
murdered my relatives. I can't forgive them. I'm not born to kill but to live'. 
According to Spehar, the, Croatians do not have to ask for forgiveness. He looks to 
a foreign precedent to support his case. 'Should England ask Scotland or India for 
forgiveness? Did England do that? We weren't aggressors, we were defenders, 
there's a big difference', he argues (I36,2008). 
When Spehar's view is taken to Radivojevic, the Serbian Orthodox priest in 
Vukovar, the notion that Serbs should ask Croats to forgive them for the acts of 
wartime violence is not met with sympathy. 'I never heard the Croats ask for 
forgiveness for Jasenovac and other concentration camps', he says, a reference to the 
infamous Croatian concentration camps of the Second World War where thousands 
of Serbs were killed. Such views were echoed in comments made by Serbian 
Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic, who compared the destruction of Vukovar to the 
ethnic cleansing undertaken by Croatian soldiers of Serbian areas in the latter stages 
of the 1991-95 war (Radio Free Europe, online resource, 2008). Radivojevic does, 
however, suggest a less divisive approach to the question of forgiveness, saying that 
both Croats and Serbs should apologise for crimes committed during the war. 
However, `it's easy to apologise but it has to come from the heart' (137,2008). The 
point here is that on the basis of the views of these two religious leaders the partial 
nature of the settlement becomes clearer. 
The scale of the task facing those who want to create spaces in which 
forgiveness can be considered is illustrated by another story from the Evangelical 
pastor in Vukovar, Laszlo Nemeth. A woman in his church saw eight people burned 
to death. She was beaten and forced to watch it. The woman remains a member of 
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the church congregation but has difficulty saying the words 'Our Father'. She prays 
for forgiveness, Nemeth notes, but she still hates the Serbs. `It's a process of 
reconciliation', he says, `most are ok, some are ok just on the surface' (138,2008). 
NGOs play a part in this process. Ljiljana Gehrecke of Europe House recounts a 
story involving a local Catholic priest: 
`I went to a Catholic priest and said "I'm sorry, I need you to forgive me". 
He said "I can't forgive you", and I said, "what did Jesus say about how 
many times you should forgive? " And he said, "forgive, forget and then you 
go to Ovcara". You get killed because of forgiveness. He was a Catholic 
priest. I told him, "Father, I am a lot older than you and I forgave a lot of 
times in my life and I never felt sorry.. (I2,2009). 
Others manage this process on their own. War veteran Mato Dudie provides a case 
in point: 
`They (NGOs) teach us that we need to forgive because Jesus forgave those 
who killed him. Our Leader (of the church) said we can't forgive if they 
don't ask for forgiveness, but they don't have to ask me, I have to ask for 
myself, I have to forgive for myself, because of myself, because I am. Hatred 
is eating me inside; it doesn't harm anyone that I hate, so I forgive my 
enemies. I forgive' (139,2009). 
It may well be that such examples are rare. This is certainly the opinion of Snjeiana 
KovaUvid, of Centre for Peace, Osijek. `Whatever they can do they can only forget, 
forgive if they have enough resources', she says. `or they can just go on hating the 
other nationality and hate the rest of the world for what a few individuals did' (114, 
2008). To meet the act of violence with anger, then, is easier than to forgive. 
Citizens in Vukovar who have more positive attitudes towards members of 
other ethnic groups and who are more able to admit that all sides committed war 
crimes during the conflict are more open to reconciliation; it is not the experience of 
trauma itself which determines attitudes to the other, but the way in which 
individuals manage their traumas in relation to the inevitable daily encounters with 
the other (Biro and Milin, 2005). 
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Forgiveness is of course intricately bound up with victimhood. One employee 
with YPGD sees the status that Vukovar has as a symbol of victimhood as related to 
the lack of economic growth, suggesting that 'somehow people living here are just 
victims all the time.. . trying to get things from the outside 
but not to learn or to 
create' (15,2008). Srdan Antic agrees with this sentiment, believing that people in 
the city `are expecting that someone will come and solve their problems' (I10, 
2008). Nena Arvaj of Centre for Peace Osijek sees Vukovar as a living memorial in 
which a mentality of `we are victims please help us' exists (115,2008). Charles 
Tauber agrees with this analysis, asserting the view that many people in Vukovar see 
themselves as victims and feel helpless (124,2008). 
Vesna Bosanac, the Director of Vukovar Hospital, also served as a witness in 
the trial of Slobodan Milosevic in The Hague. Perhaps surprisingly for an individual 
who could so easily assume an ethnically particularist perspective, being a high 
profile survivor of the war, she takes a universalist view of trauma and victimhood: 
`Everyone needs help, everyone is traumatised, all are victims, regardless of 
whether they are Croat or Serb' (140,2008). 
A similar view is offered by Laszlo Nemeth, the Evangelical pastor in Vukovar, 
regarding guilt: 
`All of them feel guilt, for fighting or not fighting, picking sides or not 
picking sides, saving someone or not, leaving or not leaving, there's a lot of 
looking back to the past and they need to get out of that. They are living in 
the past' (138,2008). 
What is interesting about these views in particular is that their universal approach to 
victimhood and guilt might open up universal approaches to forgiveness. If all are 
seen as vulnerable a more open and tolerant approach towards mutual understanding 
might be possible. The difficulty lies in persuading those such as Spehar, who sees 
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victimhood as ethnically determined, and politicians who deny the very existence of 
these problems, of the validity of such views. 
Exacerbating these issues surrounding forgiveness and victimhood is the fact 
that the nature of the conflict, which was a civil war, means that everyday life in the 
`post-war' period involves regular interactions with the other. One local resident 
described the situation as follows: 
`It's like this. What if us two are forced to live together, for some reason. 
One day we get into a fight, I stab you, but we're still forced to live together. 
If you did that to me we'll probably kill each other, or we will try to forget, 
because maybe I was crazy at the time. But it's not really the same (148, 
2009). 
Snjelana Kovairevib argues that the 1991-95 war left a legacy that was never 
properly dealt with, and no support programme was ever put in place for people to 
deal with the everyday problems that come about from living with those who were 
formally enemies. It has been noted that the return of Serbs and Croats to places 
such as Vukovar, where many people are traumatised and carrying emotional 
problems, will result in `a climate in which hatred, distrust and vengeful desires will 
be very frequent emotions' (Klain, 1993, p. 117). That no structures were put in 
place to deal with this meant that when people saw somebody they know had been 
involved with the other side during the war they had to 'deal with the wounds again', 
Kovadevid argued. She provides a story to illustrate the point: 
'One Croat soldier saw a police officer giving him a parking ticket, but he 
recognised him from the war and remembered what he did, yet he is still 
wearing a police uniform. The man said "I just don't know what to say or 
what to do, I would just rather hate myself'. He can't believe he has a pistol 
again! ' 
She adds that there is no place to make an appeal, or even to shout out, because 
freedom of speech is curtailed by the divisive atmosphere of the city (114,2008). 
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Charles Tauber believes this is also related to a societal communication problem and 
patriarchal structures which combine to limit the abilities of citizens to talk freely 
(124,2008). 
Thus far this section has centred upon unsettled relationships. A discussion 
on war veterans focuses more on the unsettled individual. Snjelana KovaUvia of 
Centre for Peace, Osijek, says of veterans, `the fact is that nobody is helping them 
out'. Their families also suffer as a result, she says, and many veterans commit 
suicide and commit domestic violence. The government has not done enough to help 
them, and there is no programme or strategy in place, although the funds have been 
available. Veterans are pacified by the role played by politicians since the war in 
honouring the memory of the war. Snjeiana explains that 'they give meaning to 
what has happened in the sense that Vukovar and the victims of Vukovar should not 
be forgotten, that those lost ones did not lose their life in vain, that it was worth it'. 
But there is little practical support for veterans apart from medical assistance the 
prescription of drugs. Some projects have been organised in Vukovar by groups of 
veterans, but they amount little more than places for socialising rather than 
psychological or welfare assistance (114,2008). 
One of Snjeiana's colleagues at the Centre for Peace, Osijek, Nena Arvaj, 
agrees with her analysis. The government, she argues, provides money for veterans' 
organisations but she believes many of them are alcoholics. The problem is that 
people who are part of strong organisations, such as groups of veterans, do not think 
they need help (115,2008). Charles Tauber notes that a leader of a local veteran's 
organisation told him that 80% of his members had made at least one suicide 
attempt, although he admits that no reliable figures exist (123,2008). Laszlo Nemeth 
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asserts that when it comes to Croatian veterans, `nobody cared and nobody cares for 
them' (138,2008). 
During one fieldwork trip to Vukovar, the author encountered one veteran 
who would be found each night in the same bar, always drinking heavily and keen to 
voice his opinions, usually in a cheerful manner. Ile had been seventeen when the 
war began in 1991, and fought as one of the 'Defenders of Vukovar' before being 
taken prisoner. Having survived the war, he currently lives off state benefits. The 
affection with which he was held by other regulars in the bar was clear, as was their 
pride for him. The veteran gave the author an expired identification card, given to 
all veterans to allow them to receive their benefits, so that he would not be forgotten. 
The lasting impression upon the author was that the veteran embodied the loss of 
youth that many more would also have suffered. 
There are numerous support groups for veterans in Vukovar, most of which 
are attached to a particular unit from the war. Mato Dudid was President of the 
Vukovar Retired Policeman Association which supports many veterans. A veteran 
himself, he was a young police officer when the war broke out and sided with the 
'Defenders' of the city. 'Everyone who went through the hell of Vukovar has 
consequences', he says, 'but some of those became alcoholics. There is one guy 
who is in rehab now, and we talk to him. We try to talk to those who drink or do bad 
things now' (139,2009). 
One problem is that many serving soldiers and policemen were forced to 
retire. `I would have never retired if I was not forced to', Dudie says, 'I started 
looking for a job after that but I had to retire, there was nothing, so it would have 
been better if we worked'. Work, or rather the lack of it, remains a key problem for 
many veterans: 
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'I understand that because most of us were not good in some way 
psychological or health so there were cases when they were making up jobs 
for people so they would have some work but they did nothing, they were 
there for nothing. It was very hard to find jobs for invalids, it's hard to find 
jobs for someone who is not 100% healthy, it's hard if they are healthy and 
even harder if they are an invalid' (139,2009). 
According to a local citizen, war veterans are seen as a burden. 'On memorial day 
everyone says they are heroes but no one cares really' (148,2009). One view in 
support of this is offered by Charles Tauber, Director of CWWPP, who says it is 
difficult to get local, national or international recognition of the levels of trauma in 
the city. This is closely related to the high levels of drug dependence, physical 
illness and suicide rates in Vukovar. He considers the combinations of drugs 
prescribed to many people as `weird and wonderful' brews which lead to addiction 
(123,2008). 
Overhanging so much of the themes and relationships discussed in this 
section is the matter of war crimes. Srdan Antic regards the Croatian attitude 
regarding war criminals is that they are surrounded by them, which allows the Croats 
to mark out all Serbs as potential war criminals (110,2008). Certainly the notion of 
living with murderers has real purchase. `I know war criminals are living here, it's 
the truth', says one local youth (148,2009). Revenge is still seen as legitimate by 
many, Antic argues (I10,2008). For many people it is still very hard to discuss war 
crimes (122,2008). This may partly explain why prosecutions of suspected war 
criminals struggle to find witnesses and to obtain local cooperation. 
Stanimirovid of the SDSS party argues that Croatian crimes committed 
against Serbs during the war continue to be ignored, 
'because they would have to talk about who killed those people, and those are 
Croatian generals, so we have to ask if that was a civil war or a war of 
aggression. If Croats were the only victims it was a war of aggression, but if 
not it was a civil war' (15,2008). 
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Again, the debate between the two priests illustrates the point here. For the Catholic 
priest, Spehar, 
`no one is doing their time for crimes committed in Vukovar. There are 
villages where lots of people were killed and nobody has been punished. 
Serbs destroyed everything. Vukovar was 95% destroyed. In one village 
Serbs planned to be recorded leaving a village by force to portray themselves 
as victims. There is a tape recording of a Croatian policeman giving bread 
and milk to a Serb woman and she killed him. You can't show me one Serb 
who wasn't wearing weapons. So we can't talk about innocent civilians'. 
In contrast, to this, 
'One Serbian soldier who was wounded was taken to the hospital by Croat 
forces, they didn't kill him. He was treated equally, witnesses are alive, and 
he accused the hospital of mistreatment' (136,2008). 
Running counter to this however are the views of the local Serbian Orthodox priest, 
Jovan Radivojevic: 
'I can never make peace with the idea that Serbs were the aggressors in this 
war; I am from Borovo, I don't agree that Serbs attacked themselves, and 
those policeman who came to Borovo on 2nd May had good intentions. 
When you come to some place with weapons you come to kill. I don't feel 
that Serbs caused the war (137,2008). 
Memorials which speak of the `Serbian aggressor' are wrong, he argues. Just as 
forcefully, he denies the notion that Serbs alone were to blame for crimes committed 
during the war: 
There are war criminals on each side. If we are looking for war criminals on 
one side we should also look on the other. I don't agree with the fact that 
only one is to blame, it takes two to fight. We are talking about Srebrenica; 
nobody is talking about Serbs killed in Bosnia. My mother lived in a Muslim 
city during the war, she was forced to leave, she had to move to a Serbian 
village, was living in a tom house.. . so there is one law for Serbs and another 
for the rest of the world (137,2008). 
This relates to comments made earlier in the chapter regarding the ways in which 
Serbs are marginalised. Clearly, the sense among both Croats and Serbs is that 
crimes were committed against the other. This has led to a loss of trust which is also 
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characterised by ethnicity. One study has shown that feelings of helplessness, fear 
and lack of understanding about why the war happened were major factors that 
contributed to the breaking up of formally close relations. The veteran, Dudi&, 
expresses the issue as follows: 
'It's a matter of trust, mostly, they are separating their kids in kindergarten 
and school, and one example 100 metres from here was a mass grave which 
was relocated. So they were working on that for three days in 1991, to 
relocate, and I can't believe that nobody saw what happened, that none of the 
neighbours saw what happened, and I say "hi" to everyone but we are not 
friends, we are just talking, but we're not friendly. It's a matter of trust' (139, 
2009). 
The same sentiment is expressed by a member of the Mothers of Vukovar, an NGO 
committed to searching for the bodies of the disappeared: 
'We, the small people, we don't argue, we just doubt each other. But the 
ones who started the war, political people, they know more than we do. It's 
like we all think, "you know where our graves are", but they actually don't' 
(143,2009). 
The issue is highly sensitive for people who are looking for their relative such as 
this, because although most local citizens will not know where the bodies are, it is 
almost certain that a few will. As well as the trials at The Hague for the massacre 
committed at Ovcara, the farm near to Vukovar where several hundred people were 
murdered having been taken from the hospital, there are also local trials for people 
accused of murder on a smaller scale. One trial of a Croatian-Serb in 2008 
concerned the disappearance of five men from the hospital in Vukovar who have yet 
to be found (Southeast European Times, 2008). Such cases fuel the notion that 
members of other ethnic groups know where the missing are, but are too afraid of 
recrimination or prosecution to say. 
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Conclusion 
`You can't build on the new foundations', argues the Evangelical pastor Laszlo 
Nemeth. The possibility of another war is very real, he believes. `They say around 
here that every 50 years there must be a war' (138,2008). According to the 
institutions discussed in chapter three, such as the United Nations and the European 
Union, the idea of Croatia sliding into war again would not seem a possibility. After 
all, the UN left Vukovar in 1998, confident in the legal framework it bequeathed, 
sure that economic and political development would lead to EU entry in the future, 
and subsequently to security. Settlement seemed not only possible, but already 
achieved. 
The discussion in this chapter suggests not so much a settlement, but 
processes of ongoing contestation. Major differences have been identified. The idea 
of settlement has thus been challenged and its partiality revealed in important ways. 
Such a view is shared by observers based in the region. One reporter writing on the 
respected Belgrade news outlet B92 argued in 2006 that `if there is a test-case for 
reconciliation 15 years after the Balkan wars, Vukovar is it, and the results are 
disappointing', citing the continuation of emotional pain and the division of public 
space as sources of tension (Jungvirth, online resource, 2006). 
It is worth pausing here to reflect on how this chapter and the previous one 
relate to the wider aims of the thesis. Together they have sought to show the partial 
nature of the post-war settlement, and in doing so, they have revealed the insecurity 
of everyday life for many. By attempting to understand the settlement in Croatia, 
which proponents would characterise as a form of emancipation given its democratic 
structural underpinnings, through the lived experiences of citizens, a different and 
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more troubling account of post-war life emerges which is characterised by exclusion 
and difference. The previous chapter described the narrative of Croat victory and 
victimhood, but this chapter has suggested that victimhood is widespread. This is 
not just a consequence of the war itself; it is a consequence of a lack of 
communicative structures within society. On the basis of the evidence presented in 
this chapter and the preceding one, post-war Vukovar is not characterised by dialogic 
relations. 
The following chapter seeks to take the thesis in a new direction. It will seek 
to explore the work of NGOs operating within the context discussed in this chapter 
and in the previous chapter. Amid the unsettled legacy of the war in Vukovar, 
NGOs pursue a number of strategies and goals. Their work will be the subject of the 
following chapter, which is also the beginning of the final section of the thesis. The 
final section further explores the interplay between the universal and the particular 
through an analysis of the emancipatory practices which take place within the local 
context of difference and contestation discussed in this chapter. Interviews with 
NGOs in Vukovar support Booth's emphasis on civil society groups as agents of 
emancipation. Subsequent interviews, however, challenge his view in important 
ways as the human limits of civil society engagement in emancipatory practices are 
also revealed. 
However, even when such limitations are taken into account, certain civil 
society practices show how Booth and Linklater's respective understandings of 
emancipatory practice are played out in what are termed micro-dialogic 
communities, to be explored in chapter 8. Such practices allow individuals to 
explore their competing truth claims about the war in Croatia through open 
dialogue. These alternative dialogues open new spaces and allow dominant 
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understandings of the war to be subverted. The purpose of the thesis is to claim that 
the security as emancipation move should be understood in light of lived experiences 
of security and insecurity. With this in mind the discussion now turns to the work of 
NGOs engaged in peacebuilding in Vukovar. 
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Chapter 6 
Interaction, Advocacy and Struggle: The Work of NGOs in Vukovar 
Introduction 
This chapter continues the empirical focus of the thesis but takes the analysis in a 
new direction. The previous three chapters have sought to explore the experience of 
insecurity in Vukovar from late 1991 onwards and to question the notion of 
settlement through a consideration of the legacy of war on spatial forms and societal 
relationships. They have argued that forms of insecurity persist in Vukovar. which 
in turn has implications for understandings of security as emancipation. 
It is within the context of contestation and division discussed in the previous 
two chapters that civil society organisations emerge. This chapter seeks to detail the 
work of seven NGOs working in Vukovar. The chapter will use firsthand accounts 
drawn from semi-structured interviews with individuals who are currently working 
or have worked in the past for the NGOs in question to detail the practical work 
which is being undertaken by those organisations. 
In Vukovar there have been a number of different institutions and NGOs 
involved in forms of `post-war reconstruction' since the war in Croatia ended in 
1995. These organisations were varied and included large international bodies such 
as the UN, the OSCE and international NGOs like Red Cross International. Some 
scholars of post-war Croatia have derided these INGOs as only reflecting the 
interested of the `new globalised professional middle class' (Stubbs. 1996). 
Regional civil society networks and small, locally based NGOs were also active. 
Together these organisations show the number of ways in which peacebuilding is 
understood and implemented. 
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As the Croatian state has stabilised under the new settlement described in 
chapter 3, many of the large organisations left the region, yet a number of smaller 
NGOs still function. There are five organisations dedicated to forms of 
peacebuilding based in Vukovar: Europe House, Peace Centre Vukovar, Youth 
Peace Group Danube, PROM and the Coalition for Work in Psychotrauma and 
Peace. Two other organisations, the Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human 
Rights and the Nansen Dialogue Centre are based in the nearby city of Osijek; 
however both organisations conduct work in Vukovar. These are the seven 
organisations with which this chapter is concerned. Each will be dealt with 
individually. The subsections will detail the mission of the organisation and the 
activities they pursue. They will provide a brief history of the NGO, describe the 
working conditions and note significant transnational connections. 
The purpose of the chapter is to detail the work of key NGOs in Vukovar and 
to provide `thick' descriptions of political activity with a view to exploring the 
relationship between civil society, security and emancipation more generally. In this 
way the chapter goes beyond a recent yet brief study of the NGOs discussed here 
which focused only on youth participation (Kosic and Byrne, 2009). Furthermore, 
that study did not consider the limitations of NGO activity as the following chapter 
will. Other studies have considered NGOs in other parts of Croatia but not Vukovar 
(Featherstone, 2000; Mitchells, 2003). 
Youth Peace Group Danube 
Youth Peace Group Danube (YPGD) is a youth club and one of the oldest 
peacebuilding organisations in the city, having been founded in 1995 following the 
end of the war in Croatia. YPGD `aims to promote the development of a civil and 
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democratic society based on non-violent culture, ethnic tolerance and respect for 
human rights' (YPGD, online resource, 2009). YPGD is also a member of a 
transnational network, the South East Europe Youth Network (SEEYN) which aims 
to unite NGOs focusing on youth issues in post-war states, to promote mutual 
understanding and to overcome prejudice (SEEYN, online resource, 2010). 
Volunteer workers from abroad have assisted the work of the organisations over the 
years, indeed, one estimate puts the number of international volunteers at two 
hundred since 1995 (15,2008). They are one of the few NGOs to own their own 
building, and subsequently are in a stronger financial position than most (16,2009). 
YPGD promotes its activities through its website but the site has not been 
updated since 2004 (YPGD, online resource 2010). The state of the site is indicative 
of a wider problem in human resources. At the time of writing, YPGD had no full- 
time staff members and was being run by a team of volunteers, many of whom had 
been part of the original team who set the project up in the first place but who are 
now occupied in other full time roles. Saga Bjelanovib is one such volunteer. He 
describes 2009 as a `tough year' for YPGD with people leaving and nobody to 
replace them. The founders of the organisation, some of whom still lived in the city 
or in the surrounding area, felt it would be a pity to close YPGD after it had 
successfully delivered many projects and so decided to keep it working (16,2009). 
This raises an important issue. If YPGD had managed to complete a number 
of projects successfully, why had they struggled to find a new generation to take 
over the organisation? The fact that the founders of the NGO had returned to 
oversee its work suggests a failure to entrench the organisation in the local 
community and to attract workers, even in an area of high unemployment. However, 
the work of YPGD continues. 
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YPGD was designed by its founders as a place where young people could 
meet others, where they could talk about subjects other than the war - `normal 
things' - and where they could bring new ideas (16,2009). The layout and 
positioning of the YPGD building is important in this respect. The building is set 
around a courtyard where football and other games are played, and access is though 
a set of gates. The courtyard cannot be viewed from the street and is self-contained. 
A number of smaller rooms are accessed off the courtyard where members can 
participate in group activities. The building itself is open planned and has an 
informal atmosphere created by the vibrancy of the activities. It is located on a 
hilltop around fifteen minutes walk from the centre of the city and thus feels separate 
to the city. This is helpful for the mission of the NGO which is essentially to be a 
different space for young people. 
The NGO is described as a meeting space by SiniSa Mitrovib, one of the 
founders of the organisation and a current volunteer, now in his mid-30s. This is 
especially important in Vukovar because of the segregated school system described 
in the previous chapter. In YPGD young people of all ethnicities participate in 
different activities without fear of prejudice. According to Saga Bjelanovid, `they get 
things here which they cannot get anywhere else in the city, as the local government 
are not doing anything for the youth'. Sini§a Mitrovid is convinced that no other 
organisation offers young people the same services, saying that `for the youth this is 
unique'. When the members meet each other at YPGD activities there is no conflict, 
and differences between them, in language for example, are unimportant. There are 
general rules to which all must abide, such as to keep the building tidy and to not 
insult others (16,2009). By way of an example, during one visit to YPGD it was 
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pointed out to the author that a group of children playing football were ethnically 
mixed. 
YPGD organise a range of free activities and pursue different strategies in 
order to engage young people in Vukovar. Activities are run outside the club in 
different locations such as the island on the Danube opposite the main square. 
Creative workshops are organised, such as jewellery making. Sports tournaments 
are arranged and important dates are promoted such as Human Rights Day. As much 
as possible the work of YPGD is user-led. The role of the club is to facilitate what 
they choose to do. Sini§a is adamant that all the activities of the NGO must come 
from the members themselves and they must be fully involved. Attention to the 
members themselves is what drives the activities. `Of course we have visions', he 
explains, `but they are far away. Our focus is on the individual, on individual 
growth' (16,2006). 
Siniga also believes that YPGD has a lasting impact on those who participate 
in YPGD activities and sees himself as an example of this. Young people are the 
future leaders of society, he says, and great energy needs to be put in to build their 
capacities. He is trying `to give them the space in which to develop themselves', and 
by doing that `society will change'. There are obvious differences between those 
who use the clubs and those who do not, he believes. `You can see those changes, ' 
he says, adding, `when you meet those people who have used the club you can see 
the differences in their behaviour, in their communication, in their attitudes and 
points of view' (16,2009). 
In summing up the activities of YPGD, Sinisa argues that the main purpose 
of the organisation is to open up the horizons of young people in Vukovar. `It's easy 
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to be a Croat, a Serb, a Ruthenian, a Slovakian, but it's hard to be a human' (16, 
2009). He argues that it is this sentiment which animates the work of the NGO. 
Europe House 
Europe House (EH) was founded in 2000 with Ljiljana Gehrecke as President, who 
remains in the position today. Originally from Belgrade and in her 70's, she is the 
only full time member of staff although she employs a part-time worker and is 
supported by a small number of volunteers. The organisation is based in a large 
building shared with other civil society organisations, although their work is not 
concerned with peacebuilding, just a short walk from one of the main streets in the 
city. An early report from 2001 describes the aims of Europe House in the following 
way: 
`The residents of Vukovar and its surrounding area are still deeply hurt, 
disappointed and depressed, and many of them have lost their self- 
confidence, health and psychological stability due to the war horrors they 
have been through. They need new hope, and they need leading in the right 
direction. They need someone to accompany them on their thorny way to 
regain self-confidence, spiritual peace and prosperity. This new hope is 
called Europe and European self-awareness. European House Vukovar was 
founded in 2000 to offer Vukovar citizens and the population of the whole 
region - regardless of their ethnic affiliation and beyond the close border -a 
vision of a common and desirable future in Europe. One step at a time, 
we attempt to resolve real and concrete life issues in order to create basic 
preconditions to make the vision come true' (Europe House, 1991). 
This explicit attempt to prepare Vukovar for European integration would later give 
way to a focus on rebuilding the community, Ljiljana explains, as people did not care 
about Europe when the organization was founded. European integration remains an 
important goal however, as Ljiljana believes that Vukovar remains a city divided 
between Serbs and Croats, a divide which must be bridged if Croatia is to join the 
EU. As with YPDG, EH has several projects running simultaneously, however the 
186 
project which takes up most of Ljiljana's time is a four month long healing course 
for local people suffering from trauma (I1,2008). 
This course has run since EH was founded and usually consists of 10-15 
participants. For the first month the group meets twice a week for four hours, and 
then for the following three months they meet once a week. All participants are also 
tasked with `homework'. The course has a three year long waiting list with 105 
people waiting to attend, and some have been reduced to tears when told of the long 
wait ahead. The course is open to anybody who wishes to attend, as Ljiljana 
explains: 
'The only thing that matters in European House are human beings, not 
nationality. If someone needs help it doesn't matter what their nationality is 
or even if they are guilty (I1,2008)' 
The course consists of twenty workshops and is broken into four sections, each a 
month long. In the first month the participants work intensively on their physical 
health, with the twice weekly workshops lasting four hours long and broken in to 
four hourly sessions. Normally during this first month the changes which have 
taken place in the participants start to become apparent: Those persons are more 
tolerant in their communication and it helps', she says, `and their relations in the 
family get better. They tell me this. ' 
The second month is focused on getting people to talk about their destructive 
feelings (Ljiljana does not use terms such as `positive' or 'negative', and prefers to 
talk of `destructive' and 'constructive' emotions). After the second month the focus 
turns away from destructive feelings towards constructive feelings such as 
compassion and love. The final month of the programme is concerned with what 
Ljiljana calls `the afterlife' (12,2009). 
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At the end of the course Ljiljana asked each of the participants to fill out a 
survey to determine how they found they course. In the nine years she has been 
running the programme, she has only ever received one negative response. The first 
question is about tolerance - is it increased, conditional or unconditional? The 
majority of people say that it increased and that it's unconditional, and only a small 
number of people say it is conditional (12,2009). In the last nine years over two 
hundred people have participated in the course, however, Ljiljana is not entirely 
happy with the progress made: 
'They're not fulfilling my expectations yet. I would like them to get more 
active in the community. For now around a third of the participants are 
satisfied in their lives and when they see me walking they give me a hug and 
tell me that I helped a lot, another third are satisfied and have order in their 
lives but they are still in the group, and the last third say they don't have time 
for exercises, so they go to the doctor and take medications' (I2,2009). 
As with YPGD, expectations have not yet been met. The ultimate aim of the 
programme is to get people to be more active as citizens, to advocate healing and 
hence prepare the way for European integration, but as yet Ljiljana does not see the 
changes being made in the city as a whole. For this reason Ljiljana uses EH to 
engage directly with religious leaders in the city in an attempt to influence 
congregations: 
'We have a religious leaders' group project, all our projects have the goal of 
reconstructing the community. I started this group 6 years ago. We are trying 
to effect their sermons in church, and I went to each of those churches to hear 
what they say and I saw those sermons were not good, as some of those 
sermons they were talking about vengeance and hate, they always talk about 
how bad the enemy is, not one word about reconciliation, and each religious 
group wanted to get their own group, so it was us and them' (12,2009). 
Since Ljiljana began organising the seminars for religious leaders in 2003 they have 
met every two or three months to discuss religion in the local community to try to 
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encourage ecumenical cooperation for the purpose of reconciliation between ethno- 
religious communities in the city. The results have been encouraging: 
`You can see this in their sermons now, they talk about fellowship and 
getting together, and the result of those meetings is the concert, we have had 
5 now'. 
The concert she refers to is an annual event in which all the religious communities in 
the city - Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish, Evangelical, Muslim, Adventist - congregate 
to listen to music drawn from each faith, with local people singing and playing their 
instruments in front of a live audience which is then broadcast on regional television. 
In addition to this Ljiljana has also organised a monthly public conference for 
local people which she sees as the only place where people in Vukovar can come and 
talk. These events usually feature a prominent speaker such as a national politician 
or a senior official from the European Union making a presentation about some 
aspect of Croatian politics, followed by a discussion for which the aim `is for Croats 
and Serbs to discuss their problems without conflict'. The subject of each conference 
varies, but this goal is consistent: 
'First subject of the conference was how Vukovar can become productive as a 
community. Most of them were separated, but they all agreed that separation 
is part of the problem. We take another step with each conference, and on the 
third conference they all gave examples of good things from the war, like 
when Croats helped Serbs and when Serbs helped Croats. The last conference 
was about how the community has developed over the last ten years, and the 
tensions are very low. With God's help we will talk about suffering this time' 
(I2,2009). 
There are many themes here which are important for the wider aim of the thesis, 
which is to explore the notion of emancipation as lived experience. These themes 
will be explored at length in the final chapter. 
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Project Northern Ireland 
Project Northern Ireland (PRONI) is based in a large building fifteen minutes walk 
from the central square. According to its website PRONI is a `non-governmental, 
non-profit organization which gives special attention to youth, respecting differences 
in ethnic background, religion, culture, gender, race' (PRONI, online resource, 
2010). 
Irena Mikulic worked with the Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human 
Rights in Osijek as a member of a youth group, which in 1994 began to conduct 
cultural exchanges, known as International Peace Summer Camps with other youth 
groups in the region and in Hungary, Slovakia and the Netherlands. Over 250 young 
people would attend these camps and participate in workshops focused on the arts 
and peacebuilding. PROM was born out of these initial activities with the help of 
groups from Sweden and Northern Ireland, from where the name PROM derives. 
Initially the group met at the peace centre in Osijek as that was the only place 
doing peacebuilding at the time, and then YPGD became involved also. Eventually 
there were sixteen people from Osijek and Vukovar who had come together to work 
on education projects; a good example of the fluidity of civil society organisations. 
Irena describes these early developments as a 'movement', and by the late 1990s 
PROM had grown into a large youth project (122,2008). The aim of the 
organisation is as follows: 
PROM aims at stimulating cooperation and understanding between people. 
PROM wants to create and encourage different activities for youth outside 
official system of education with the aim to decrease risk of youth 
involvement, through ignorance and lack of alternatives, with drugs, alcohol, 
delinquency, hopelessness... ' (PROM online resource, 2010). 
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The work of the organisation is centered around education projects with young 
people. Irena provides training on the nature of civil society and public 
administration. As the leader of a training team she trains others in capacity 
building, human resources, strategic planning, organisational planning, sustainable 
development and finance. She also holds workshops on prejudice, stereotypes, 
communication development and peer relations, working in conjunction with schools 
and teachers. Such training is user led; 'it depends what people need'. For her, 
education is the starting point of reconciliation. 
The growth of the organisation has been in large part due to the financial 
backing of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who provided support for nine 
years from the founding of PRONI, and the Swedish International Development 
Agency, although very little came from the Croatian government - just 8000 Kunas 
when they needed 300,000 for the year. In total, PROM has opened twenty-one 
youth clubs in Croatia across five counties. Since 2002 the organisation has also 
contributed towards policy making in the country, a rarity among the NGO 
community in Vukovar. PROM also organises a national youth conference each 
year. One possible explanation for this success at the policy level, as spokepersons 
for PRONI understand, is that they do not take party political positions. 
The focus of the youth clubs is on enhancing quality of life for young people 
and on 'opening the eyes of local government to accept youngsters'. As with YPGD 
the activities of PRONI are guided by community needs, and the PRONI board is 
made up of local people of all ages. In Vukovar, Irena and her colleague Karolina 
gog believe that PROM is the most recognisable youth organisation in the city, 
perhaps contradicting the volunteers at YPGD. For them it is the organisational 
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culture of PROM which is the key to their success, the fact that they are willing to 
use their initiative in order to make progress (122,208). The account given by Irena 
and Karolina of PROM is unusual in that it sounds more like a story of success than 
of struggle. 
Coalition for Work with Psychotrauma and Peace 
Charles Tauber is an American doctor who has lived and worked in Vukovar since 
1995. Charles is the Head of Mission for the Coalition for Work with Psychotrauma 
and Peace (CWWPP). CWWPP has been working in Vukovar since Charles was 
drawn to the region during the conflict of the early 1990s. Thinking he would be in 
Vukovar for six weeks when the call for physicians was being answered by a variety 
of international NGOs, Charles has been living in the city since June 1995. The 
organisation is based in The Netherlands and has a board consisting of international 
members, although Charles acts autonomously. 
It is important to note this because Booth places great emphasis on the 
individual not only as the ultimate referent point of security analysis but also as the 
agent of security itself within the realm of global civil society - the notion of 
`ordinary people living extraordinary lives'. The possibilities for emancipation are 
in large part with those who refuse to think as national citizens and choose instead to 
view themselves as cosmopolitan citizens of the world, and who choose to embrace 
the many possibilities for such activism provided by globalisation (Booth, 2007, pp. 
458-61). 
There are ways in which it is possible to understand Tauber in terms familiar 
to Booth, as a global citizen refusing to live according to the rules of the state. An 
American citizen by birth, and a trained medical doctor and trained trauma 
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counsellor, he left his home in the Netherlands to come to Vukovar in 1993 when the 
city was under the control of the Serb dominated Yugoslav National Army. With the 
help of a number of global civil society networks including faith groups, physicians 
and academics, he founded the Vukovar CWWPP out of recognition that a huge 
amount of work would be needed in the field of psychological assistance (123,2008). 
It is important to note that Tauber would have been subject to some personal 
risk at this time. Although the war in Vukovar had ended, the war in neighbouring 
Bosnia was raging and the region as a whole remained highly unstable and 
unpredictable. Unexploded ordinance and landmines remained within Vukovar itself 
and in the immediate vicinity. Paramilitaries, who had been involved in the 
disappearance of foreign aid workers and journalists in the Vukovar region, 
remained at large. Aware of these dangers, Tauber took the decision to come to the 
war zone to found an NGO with the aim of helping all those suffering from trauma 
as a result of the conflict. These seem to be the actions of a man acting as if the lives 
of those beyond borders are of the same moral relevance as his own, in other words, 
the actions of a cosmopolitan citizen. 
As a doctor Charles had trained as a trauma specialist, and his early work in 
the city had involved implementing what he terms the 'core course', a programme for 
dealing with trauma which he been 'trying out' since 1988. In this period he recalls 
many disputes with other organisations who had been sending volunteers to the area 
for short periods without adequate preparation for the situations they would 
encounter, leaving them with secondary traumatisation and unable to assist the 
people they were suppossed to be supporting. Collaborating with the Centre for 
Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights in Osijek Charles would run up to twenty 
groups each week, some dedicated to capacity building by training others in dealing 
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with trauma, and others focused on providing direct assistance to traumatised 
people. Funding in this early period was drawn from Swiss Church Aid (122,2008). 
The work of CWWPP remains divided between capacity building through 
training and providing direct assistance, which Charles refers to as treatment. The 
office is currently based in a large house a short walk from the city centre and has 
staff of four, including Charles. Their work is explicitly focused on trauma so as to 
fulfil a role which should be performed by national government, according to 
Charles, which is helping people cope with their trauma caused by the war (I2, 
2008). 
The national government sees trauma as a peripheral issue, he argues, 
although they pay the problem 'lip service' to keep the veterans content. According 
to Charles, most teatment for trauma provided by the government in Croatia involves 
drugs such as benzodiazepine, valium, librium, anti-psycotics and anti-epileptics 
over longer periods of time than would be usual 'in the West', which for many leads 
to drug dependency. Trauma is a central problem for society Charles argues, and 
dealing with it in ways which do not involve the 'weird and wonderful' drug 
combinations is essential for reconciliation and for dealing with a range of social ills 
such as unemployment, drug and alcohol abuse, domestic violence and suicide. 
These problems exacerbate the trauma experienced by individuals leading to a cycle 
between the individual sufferer and the social contexts they inhabit, penetrating 
different levels of society. In contrast to the dominant usage within the international 
medical community, Charles does not refer to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) because for him this term is more of a legal signifier than a diagnostic 
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expression, so in place of this he uses the phrase post-traumatic stress reactions (I1, 
2008). 
Charles approaches his service users using individual and group therapy, with 
the emphasis being on broadening individual identity beyond ethnicity so as to 
overcome the narrow ways in which individual identity is constructed along ethno- 
religious-nationalist lines. This does not mean rejecting anything, but rather 
recognising that their cultural contexts has been shaped by powerful forces which 
emphasise the importance of ethnicity, and that there are other ways in addition to 
this which can be used to understand oneself. The goal of the therapy provided by 
Charles and his colleagues at CWWPP is what he terms 'functionality', 'feeling good' 
and being capable of using one's initiative to overcome depression. A core part of 
Charles's work is therefore about empowerment, enabling people to take self- 
treatment seriously through action, whether it be starting up a project for themselves, 
getting a job, returning to education or even moving away from the area (124,2008). 
Following treatment Charles evaluates his work by assessing how 
independent the individuals he has worked with have become, if at all, and to see 
how well they cope with various life events, an evaluation for which he relies on his 
training as a doctor and his experience in Vukovar. Success though is an ambiguous 
concept for Charles, who concedes that perhaps after a decade or more the results 
might come to fruition, but that it's ultimately impossible to know how successful 
CWWPP have been in the area due to the methodological problems such a question 
provides. Asked if there was less trauma in the city after over a decade of his work 
there, he replied in the negative (126,2008). 
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Centre for Peace, Vukovar 
The Centre for Peace, Legal Advice and Psychosocial Assistance was founded in 
August 1996 with the support of Oxfam, with the vision of 
`a modem democratic society, the rule of law and respect of human rights 
and values, a society of tolerance and equal opportunities for all its citizens 
without discrimination and regardless of national/ethnic, religious, cultural, 
gender, social or other differences' (Centre for Peace Vukovar, online 
resource, 2010). 
Ljubomir Mikid has worked for the organisation since 1998 and describes the work 
of the centre as advocating human rights in general but with a special focus on 
refugees and minority rights. The challenge is set by the Croatian government which 
`remains still one of the main barriers to solving IDP (internally displaced 
persons) and refugee issues in the region... although many officials say that 
refugees are no longer a political problem but an economic problem, I 
disagree' (120,2008). 
Studies undertaken by the centre suggest that UN resolutions relating to refugees 
have not been respected and that the local judicial process causes obstruction to the 
protection of human rights (Mikid, 2006a; Mikio, 2006b). Research has also been 
conducted by the centre into access to housing for returning refugees and former 
tenants, in which the centre argues that the Serbian minority have been discriminated 
against (Bubalo and Milde, 2008). That there has been a lack of concern by the 
Croatian government for the rights of minority returnees has not gone unnoticed by 
scholars (Harvey, 2006). The centre seeks to provide legal assistance to all those 
who are interested in their legal services regardless of ethnic background, according 
to Mikic. However, the focus on minority rights means they mainly work with Serbs 
who face discrimination (120,2008). 
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Most of the Centre's work has focused on ensuring that citizens are aware of 
what they are entitled to under the law and helping people to uphold their own 
rights. This has been central to their work since the NGO was founded. The 
President of the Management Board explains: 
`I would like to emphasise that we started work here during peaceful 
reintegration so we started helping everyone, those who stayed here and those 
who wanted to come back. They needed their documents and we helped 
them. We had various problems. We needed to reintegrate not only 
properties but also the people and some people worked here so we had to 
help with jobs and papers, statutes, employment rights. Many people who 
were born or married in that time. They need to strengthen their status' (I21, 
2009). 
As well as providing free legal advice the organisation has also played an active role 
in lobbying the government for changes to the law: 
`As a civil initiative we tried to change to affect every change in the law and 
it's important that we helped to create two new laws. You know Croatia as a 
country, we are trying to get closer to European law so we were part of 
creating two new important laws -a law against discrimination and a law for 
free legal advice. Both laws were starting at the beginning of this year 
(2009) and we now monitor them' (121,2009). 
The organisation stresses that they work with all ethnicities, particularly the minority 
groups in Vukovar such as Serbs, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ruthenians. This is 
because all these groups have the same problems related to forms of discrimination. 
Centre for Peace Vukovar conduct their own analysis to ensure that the government 
is held to account. The NGO wants to see human rights upheld and consider 
minority rights to be synonymous with this. Educating members of ethnic minority 
groups about their rights is thus central to their work. The NGO also organises 
workshops for religious and political leaders in Vukovar to discuss the problems 
faced by the city. Underpinning all these activities is the notion that the problems 
discussed in the previous chapter need to be recognised openly: 
`We shouldn't take the problem and sweep it under the carpet; we have to 
talk about it but from different positions. Both sides have their truths and 
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both truths have to be heard, so both sides have to see that. We have to 
respect both sides and their problems and the torture that they went through, 
because they are all citizens of this city' (121,2009). 
The legal system plays an important role here, it is argued, because the law provides 
the basis for protection against discrimination. One of the roles of the Centre is to 
try to rebuild trust in the legal system itself. 
The Centre takes a positive approach towards international engagement, and 
hope that membership of the EU will bring more respect for human rights. 'We have 
to connect with the wider region, where Bosnia and Serbia borders, and we have to 
show good will to connect people in those areas', one employee argues. 'It's all 
connected to the policy of the countries and the behaviour of politicians'. The NGO 
worker also says they have connections with the Peace Centre in Osijek, the Serbian 
Democratic Forum and a British NGO -a coalition for the promotion of human 
rights, as they call it (121,2009). 
Nansen Dialogue Centre 
Based in Osijek, a thirty minute drive north-west from Vukovar, is the office of the 
Nansen Dialogue Network. The Network extends throughout the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia and has `dialogue centres' in ten cities and a training centre in 
Norway. Financial support comes from the Norwegian government. The aim of 
each centre is to deal with specific inter-ethnic problems in the local area, and for the 
Osijek centre this meant dealing with the problems facing Vukovar discussed in the 
previous chapter. Srdan Antic, a project worker at the centre in his mid-30s, offers 
insights into the practical work being done by him and his colleagues at the Nansen 
Dialogue Centre, Osijek. 
Srdan is concerned primarily with a school project in Vukovar, with the aim 
being to overcome the segregated schooling problem by creating an integrated 
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primary school in the city. As he sees it this would give power to the parents rather 
than the politicians who would prefer to keep the city divided along ethnic lines. 
Although in Croatia as a whole there is a high standard of education for ethnic 
minority groups based upon the European Charter for Minority Rights, he argues, it 
is different in Vukovar where local politicians maintain the ethnic divide in schools. 
This might have been logical at first says Srdan, but a decade after the period of 
`peaceful reintegration' ended the reconciliation process in the city has reached a 
point at which mixed schools are a possibility. 
Research conducted by the Osijek office show that 78% of parents in 
Vukovar want to see mixed schools (110,2008), although these figures have been 
rejected by local politicians who believe that parents and teachers prefer the 
segregated system (134,2008). For them, argues Srdan, the priority for schools is to 
keep them divided and to select teachers based not on merit but on ethnicity; `they 
deny this, but this is reality'. Srdan sees part of his task as raising awareness about 
the benefits mixed schools would bring and that such changes have widespread 
support among parents. The school project also offers guidance for how sensitive 
subjects such as history should be taught. `We should teach and promote the 
multiethnic history of the city as a value', he says, adding, `we want to present this 
reality as reality' (110,2008). 
Much of Srdan's work has focused on the building of the new school which 
has involved years of gathering support at local and national levels. One source of 
local support has been an association of Vukovar parents who back the idea of a 
shared school, known as the Parents' Club. The Parents' Club and the Nansen 
Dialogue Centre published a statement of intent regarding the plan for a joint school 
which offers an insight into its normative justification: 
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`Parents' Club advocates and supports a school in which: all children will 
learn and live together, help each other and grow together, be accepted and 
satisfied with school, feel secure and will be happy in school. Values that 
The New School is promoting are: acceptance and respect for others, 
accepting differences, inclusiveness, solidarity, equal opportunities and non- 
violence and peaceful coexistence. The New School will be new also 
because of the relations it fosters, and because of methods and modalities of 
work. This will be a school that will enable acquiring of knowledge and skills 
useful and needed for modern life, this will be a school that respects 
individuality and identity of every pupil, parent and a member of school staff. 
This will be a school that develops, among its pupils, following 
characteristics: creativity, competence, critical thinking, teamwork and 
cooperation, as well as conflict resolution skills'. 
The statement also highlights the importance of respecting cultural differences: 
`The New School will not only enable members of minority to realise their 
right to education in their own language and alphabet and to learn about their 
cultural heritage, but goes a step further, The New School enables and 
encourages all pupils to learn about cultural heritage of all ethnic groups that 
live in Vukovar region so that they get to know each other, understand and 
respect their differences' (Nansen Dialogue Centre, online resource, 2010). 
As well as the school project, the Nansen Dialogue Centre has also been heavily 
involved with the production of a documentary, `Untold Stories', which sought to 
show acts of compassion towards `enemy' combatants and civilians throughout the 
region during the war. The documentary has been broadcast on Croatian television 
and at film festivals in the country. The documentary was shown in Vukovar itself 
and the Nansen Dialogue Centre sent 150 invitations to government officials, but 
none of them accepted. Few Serbs came to the event, however, war veterans, 
mothers of the missing and former prisoners of war did come. The film, which 
attempted to highlight acts of compassion which had been forgotten, did not provoke 
disapproving responses. In fact the opposite occurred. 'After the movie we gave 
them an opportunity to write down something', Srdan explains, 'we didn't receive a 
single negative reply' (I11,2009). 
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Centre for Peace, Osijek 
The Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights has been based in Osijek 
since 1992. The Centre says its vision is for `sustainable peace' and describes its 
mission as `building a society based on the culture of peace (Centre for Peace, 
Osijek, online resource, 2010). The Centre for Peace is one of the largest such 
organisations in Croatia and undertakes a number of activities in the eastern part of 
the country. As the thesis is focused on Vukovar, however, this section will 
concentrate on the programme taking place in Vukovar specifically. 
One project running out of Centre for Peace, Osijek is known as `Touch of 
Hope'. According to one of the project leaders, Snjeiana Kova6evid, this project 
aims to `encourage people to work on their wounds, to rethink their past and to see 
where they find inner resources to overcome, to improve their health in the context 
of the holistic approach to health, of each individual'. The project ensures that 
people of different ethnic backgrounds sit together with the hope that `working on 
their personal wounds and overcoming their wounds would actually contribute to the 
fact that they grow in community with the other, regardless of nationality' (114, 
2008). 
Almost all the participants of the project come from Vukovar now, according 
to another project leader, Nena Arvaj. The Centre for Peace had begun its work in 
Osijek in the early 1990s as other areas were under the control of the Serb dominated 
Yugoslav National Army and thus not open to Croats, however, during this period 
the Centre knew that at some point the areas closed to Croats would once again be 
open to them and so they began sending active listening teams to Serbian areas to see 
how people felt and to make contacts. These were followed by the formation of 
peace teams who would visit the countryside around Osijek, which is how the centre 
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began work in Vukovar. The peace teams encouraged local participation in conflict 
resolution programmes and the writing down of stories from the war and its 
aftermath, some of which were published in short collections such as Stories from 
Berek (Aleksa, date unknown, c. 2006). 
The project encourages participants to share so that they learn that everybody 
is suffering from the war, and because the groups taking part in the project are small 
this gives the participants the opportunity to trust one another and to find mutual 
support. According to Nena, they do not pretend that people are not hurt, but rather 
try to explore how that hurt can be overcome. The participants might see this as 
impossible at first, and many are afraid of sharing because it might cause fresh pain, 
but once they see the method working they are encouraged to share their experiences 
and feelings outside of the group (115,2008). 
The Touch of Hope Programme lasts four months and consists of a number 
of weekly workshops and several residential trips at weekends. According to the 
project leaders, people sign up to the programme when they hear good feedback 
from previous participants and see the changes that have come about since their 
participation. People also decide to attend the course when they decide to face their 
fears about engaging with different ethnicities. These are powerful emotions at play 
as mothers who have lost sons sit next to veterans from the other side. Snjezana 
explained that although the participants come from opposing sides they ultimately 
try to create a sense of a group, of the group being a community in itself where 
participants can trust and support one another. In April 2009 the Touch of Hope 
Group consisted of twenty people, although they normally prefer sixteen. The group 
discuss their feelings together, and Snjezana recalls that occasionally people would 
stand up and walk out because the discussion was too painful. Listening can be a 
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problem, despite some workshops being dedicated to listening, as some participants 
listen not through their ears but through what they have experienced. As Snjezana 
described, 
`I said to one woman try to listen to what she is saying, not to what you're 
hearing from your experiences, because you heard something different to me 
even though we were listening to the same words'. 
The programme tries to impart nonviolent listening skills, again Snjezana explains 
that the course is about 
`listening to the person who is willing to share with me, where I choose to ask 
open questions rather than closed. I will allow the other person to explore 
what she meant, not to predict or to imagine. It really helps communication' 
(116,2009). 
It is essential that the programme directors respect each participant, as the task is not 
to change their minds, but to 
`support them to start thinking in another way, so it is a change in attitude 
that we would expect but we would not force them to think in another way if 
they are not ready' (I16,2009). 
Snjzena and Nena know when a person is ready simply by asking them questions 
about what they have learned, whether they want to test their new listening skills, 
and they make a judgement about when a person is ready by relying on their 
experience. Sometimes the reaction in the participant is delayed; `that's why they 
call it a process'. 
The process of transformation in the workshop is always different because 
each group is different, according to Nena. It all depends on when people are ready 
to speak. In some groups the community feeling comes quickly and they support 
and encourage each other, whereas in others tensions remain. Sometimes if there is a 
large number of one ethnic group they are able to agree much more quickly. The 
process has to be managed by the facilitators who in the first two or three workshops 
`build the group', as Nena puts it. This involves playing games and exercises 
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designed to get to know one another. In one early workshop the participants draw a 
picture of health in sub-groups and discuss their different interpretations of health 
and of their self-identity. One person shares the picture with the rest of the group, 
and the emphasis is on sharing objects and opinions. Occasionally someone refuses 
to listen to another participant. Nena explains that her role in these circumstances is 
to try and make space for each person, saying it's your turn now, and if there's an 
open conflict they try to help them hear each other and focus on `the person as a 
person'. The importance of building the group is evident here, as participants have 
to offer support to one another. This is not easy: 
`It's difficult, because we work with people who admit that they're wounded, 
and sometimes they think they have a right to yell, or whatever, it's a process 
for them to learn and to express their feelings but not to attack others. You 
always facilitate, always make sure it's positive' (I16,2009). 
There are rules to the workshops, for example, participants have to stay close to the 
theme of the conversation and not digress to what are seen as peripheral issues, such 
as the Second World War. Nena explains that they try to focus the discussion of the 
individuals on the group instead. These rules are group led: 
`With every group we need rules because we are going to do this and this and 
this, and now you can all say what you need, how would you like us to work, 
and they give suggestions and we write them down, and we always say we 
can add some more, we can change them, they are flexible, but we have to 
stick to them' (116,2009). 
The discussion about the rules begins at the first workshop. At times it is difficult to 
get people to keep to the rules, but 
`if we want to change the rules we can open the discussion about how, what's 
better? We always respect the whole group, so if we want to respect 
everyone we all need to share it with the group' (116,2009). 
The rules are formed according to a group decision, based upon a complete 
consensus, not a majority view. This is peacebuilding informed and guided by 
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discourse ethics, suggesting it is premature to argue that it would be foolish to 
suggest that forms of communicative action have yet to impinge upon world politics. 
The rules are often about not talking too much, having a right to opt out of the 
dialogue if necessary, and to not speak on behalf of others. Manuals are often used 
to help the facilitators. As Nena put it, `different people need different things' and 
their role is to understand what they need. 
After the programme finishes they organise public lectures where people 
share with others their positive experiences of the project, and it is not uncommon 
for participants to speak movingly of their experiences, for example being detained 
in a Serbian concentration camp, and to induce compassion among the mixed ethnic 
audience. The strength of the project comes partly from the group dynamic, but 
also from something more ambiguous; as Nena says 
`the group has strength, and we learn from experience. You can teach maths 
or science but some things with relations you have to have something else' 
(116,2009). 
The Struggle against Local Government 
One thing that is striking about the interviews conducted with civil society activists 
in Vukovar is the extent to which many NGO workers refer to their local government 
as an obstacle to their work. This is consistent with other studies of the relationship 
between civil society and the state in Croatia which have characterised that 
relationship in terms of struggle (Koschmieder, 2001). It is important to dwell on 
this point as it would appear also to confirm Booth's suspicion of government action 
- states are `necessary but flawed institutions' he argues (Booth, 2007, p. 205). The 
point also raises important questions to be covered in the following chapter. 
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Srdjan Antic of the Nansen Dialogue Centre has strong opinions about local 
government in Vukovar. For him, the local government which up until May 2009 
was dominated by the right wing HDZ, the party of Tudjman, exaggerates the extent 
to which ethnic conflict characterises the city in public, yet in private the same 
politicians cooperate fully `because they have a common interest in keeping power, 
they need each other'. A secret agreement exists between politicians of different 
ethnicities he believes. He argues that keeping the city divided is in the interests of 
local politicians who are able to benefit by playing the ethnic card come election 
time. 
This strategy works in part because people rely too much on politicians to 
resolve their problems; `we stepped out of the democratic system because of the war, 
and people are still not aware of how democracy actually functions. They expect 
that someone will come and solve their problems'. Such people do not understand 
NGOs, he argues, and try to stall any form of cooperation; `they are always trying to 
avoid it, not saying yes, not saying no'. The local politicians are not driven by 
ideological commitments, but by the need to take power. According to Srdan one 
council member belonging to the Social Democratic Party told him that 'ideology is 
not important because we're all working for the good of the city'. Srdan's response 
is unambiguous: `Bullshit! ' Since the end of the war, he asserts, politicians have 
only been interested in one thing: 
`There is no honest interest to support reconciliation, there is only the 
interests of the politicians, not of the ethnic groups who live here. And there 
is some theory that time heals, fuck it, it's fifteen years after the war'. 
Local politicians speak with two tongues about the nature of ethnic conflict in 
Vukovar, changing their story depending on the audience, he says. The Dutch 
ambassador to Croatia visited Vukovar but was told there were no problems relating 
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to ethnic conflict by local politicians, however, the same politicians rely upon 
continued ethnic tension to fuel their election victories (110,2008). 
Sinisa Mitrovic of Youth Peace Group Danube describes a story similar to 
the account given by Srdan Antic. Only since 2006 has YPGD received financial 
support from the local government, as the administration has been overtly nationalist 
in the years following the war. YPGD have been seen as a potentially subversive 
organisation by the local authorities; in one episode the ex-Mayor was targeted with 
a bomb and the police found reason to question YPGD members to ask if they were 
involved. They have also been accused of selling drugs and alcohol to young people 
in the local media. 
In 2001 YPGD held meetings with local political parties and the Mayor of 
Vukovar which resulted in deep disagreements and tension between them, with 
YPGD members accused of being anti-Croat until one member reminded the 
politicians that his father had been killed at Ovcara. The problem, according to 
Sinisa Mitrovic, is that there are very few new politicians coming into power in the 
city, as many have been in the city hall since the war, clinging to power for its own 
sake: `local politicians are local Chiefs' he says, derogatively. The Mayor also said 
that `there will be no reconciliation before we f ind all the victims of the war', 
directly opposing the purpose and activities of YPGD (15,2008). 
Sinisa accepts that in the immediate aftermath of the war he can understand 
why local politicians found it difficult to work with civil society organisations as 
many had been founded with the intention of protecting minority rights rather than 
for the direct benefit of Croats, however, with over a decade past since the war ended 
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he cannot understand why they are so resistant to cooperation with groups such as 
YPGD. Overall, concrete action with the local administration has been very hard. 
Sinisa also supports the claims made by Srdan Antic that local political 
parties exaggerate ethnic tensions come election time, saying that at elections there 
are always a few incidents coming directly from the parties, such as graffiti, fights 
and arguments about mass graves; `I think they are using this time to get their 
sheep'. Local politicians stay in power by keeping people divided and playing to the 
sentiments of veterans, he argues, who number half a million nationally and who 
constitute a significant proportion of the electorate in Vukovar (15,2008). 
Efforts have been made by YPGD to form concrete projects with the 
administration, but as Sinisa says, 'sometimes it feels like I'm calling them all the 
time.. . and they need 
days and days to decide.. . and of course they 
do nothing out of 
their working times'. The politicians do not see local government for citizens but for 
themselves. He had heard that there were five million kunas available for capacity 
building but the city hall had no idea how to use it and did not consult civil society 
groups on how best to use it (15,2008). Sinisa Mitrovic and Srdjan Antic therefore 
have very similar views about local government in Vukovar based on their 
experiences. 
Ljiljana Gehrecke has a similar story to tell about the relations between 
Europe House and local government in Vukovar. 'We are totally ignored', she says. 
The Mayor of city did not visit her organisation when initiated in 2000 for eight 
years. Ljiljana worked on a project with other NGOs in Vukovar known as the 
'Open Coalition', which sought to produce a long term plan for the city, something 
Srdan Antic sees as missing. The group succeeded in producing a document which 
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they hoped would serve as a `foundation for a long term vision, that everyone could 
agree on because everyone wants a better future, and there would be disagreements 
but it would be a foundation'. The coalition worked on this project for three years 
and consulted high school students as part of the process. On completion of the plan, 
they sent the document to the local council; their response - nothing. Ljiljana had 
hoped that somebody in the city hall would care, but nothing happened. Two years 
later the council paid for a similar document to be written, but in her opinion, `it 
wasn't as good as the one we wrote' (I1,2008). 
In recent months the local government has made more promising noises in 
their direction, making moves to cooperate. This rarely happens however, and they 
receive very little support from the local government and their work is rarely 
featured in local newspapers. The new Mayor, elected in the spring of 2009, even 
asked her to present her work to the council, although nothing has come of this (12, 
2009). Ljiljana has also faced pressures to conform to nationalist sentiments. One 
councillor dealing with social activities in the city tried to persuade her that Ell 
should have `Croatian' in the title, otherwise it would not be seen as an important 
organisation. The city hall has not been supportive of her overall, she says: 
'The city council is the biggest obstacle. They don't want to change their 
first opinions. When you do bad it is difficult to stop, but if they helped more 
I wouldn't try as much' (I1,2008). 
Nansen Dialogue Centre, YPGD and Europe House have all had problems with local 
government as these accounts show. Snjezana from Centre for Peace, Osijek also 
reported that local government only acknowledge their role when they go directly to 
the city hall. She believes that they have problems with their work, but 'usually they 
don't say it outside but they know we know it' (114,2008). Her colleague Nena 
noted that even though the Centre for Peace is well established they are still ignored 
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by local politicians (116,2009). Charles Tauber of CWWPP is also adamant that 
there has been no will from local government to focus on peacebuilding in the years 
following the war. Politicians are simply not interested in their work, he says, and 
are probably against it (124,2008). 
Of the seven organisations under consideration here, there are two which do 
not share this story of struggle against local government, Centre for Peace Vukovar 
and PROM. A worker from Centre for Peace Vukovar explained that they have not 
had many problems with the local government; however, the national political 
situation makes their work difficult (120,2008). PROM are the only organisation to 
have reported a positive relationship with the local government, although they do 
concede that previous mayors had not been very supportive towards NGOs. The city 
hall, whilst not always providing financial support, has given PROM moral support 
and has worked with them on some projects. PRONI have been able to contribute 
towards policy at local and national levels. Asked if PROM was the exception in 
this regard in Vukovar, they replied positively, saying that it was their capacity as a 
nationwide organisation (PROM has twenty-one youth clubs, four offices and a 
training centre on the Adriatic coast) which sets them apart (122,2008). 
The experience of PRONI from the interviews tells a story of success which 
is not present in the accounts given by other NGOs in Vukovar. For the majority, 
their experience has been one of being neglected by the local authorities, denied 
financial backing and moral support for a long time, and seeing their work 
delegitimsed by their democratic representatives. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed the work of particular NGOs in Vukovar. In conclusion it 
is important to comment on how their work relates to arguments made by Ken Booth 
with regards to the connection between (global) civil society and emancipation. It is 
important to make this connection because Booth places great emphasis on the role 
of civil society agents as practitioners of emancipation. 
Booth argues that `progressive civil society informed by world security 
principles represents critical theory's organised political orientation at this period of 
history' (Booth, 2007, p. 455). World security refers to 
`the structures and processes within human society, locally and globally, that 
work towards the reduction of the threats and risks that determine individual 
and group lives. The greater the level of security enjoyed, the more 
individuals and groups (including human society as a whole) can have an 
existence beyond the instinctual animal struggle merely to survive' (Booth, 
2007, p. 4). 
Booth also characterises this understanding of security as `survival-plus', to express 
the notion that security means not only being alive but also being free from life 
determining threats and having the space to make choices (Booth, 2007, p. 102). 
The promotion of security in this way would involve the advocating of aims such as 
peace, democracy, environmental sustainability and economic justice within the 
global public sphere, Booth argues, drawing upon Kaldor (Kaldor, 2003; Booth, 
2007, p. 456). Transnational organisations and movements can operate in that 
sphere to further these emancipatory goals, Booth argues, and he takes the trouble to 
name some of the groups he feels have made contributions to those goals such as 
Peace Brigades International in Colombia and the Dhammayietra Peace Walk in 
Cambodia (Booth, 2007, p. 459). Such organisations are full of 'ordinary people 
living extraordinary lives', he asserts (Booth, 2007, p. 458). 
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It is reasonable to argue that the organisations discussed in this chapter would 
have Booth's approval. All of the organisations here make a point of asserting that 
they stand for `peace', either in their own self-description - `Peace Centre', 
`Coalition for Peace', `Youth Peace Group' - or by proclaiming that they are 
working towards `peace' in their mission statements. All the NGOs discussed here 
also have informal or formal transnational links connecting civil society in Vukovar 
to global civil society as described by Booth and Kaldor. They are all concerned 
with bringing about a form of security which can be seen through Booth's concept of 
`survival-plus'. 
All of the organisations discussed here are concerned with the ways in which 
the legacy of the war in Croatia continues to harm people in Vukovar. NGOs such 
as Centre for Peace, Osijek, Europe House, Youth Peace Group Danube and PRONI 
seek to create alternative public spaces in which people can interact and engage in 
dialogue without fear of discrimination or recrimination. Peace Centre Vukovar seek 
to hold the government to account and to ensure that cultural and ethnic differences 
are protected. The Nansen Dialogue Centre seek to promote a new local education 
system based upon mutual understanding rather than segregation, and the CWWPP 
attempt to help individuals by providing trauma counselling which is seen as 
essential for any form of genuine settlement in Vukovar. 
These factors raise the spectre of the totalising project, the fusion of 
sovereignty, territoriality, nationalism and sovereignty. The fact that many of the 
NGOs discussed here have faced problems with the local government adds a notion 
of struggle to the analysis. Civil society actors working towards a reconciliation of 
the unsettled legacy of the war often appear to act in opposition to the state itself 
represented through the local government. The NGOs discussed in this chapter 
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advocate norms which would otherwise not be given public voice. As such the 
NGOs in question can be seen to be opposing the further encroachment of the 
totalising project upon everyday life, by creating social spaces in which alternative 
understandings of the war and identity can be expressed. Kosic and Byrne argue that 
more grassroots organisations are needed for peacebuilding (Kosic and Byrne, 2009, 
p. 75). This chapter supports that view, whilst also going further by relating such 
political activity to the broader picture of resistance against the totalising project. 
The organisations discussed here then can be seen through Booth's work as 
practitioners of emancipation, because they all advocate peace and attempt to further 
the security of local people by encouraging non-discriminatory participation in their 
respective programmes. To accept this point as it stands, however, would be to only 
present part of the picture. The following chapter explores a different shade of civil 
society activity - apparent in the lived experience of NGO work, which is equally 
important in developing the emancipation as security move though understandings of 
lived experience. 
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Chapter 7 
Conflict and Contradictions: The Politics of NGOs in Vukovar 
Introduction 
The previous chapter detailed the ways in which NGOs pursue apparently similar 
goals. It also showed that many NGOs have faced similar problems with the local 
government. The question therefore emerges regarding the extent to which NGOs in 
Vukovar cooperated in order to further their aims. Each share a commitment to 
peace and inter-ethnic dialogue, so it would seem only natural for like-minded, under 
resourced NGOs to collaborate. Yet the picture emerging from the interviews 
suggests there has not been much cooperation between NGOs in Vukovar. 
Indeed, a more complicated situation arises in which NGOs struggle not only 
against state power embodied in local government, but also against one another, 
cooperating at times, but in large part ignoring one another and competing for 
resources and public attention. This chapter will now detail these findings, and in 
doing so it will raise serious questions for Booth's approach to security studies 
which places hope in the realm of global civil society. 
Even when NGOs express emancipatory sentiments in rhetoric, in practice 
they seem trapped in the daily business of politics. This chapter therefore focuses on 
the darker aspects of civil society. It will also show the struggle within NGOs for 
power, and will raise concerns about how civil society can act as a depository for 
nationalist feelings and how NGOs can be used as a form of control. This chapter 
address different dimensions of the politics of the NGOs in Vukovar discussed in the 
previous chapter. It considers the lack of collective active between NGOs and 
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possible reasons for this, before exploring the levels of tension between the NGOs 
concerned. In doing so the chapter is informed by the notion that 
`only by placing our normative contemplations in dialogue with our 
empirically-informed accounts of the limits of possibility can we arrive at 
practices that will lead to more inclusive, less violent patterns of communal 
identification and interaction' (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998, p. 287). 
ESRC guidelines stipulate that `harm to research participants must be avoided' 
(ESRC, 2010, p. 1). This thesis seeks to follow that principle, and seeks to ensure that 
the dignity and autonomy of research participants is respected. This chapter uses material 
from the fieldwork which - if referenced in the manner of previous chapters - could 
potentially harm some of the interviewees by causing offence and/or damaging 
workplace relations between interviewees. The chapter therefore proceeds to make 
use of the material, which is important in understanding the politics between NGOs 
engaged in peacebuilding in Vukovar, in such a way as to protect the anonymity of 
the sources when the material risks offending interviewees and/or harming 
workplace relations. 
In the interests of transparency it is also important to reference where 
interview material is used. On-record interview material which has been deemed by 
the author to be potentially harmful to other interviewees has for the purposes of this 
chapter been converted to off-record material, and is referenced as such. 
Competition between NGOs 
As mentioned above there has been limited cooperation between NGOs engaged in 
peacebuilding in Vukovar since the war ended, indeed, the failed `Open Coalition' 
led by Ljiljana Gehrecke seems to be the exception rather than the rule. Srdan Antic 
argues there is a lot of negative thinking within NGOs in Vukovar and cites Charles 
Tauber as one NGO worker who tried to get the NGOs in the city to cooperate but 
failed due to lack of a collective will. NGOs share contacts but not visions he says, 
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`people are willing to cooperate if it does not jeopardise interests'. He sums up the 
relationship between NGOs in this way: `There is a kind of marketplace here, there 
is competition'. All NGOs are simply trying to stay alive he says, and because they 
all have to compete against each other sometimes it is illogical to cooperate. The 
necessity to attract and retain funding infringes upon the ability of civil society 
actors to consolidate coalitions with similar organisations who share their values 
(110,2010). Although in the past cooperation was seen as something all NGOs 
should do it did not develop this way. One possible reason for this was that some 
NGOs lost credibility after allegations of corruption involving NGO employees 
taking money from their organisations, Tauber argues (I11,2009). Tauber did not 
elaborate on this matter but it is clear that he feels that civil society in Vukovar 
suffered as a result. 
Whilst there is competition between NGOs for resources, another reason 
against cooperation comes from choice. Marijan Persinovic for example said that 
although it would be good to have had more cooperation with other NGOs for his 
project Touch of Hope which he worked on, 'I can cooperate best with Christians 
and people who are ready to involve themselves spiritually in peacebuilding' (118, 
2008). What this suggests is that it would be mistaken to assume that emancipatory 
aims, which seek to advance dialogic relations between ethnic groups in places such 
as Vukovar, overcome the particular preferences, even prejudices, of individual 
agents of practices which attempt to further such aims. 
Other NGOs appear to have chosen not to work with others because of their 
moral preferences but because they see themselves as exceptional within the city - 
Peace Centre Vukovar for example does not have many contacts with other NGOs 
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nor any joint projects because they see themselves as being the only organisation in 
Vukovar to be dealing with displaced persons and refugees (120,2008). 
Another reason for lack of cooperation between NGOs has been the fact that 
the daily work of developing programmes, implementing them, applying for funding, 
and reporting to donor's local authorities takes time. The commitments which civil 
society groups have as part of their work restricts their ability to coordinate with 
other NGOs; employees at PROM said they cooperate with some groups but not 
many because they already have so much to do, and Nena from Centre for Peace 
Osijek said, `we cannot do too many things at the same time'. (122,2008; 115,2008). 
Katarina Kruhonja, one of the founding members of Centre for Peace Osijek, also 
said that `you need a lot of energy just to put into practice your own activities'. 
Other organisations always expect the Centre for Peace, Osijek to take the lead in 
such collaborative efforts but this takes time, and although Katarina believes that 
long term cooperation between NGOs should be part of their programme, it simply 
doesn't happen. Such attempts have been made as peripheral projects, but really 
they need to be built into the structure of the organisation itself for cooperation to 
work, and this needs to be reciprocated. Although there was some cooperation with 
Europe House who hosted the Touch of Hope Project, and also with VIMIO, these 
were short-term projects with little sustained or significant outcomes (113,2009). 
Nena also says that as people leave organisations the personal connections between 
them are lost, further inhibiting their ability to coordinate (115,2008). 
A further reason for lack of cooperation is the need to maintain the reputation 
of the organisation which might otherwise be compromised by imprudent 
connections with others. One NGO worker described how their organisation had 
cooperated with another to provide legal assistance to people in the immediate 
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aftermath of the war. In subsequent years, however, that organisation acquired a 
reputation for being pro-Serb because it had been formed during the war when the 
area was controlled by the Yugoslav National Army. This meant that their 
cooperation could not be continued, the NGO worker described, because of the risk 
posed to the reputation of their own organisation which is seen as ethnically-neutral. 
The same source argued that some NGOs in Vukovar lack the human capacity for 
significant cooperation between NGOs, especially those reliant upon aging staff 
members. Furthermore, not all NGOs in Vukovar follow up on promises of future 
cooperation (Off record, 2008a). 
Another source described it is disappointing that there had not been much 
solidarity between NGOs in Vukovar. He says that attempts at bringing NGOs 
together which he was involved with were scuppered by self interest and by several 
scandals involving NGO employees taking money from their employers. The main 
motive for people working for NGOs he argues has been to make money, not to 
advocate certain values or policies. Another explanation, offered by the same 
source, is that NGOs in Vukovar do not fully understand what civil society is 
because of the authoritarian society they were born into (Off record, 2008b). 
The section above has sought to show how although most NGOs working in 
Vukovar struggle against the same institutions of the totalising project, there have 
not been significant attempts to cooperate since the end of the war. Lack of time is a 
key factor, and occasionally NGOs will choose not to work with others because such 
work would conflict with personal values. Some NGOs might be more self 
interested, which supports the points made above about NGOs being in competition 
with one another, and remarks made by NGO workers that they would rather not 
work with certain organisations in order to protect their own reputations. These are 
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all serious points for consideration, particularly for theorists such as Booth who 
conceptualise homogenous understandings of global civil society, for here is an 
example of a collective action failure on the part of NGOs which is in large part 
created by choice. 
Collective action could have been possible between NGOs in Vukovar, 
particularly when it is considered that there do exist fluid networks linking most of 
the organisations. Consider that a senior member of YPGD also works for CWWPP, 
and that another had worked for Peace Centre Osijek. Ljiljana Gehrecke took part in 
the Touch of Hope programme organised by Peace Centre Osijek, and some 
employees at PROM also worked there. Srdan Antic of the Nansen Dialogue Centre 
also worked with YPGD previously. This all takes place within the confines of a 
relatively small city with a small number of NGOs dedicated to peacebuilding and as 
such personal contacts are easy to make and keep. Yet there has been little 
cooperation. 
Gossip, Rumour and Internal Tensions 
Perhaps therefore, there is another level of analysis to which it might be possible to 
understand why there has been little cooperation among NGOs in Vukovar. The 
reasons explored above are largely concerned with the lack of organisational 
capacity and strategy, yet there is another level which might help us understand this 
collective action failure in Vukovar, the more ambiguous and intangible realm of 
hearsay where rumour, gossip and intuition dwell. Some employees at the 
organisations assessed for this chapter were willing to provide information not only 
about other NGOs and but also about their own colleagues which undermines, 
sometimes seriously, the claims made by the NGOs to be working for peacebuilding. 
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It has already been shown that the view of at least one NGO worker is that 
some organisations only work with Serbs, yet this is perhaps unsurprising as the 
organisation in question has an explicit interest in minority rights, a legitimate 
concern for peacebuilding. What is perhaps more surprising is that a different source 
(from the same NGO) has questioned the supposed ethnic neutrality of a different 
NGO which is not concerned only with minority legal rights, saying, `I met them and 
they were strong Serbs, and Serbs with strong accents' (Off record, 2008c). When 
asked if there were not a mixed group of people using the facilities provided by the 
NGO in question, a source replied `that would be pretty new to me', explaining that 
a colleague had connections with the NGO, who had said that all the leaders had 
strong Serb names and talked in Serbian. This could be seen as problem for Croats 
wanting to join the NGO who might be put off by the apparent bias towards Serbs. 
As one interviewee put it, 'I'm not sure what they are doing now to overcome the 
ethnic barriers. As far as I know they are strong Serbs' (Off record, 2008d). This is 
a serious accusation to make against an organisation professing to be ethnically 
impartial. 
However, the situation is complicated by an accusation made by a different 
interviewee with regards to the source quoted above, in which it is claimed that the 
NGO worker, again one professing to ethnic neutrality, said in the recent past that 
`Serbs have to ask for forgiveness before reconciliation can take place' (Off record, 
2009e). The source of this accusation -a fellow civil society activist - has also 
claimed that a highly respected NGO worker with an international reputation and 
who has done much work in Vukovar prevented a large amount of money from 
coming into Vukovar to support NGO work (Off record, 2008f). Whether or not 
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these rumours are true is unimportant, what matters is that they are believed and 
serve to undermine trust between NGOs. 
Other testimonies provide insights into the working cultures of the 
organisations under review in this chapter, which further supports the claim that 
relations within civil society in Vukovar are not always characterised by 
collaboration. These testimonies are especially important because they come from 
within those organisations. The first comes from a volunteer at an NGO in Vukovar, 
who when asked what her duties were at the organisation replied, 
`I make coffee, wash dishes... nothing interesting. All the time I've been here 
I've only been to one seminar'. 
This is an intriguing comment, particular when considering the fact that the work of 
the NGO in question can be seen as contributing to an emancipatory process in ways 
described in the previous chapter. The implication is that although in some ways the 
NGO is pursuing an emancipatory agenda, in other ways the organisation is stifling 
the emancipatory project by failing to reflect upon its internal resources. The 
following passage elaborates this point, in which the NGO worker describes her 
employer as 'brilliant' in terms of personal characteristics, but 
`not a good manager... there's no actual work, it's all on paper, I know the 
goals, what kind of society they want to achieve, but nothing is really 
happening.. .1 can't insist on my ideas because (they have their) own ideas 
about health and trauma ... they all have their own projects, and they're not 
open'. 
In the time she has worked at the NGO her duties have been trivial in contrast to the 
more profound work undertaken by her superiors: 
`I have no options. I don't have the chance to talk. There was a woman from 
Srebrenica and for that occasion I was making sandwiches and I wouldn't say 
anything. I felt stupid' (Off record, 2009g). 
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These are important points for considering the practical work of emancipatory 
politics because they show how NGOs are also subject to the limitations of any 
workplace. 
Similar issues are raised with regards to a different NGO to a more extreme 
level. One employee described the director of their own organisation as 'a 
megalomaniac' (Off record, 2009h). The same source says that the director is a 
`dreamer' whose expectations are too high which leads him to blame himself and 
others for failure. The source also notes that although the director has good 
intentions, 
'He is isolated... with no friends or family which puts him in a very difficult 
position, but you and I can't help him. He needs to find a friend or a partner. 
It's his choice, he chose his life, we can't do much' (Off record, 20091). 
One source informed the author that the person in question forces his staff to have 
therapy with him (Off record, 2009j). A former volunteer with the organisation 
complained that the director in question has asked for inappropriate and unnecessary 
medical details before she arrived in the country. Colleagues have noted that he 
became increasingly ostracised in Vukovar as others came to distrust him and his 
peacebuilding methods. A respected member of the NGO community in the area 
described him as `an embarrassment' (Off record, 2009k). 
Thus a different dimension of emancipatory practice comes to the fore, which 
challenges the notion of civil society being a depositary of emancipatory intentions 
and collaboration. The methods and individual strategies employed by those who 
pursue emancipatory goals are contested - even when the ends are broadly agreed 
upon, there is a form of politics being practised with regards to the means, in which 
power relations between individuals are present. A focus on security at the 
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individual level may enable the voices of individuals to come to the fore, but such a 
method also reveals the tensions within emancipatory practices. Emancipation as a 
process, as a means, does not embrace some form of endpoint in itself; it may be the 
case that within the process are multiple contestations ongoing at any time and in any 
context. 
The Limits of the Individual 
One interviewee in particular appeared to express the limits of the notion of the 
individual as security agent, with the strain of years of work in the city beginning to 
show physically and emotionally. `In many senses it's a beautiful city', he says, 'in 
other ways I don't have many friends here. It's very difficult to find someone to 
have a beer with' (Off record, 20091). He does not appear to 'switch-off from work 
very often, usually working late into the night on a variety of projects for the 
organisation, and rarely taking days off. As of mid-2009 he had become so 
overwhelmed with his work that he had stopped using the internet completely, and 
hence no longer communicates via email. This makes cooperation and 
communication with others more difficult. His speech is punctuated by violent 
coughing fits, and he travels abroad for health checks, not trusting the Croatian 
health service. 
This particular employee seems regretful that his work in Vukovar has not 
resulted in more tangible outcomes. Asked if his work has been a success, he 
replies, `I don't know. Technically I say yes, privately I'm not sure. I don't see the 
city changing much'. He thinks that some of the work done with the individuals 
may have had an impact, but understanding the impact on the city as a whole is 
difficult to measure. He is now ready to leave, he says (Off record, 2009m). 
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Despite of the difficulties he has faced in Vukovar, or perhaps because of 
them, the individual concerned has a number of plans for the future to expand the 
work of the organisation in new directions and to new geographic locations. This 
raises another issue about him specifically, which is that many people in the city - 
including colleagues - recognise him as being perpetually unrealistic, especially as 
he has a number of substantial plans for the future (Off record, 2009n). 
The likelihood of these projects ever coming to fruition seems unlikely given 
how the individual in question has struggled with the relatively small scale operation 
in Vukovar. It is not clear what the interviewee will do in the foreseeable future, but 
it does seem increasingly likely that he will leave Vukovar soon. `I'm ready to 
leave', he admits, and readily accepts that he is disillusioned with peacebuilding in 
Vukovar (Off record, 2009o). 
Such an individual provokes serious thought for considerations of the 
individual as emancipatory agent. Individuals with the desire to help others deal 
with the legacy of war, to help them with their own specific processes of 
emancipation, can harm themselves, their colleagues and those they sought to help. 
One off the record remark from a former colleague was that the individual in 
question has built up a very strong emotional attachment to Vukovar which explains 
his longevity. The same source also expressed a worry that he might not be 
practising his methods correctly, that he might be putting too much pressure on 
people to talk (Off record, 2009p). These are important matters to consider when 
arguing in favour of an ever expanding and increasingly active global civil society. 
Not only does such an assessment raise the issue of how individuals can talk 
the language of emancipation without pursuing emancipatory means, it also 
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highlights the fact that an emancipatory goal such as `reconciliation' can consume an 
individual, harming themselves and those they seek to help. 
Religious Conviction and Emancipation 
During the interviews it became apparent that some of the NGO workers discussed 
in this thesis have strong religious conviction that informs their work. There is a 
potential conflict here with the dialogic principles espoused by Linklater. For 
Linklater, norms are only universally valid if they carry the consent of all those who 
stand to be affected by them, and morality is continually subject to the outcome of 
deliberation (Linklater, 1998). There is some evidence to suggest however that 
NGOs promote religious sentiments which are not always open for debate which 
raises the issue of the extent to which NGO workers in Vukovar are true to the 
dialogic principles they advocate. Ljiljana Gehrecke of Europe House is a case in 
point. Her faith is vital to her work: 
`I'm an optimist and I have a clear vision of what will come. There is an 
analogy between human beings and society. I know that every human being 
yearns for something more spiritual, but he can't get to that in everyday life 
because he is occupied with everyday problems, unless something happens 
which makes us think about spirituality... like a trauma, we try to talk to God. 
It's the same for the community, situation in Vukovar is still very difficult, 
and people are in pain, and that suffering is making them find some solution, 
relief, and I can see that in my workshops. People are coming with big 
problems, problems with health, and through that work on themselves they 
see that they can help others with God's help, and their consciousness 
expands. All the problems in everyday life come from narrow minds, lack of 
consciousness, and human beings with a big consciousness is closer to God. 
He doesn't hate. When our consciousness is deeper we get closer to God and 
we see the big picture, because the community is what the people are like, 
community is people, community can't be good if people are bad' (12,2009). 
A committed Christian, her beliefs directly inform her work as a peacebuilder. 
'I'm a Christian and I try not to conflict with Christian theology, I quote the 
bible a lot, I'm not saying that other religions are not right. I say that every 
belief is good, it's good to respect the greater force and every religion is a 
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path to that force. I tell atheists that God is really morality, and that man can 
be moral, the man who is moral is close to God, even if he can't imagine God 
as we present him. Without morality there is no health' (12,2009). 
She develops her understanding of morality as follows: 
'I base morality on the Bible, you can say that God is love but you can also 
say that God is morality, and the closer we get to morality the closer we get 
to God, and the closer we get to God the healthier we are and the stronger we 
are. As we get stronger we get more self confidence and trust others more, 
and the closer we get to God we get more whole, and the same if we were 
further away, we would have more fear and would be more insecure, and the 
fear causes illness' (12,2009). 
This directly contradicts Linklater's assertions that morality stems from deliberation. 
Gehrecke elaborates upon this point in more detail when asked if atheists are unable 
to participate in her workshops: 
'Atheists don't really exist, they are only people who can't picture God as we 
do, someone is a moral human being, he is moral because he respects the 
higher force, people know that there is a higher force by their intuition and 
they have to respect that higher force, so I quote the Bible a lot, I'm not 
forcing it on anyone, here's an illustration - I'm trying to wake up in those 
people that is only one good path. My experience is that a lot of people go to 
church and pray but they don't live that, they don't have deep faith, but when 
we reach the end of the course I notice those people who say they're atheists, 
they have deep respect for that higher force, and I try to teach them the 
importance of prayer. I can say that everyone's praying, I tell them you can 
pick one of the names - God, higher force, the maker, universal intelligence, 
whatever, it's important you respect that, and rm trying to tell them if it 
wasn't for that higher force nothing would exist, from the order in the 
universe to the order at home, without the higher force nothing would 
function, and more than that they become aware that the higher force works 
for us when we ask it' (12,2009). 
The problem is not that Gehrecke is trying to force her beliefs upon others - she is 
not - but that those beliefs do not seem to be subject to debate. They are apparently 
above debate which contradicts one of the principles of the dialogic community 
which is that participants must be prepared to question their own truth claims to take 
part in such a community (Linklater, 1998, p. 92). 
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A related sentiment comes from Marijan Persinovic, a Seventh Day 
Adventist pastor who has worked on the Touch of Hope programme in Vukovar. 'I 
can cooperate best with Christians and people are ready to involve spiritually in 
peacebuilding', he says (117,2008). His workshops frequently involve role-playing 
Biblical stories, and he notes that `people who have Christian backgrounds are more 
ready to participate in this kind of workshop' (118,2008). 
This raises important questions about the relationship between religion and 
emancipatory action. The holding of strong religious convictions which are not open 
to debate may well violate discourse ethics, but at the same time it could be those 
very convictions which enable the individuals concerned to conduct their work. One 
conclusion that can be drawn from the previous section is that long term engagement 
in peacebuilding -a form of emancipatory activity - can take a heavy toll on the 
individuals concerned. It may well be the case that the holding of absolute 
conviction in religious teachings provides the moral certainty required for such work. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored some of the ways in which NGOs in Vukovar contradict 
the behaviour hoped of them by Booth. It has detailed how the realm of civil society 
functions as a political space in itself rather than as a single agent of progress, and in 
doing so the chapter has revealed the work of NGOs in Vukovar to be beset by 
competition, contestation and a general lack of cooperation. 
Questions have been raised in the chapter regarding the role of individuals 
themselves in the emancipatory process. Booth places great emphasis on individuals 
as referent points and agents of security. When seen in the context of the previous 
chapter the evidence presented here suggests that emancipatory and non- 
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emancipatory practices can exist simultaneously. Booth's emphasis on the role of 
the individual agent of security needs to take this into account because the theory as 
it stands does not pay sufficient attention to the fact that civil society agents do not 
always assume roles and strategies which differ from what might be understood as 
traditional political practice. NGOs and their `extraordinary' people do not represent 
an end of politics as Booth implies, merely a different site of politics. 
The cases of individual activists presents an example of how the adoption of 
an emancipatory agenda can damage individuals. Individuals attempting to 
contribute to an emancipatory process can be left battling against isolation and 
loneliness in Vukovar. Such experiences are not that of enlightenment through 
emancipatory action, but a form of suffering in the name of emancipation. It is 
important to consider these issues because such experiences suggests that if the 
individual is to be held up as an agent of security, as Booth does, then it is also 
necessary to see the individual as vulnerable and susceptible to pain. 
This is not to say that the idea of the individual as an agent of security should 
be rejected; indeed, the following chapter returns to the positive role played by 
individuals. What is important however is to recognise that human frailties to not 
disappear when an emancipatory cause is taken up. Indeed. emancipatory causes 
may harm the individuals who subscribe to them. Such a point invokes recent 
comments made by Linklater in which he acknowledges that emancipatory ideals 
can also serve to cause harm, a fact that is for Linklater symptomatic of the internal 
tensions within contemporary societies (Linklater, online resource, 2010). 
This is a point best explored through a consideration of the security as 
emancipation move through lived experiences, which this thesis argues for. The 
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following chapter introduces the transformative experiences of individuals to argue 
that despite the contradictions and challenges discussed in this chapter, it is possible 
to see genuine processes of emancipation at an individual level in Vukovar, 
processes which are facilitated by the NGOs in question. 
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Chapter 8 
Micro-Dialogic Communities and Individual Transformation 
Introduction 
This thesis began with an affirmation of the security as emancipation theoretical 
move. It ends by returning to that theme in specific empirical contexts by examining 
what have been termed micro-dialogic communities. The chapter closely examines 
the descriptions of separate projects run in Vukovar by Europe House and Centre for 
Peace, Osijek, in light of Linklater's notion of the dialogic community. It does this 
in order to suggest that these projects closely resemble, at a micro level, a form of 
political community underpinned by discourse ethics. That argument is then 
explored further through firsthand testimonies of participation in one of those 
projects in order to analyse the experience of individual transformation and to 
understand the radical impact of participation in micro-dialogic communities in light 
of the restricted local society discussed in chapters 4 and 5 specifically. 
The chapter opens with descriptions of the two NGO projects in order to 
make the case that such projects can be seen to embody dialogic principles. The 
chapter then introduces the testimony of participants in one of the projects to explore 
in more depth the nature of individual transformation. It closes by reflecting upon 
the experience of one individual who was instrumental in the foundation of an NGO 
working in Vukovar in order to explore the idea of the individual as agent of 
emancipation. As such this chapter strongly challenges scholars who have argued 
with regards to post-war Croatia that non-violent conflict resolution offers little in 
terms of fundamental change, and that such approaches are only useful on a small 
scale in contexts such as schools and local communities (Stubbs, 1995). The 
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argument here is that it is precisely through such micro-perspectives that 
fundamental change in ways that can be understood as emancipatory can be 
witnessed and understood. 
Micro-Dialogic Communities in Practice 
Chapter 6 discussed the ways in which NGOs in Vukovar act in accordance with the 
emancipatory principles offered by Booth and Linklater. Essentially their work 
involves opening up new spaces for dialogue and advocating on behalf of minority 
groups and issues which are at risk of being sidelined. Two of the NGOs in 
question, however, conduct projects which resemble in important ways the idea of 
the dialogic community outlined in chapter 2. Those are Europe House and Centre 
for Peace, Osijek. This section will seek to describe the ways in which this is so. 
The four month long course run by Ljiljana Gehrecke of Europe House 
involves workshops on constructive and destructive emotions. An important part of 
her description of those workshops emerges when she talks about how she deals with 
participants who feel hatred towards members of different ethnic groups: 
When I talk about hatred I say that every hatred is justified, because every 
hatred has a reason - the only thing is if the reason is justified or made up. I 
don't want to put guilt on anyone because guilt is a burden. I tell them your 
hate is justified but what is the reason it is justified' (12,2009). 
When asked how she gets participants to decide whether or not such a reason is 
justified she replies: 
'We discuss it in a group, and they come to know that every destructive 
thought is bad for them' (12,2009). 
This is a significant for considerations of discourse ethics because of this emphasis 
on deliberation as a means to deciding whether or not exclusionary tendencies are 
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justified. Gehrecke herself notes that there are many similarities between her course 
and one of the projects run by the Centre for Peace, Osijek, called Touch of Hope. 
This section will now explore that project in more depth to draw the links between 
the idea of the dialogic community and the practices of NGOs in Vukovar. 
Interestingly for the purposes of this chapter Snjezana of Centre for Peace, 
Osijek, describes the project in the following terms: 
`It is a process of learning, seeing ourselves as a group - not about loving 
Serbs or Croat but learning to overcome our own fears, it's about something 
concrete, a process of learning' (116,2009). 
The emphasis on learning resonates with Linklater's emphasis on moral-practical 
learning as noted in the previous section, which stresses the important of questioning 
traditional authority structures. What is being described in the quotation above is a 
process which involves learning that one's views of the other ethnic group has been 
conditioned by ethnic division. She recounts the experience of trying to ensure that 
participants in the ethnically-mixed workshops actually listen to one another. 
'I said to one woman try to listen to what she is saying, not to what you're 
hearing from your experiences, because you heard something different to me 
even though we were listening to the same words' (116,2009). 
It is at this point that the `hermeneutic moral skills and interpersonal sensibilities' 
necessary for the formation of dialogic communities described by Linklater become 
apparent. Snjezana continues to describe the skills she tries to teach the workshop 
participants: 
`Listening skills in nonviolence is about listening to the person who is willing 
to share with me, where I choose to ask open questions rather than closed. I 
will allow the other person to explore what she meant, not to predict or to 
imagine. It really helps communication' (116,2009). 
One of the principles of dialogic relations is that participants in a dialogue must not 
be forced to speak. Their participation must be as a result of their own freely made 
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decision. Importantly therefore, Snjezana explains that as a facilitator she does not 
put pressure on people to speak. This is in contrast to some of the accusations made 
against NGO workers in the previous chapter: 
'We support them to start thinking in another way, so it is a change in attitude 
that we would expect but we would not force them to think in another way if 
they are not ready' (116,2009). 
They are trying to teach the participants to respect everybody, she adds. They know 
when the participants are ready to contribute to discussions because the facilitators 
themselves ask them if they are ready and if they would like to test the listening 
skills that have been developed in the workshops. This can take time, 'that's why we 
call it a process', says Snjezana. 
Within each group there are individual processes of transformation occurring 
within these micro-dialogic communities according to another facilitator, Nena 
Arvoj. Again though the role of the facilitator herself is central to these processes 
which are essentially long term: 
`Each person is different, and each group is different, so it all depends on 
when people are ready - in some groups they are ready very quickly. 
encouraging each other, but in the present group there are tensions always, 
more tense, so it depends on the group. In some groups where there are more 
Croats, they share the same thoughts and have similar ideas about how 
Vukovar should change, so it wasn't that difficult, and it was stressful for us. 
In the first 2 or 3 workshops we try to build the group, through games and 
exercises so that they hear each other and get to know each others, it doesn't 
just happen that they come and talk about forgiveness' (116,2009). 
The issue of personal transformation will be discussed in the next section, but the 
point to emphasise here is that the group - the political community - has to be built 
by the facilitators. In order to come to more substantial issues such as forgiveness, 
issues which are central to individual emancipation in this specific context, the 
community itself must be formed first and a level of trust built into its structures. 
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Playing games is important here, as are interactive group activities based around the 
core themes such as health. Nena explains: 
'They draw a picture of health and realise that they don't all have the same 
views. We talk about identity, they listen to others, and that's how they form 
the group and understand themselves in the group. They draw 2 or 3 pictures 
in a group; one person shares how the group sees health. They have to share 
things, their opinions, mixed groups' (116,2009). 
These kind of exercises take place during the early stages of the course and it is 
important to note that interaction and deliberation are central here. The community 
is formed through the exercise of `empathetic cooperation' and 'the search for 
mutual comprehension' as put by Linklater. Once these skills have been developed 
the workshops can address the substantive issues underlying the divisions discussed 
in previous chapters. The groups within the workshops are formed at random. 
Linklater points out that dialogic communities are spaces of conflict as well 
as consent and cooperation. Disagreements do occur in the workshops, but the 
facilitators try to make space for each participant and attempt to direct the dialogue 
so that speakers take turns to address the group. When open conflicts occur in the 
groups, the facilitators try to ensure that participants hear each other and see each 
other as people. Sometimes they mediate between the conflicting groups. This can 
be very challenging for the group leaders, as Nena argues: 
'Yes, it's difficult, because we work with people who admit that they're 
wounded, and sometimes they think they have a right to yell, or whatever, it's 
a process for them to learn and to express their feelings but not to attack 
others' (I16,2009). 
This process can be difficult for some, she says, and occasionally participants 
become more agitated as a result of the dialogue. Indeed, at times the facilitators 
have to stop the discussion from going any further, although they try to maintain a 
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constructive atmosphere. 'You always facilitate', says Nena, `Always make sure it's 
positive' (I16,2009). 
Previous chapters have noted the range of issues which ensure the postwar 
settlement remains partial. Because of the open nature of the deliberation occurring 
in these micro-dialogic communities the conversations can be wide-ranging. This 
presents another challenge for the facilitators. `We always stick to the topic', Nena 
says, `so if they talk about World War Two we say "yes it was a big conflict but now 
we are talking about you"'. 
The facilitators alone do not decide the direction of the debate, however, as 
the participants themselves construct a framework of rules under which they are all 
subject. Nena explains this process: 
`With every group we say, "we need rules because we are going to do this 
and this and this, and now you can all say what you need, how would you 
like us to work? " And they give suggestions and we write them down, and 
we always say, "we can add some more, we can change them, they are 
flexible, but we have to stick to them"' (I16,2009). 
This process of rule-making ensures that participants are able to contribute freely to 
the discussion, as is stipulated by Linklater's notion of dialogic community. The 
rules are made at the first workshop so as to ensure that the dialogic norms are 
established from the outset. It can be challenging to ensure that participants keep to 
the rule, however, 
'if we want to change the rules we can open the discussion about how, what's 
better? We always respect the whole group, so if we want to respect everyone 
we all need to share it with the group' (116,2009). 
Changes to the rules, then, are also subject to deliberation. There must be a 
consensus within the group regarding the formation of the rules and any subsequent 
changes rather than a majority decisions. This is perhaps one clear way in which the 
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micro-dialogic communities can operate a more direct form of participation than the 
larger, institutional bodies which Linklater discusses. 
The rules of engagement differ from group to group, but past rules have 
included not talking for too long and having the right to disengage from the 
conversation if necessary. The emphasis is completely on trying to ensure that 
participants speak for themselves and not for others. Some people try to talk about 
the general situation in Vukovar and the facilitators try to get them just to talk for 
themselves, and some don't want to talk at all so the facilitators try to encourage 
them - 'different people need different things' as Nena expresses. You can teach 
maths or science', she adds, `but some things with relations you have to have 
something else' (116,2009). She is referring to the expertise of the individual as 
agent of security and emancipation. 
Engaging the Other: Individual Transformations I 
So far the argument has been made that NGO projects exist which can be seen as 
micro-dialogic communities. The emphasis has been with the NGO staff themselves 
who facilitate such communities. The chapter will now utilise firsthand testimonies 
of group participants in order to understand the impact of having participated in such 
projects. This section makes use of firsthand testimonies obtained by a project called 
`Touch of Hope' which is run by the Centre for Peace in Osijek in conjunction with a 
small number of dedicated British based activists who also lead workshops and who 
contribute to the strategic direction of the project. The testimonies have been 
collected with the permission of the participants in the project and printed together in 
a short, home-printed publication called Stories from Croatia: A Touch of Hope 
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(Touch of Hope, 2010). This is the first academic study to make use of the 
testimonies. 
It is important to recall the essential partiality of the post-war settlement in 
Vukovar. Social division is embedded, as the following testimony describes: 
'After eight years we came back to Vukovar and I decided to never again 
speak to Serbians. As I came to Vukovar my emotions started to came out 
and I decided to go and visited my old friend. The response that I received 
from my friend was shocking. She told me that she don't know me and I felt 
hurt. I told her "You do not know me now, I will not know anyone else who 
is the same nationality as you' (Touch of Hope, 2010, p. 33). 
One testimony uses a similar everyday experience to portray the partial nature of 
division in the following way. Again, the experience of the individual encounter is 
used to inform wider meaning about the predicament in which this observer finds 
himself: 
`My families tailor Bato lives very near to where we live. Every day we buy 
bread in the same store and we talk. I asked him why he changed overnight 
his attitude toward me and my family back then November 18th 1991. Ile 
only said: "There was that kind of the time... " I forgave him all... 
I even met Jovica five months after we returned to Vukovar. Ile approached 
me first and said: "You are looking good professor...! " I replied shortly: "I 
forgive you... but do change your way of life. Do you know where your 
brother was during the war? " He went away with tears in his eyes, depressed 
and embarrassed. I barely see him today since he decided to continue his life 
living in the Republic of Serbia. 
His brother as a Serb was a defender of Vukovar and a Croatian soldier. 
This is just a piece of the Vukovar's mosaic... this is Vukovar' (Touch of 
Hope, 2010, pp. 25-27). 
It is within this social context, in which everyday encounters provide any number of 
possibilities for re-encountering the past as well as the present, that the spaces 
created by facilitators operate. Vukovar's `mosaic' would not be complete without 
including the following testimonies. 
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One passage, entitled `Steps of Hope', shows the impact of the partial nature 
of the settlement upon personal relationships: 
`Our interpersonal relationships in Vukovar have been seriously damaged by 
war. Each had his or her own truth. Even though there should be only one 
truth, there were two truths among us: our and theirs. Since we live in Croatia 
Serbian victims are rarely mentioned and Serbs carry collective 
(responsibility) guilt for everything that happened in the war. I could not 
agree with it. Negative emotions were intensifying in me every time I 
listened to that from TV, read in newspapers or when I was told that straight 
to my face' (Touch of Hope, 2010, p. 5). 
The participant expresses the human impact of confronting what Linklater terms the 
`radically different' within the micro-dialogic community: 
`At the very beginning of the first workshop I reacted emotionally and I had 
conflict with Jadranka from Vukovar, who was one of the participants. She 
also had her painful memories, and Rosa who would sit next to her lost her 
husband and son. Ivana's son was killed and she could not even speak about 
it. Her eyes and spasm on her lips spoke about that. 
I had lost my father. One shell was only his. Its small parts pierced in his 
back and his legs. He has bled to death alone in front of the basement doors' 
(Touch of Hope, 2010, p. 7). 
The participant describes how over the course of the weekly workshops she came to 
see the perspectives of others. The act of confronting one's own judgments and of 
engaging the `other' in a dialogue had an emancipatory effect, releasing the 
participant from her own fears about her mixed emotions: 
`So we have spoken. I am not afraid about my mixed thoughts and feelings 
when I can share them with someone. For the first time I shared those 
feelings with the ones who would have, I believed, killed me in the war 
without hesitation. But I realised that these people would never kill me. I 
know they would protect me and save me. They do not carry hatred or 
revenge. They were doing what they thought was right in that time of chaos, 
madness and evil' (Touch of Hope, 2010, p. 7). 
By the end of the course the participant came to recognise the shared vulnerability of 
the people in Vukovar, and that her own sense of loss and fear were mirrored in 
those she had deemed to be different: 
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`At the last workshop I realised that we are all victims and that as such we 
can help each other a lot. None of us came here by accident. We all suffer 
from PTSD. The war left our emotional life ruined and the quality of future 
depends on dealing with the past' (Touch of Hope, 2010, p. 9). 
Another testimony illustrates the tension between the structural peace process which 
enabled people to return to their home city, and the emotional journey which the 
return home entailed: 
`On my return to Vukovar I ended up in the hospital again in order to gain 
strength and to be able organize my life. I was happy that all of us stayed 
alive through it all and I wanted to start building a new life. But at the same 
time I felt I didn't belong to that city any more because many people, mothers 
and wives, lost their loved ones... Though I did not lose anyone close to me, 
I mourn over people that died and I feel we were united, defending our city, 
and our country' (Touch of Hope, 2010, p. 29). 
The participant is here reflecting the ways in which grief and insecurity were 
politicised by the war and separated along ethnic lines. Despite the return home and 
the feeling of unity found in members of the same ethnic group, this participant felt 
the need to take part in the Touch of Hope project. Interestingly, local connections 
play a role, suggesting that it is to the locality that theorists of emancipation should 
look rather than always to the global: 
`One day my youngest daughter suggested to me to come to the workshops 
where I met Nena, the leader of the group, and we found out I knew her and 
her parents in time when she was a baby' (Touch of Hope, 2010, p. 29). 
Speaking of her involvement in the micro-dialogic communities formed by the 
workshops, it is the experience of difference which makes her participation 
worthwhile, the experience of encountering the other: 
`I am glad each time I can come to the workshop and heard a new ways of 
thinking and attitudes of others' (Touch of Hope, 2010, p. 29). 
Through her engagement with the other the participant finds that the workshops 
bring about change in herself. Importantly for the wider considerations of this thesis, 
the participant recognises that bringing about changes in herself in order to see the 
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perspective of others - the transformation from identifying with a single cultural- 
political group to identifying with those formally excluded - can only be a personal 
change which have to be sanctioned by the individuals concerned: 
`I am searching for inner peace now. I have found myself again, and am 
trying to look at life on the brighter side. 
I have realised that I cannot change others but only myself. I have continued 
with my life as best as I can, and look on each day as a new day that brings 
new understandings and through which you can become new person' (Touch 
of Hope, 2010, p. 29). 
The emphasis on becoming a `new person' is key here. Booth and Linklater are 
scholars of political transformation, but there work does not pay sufficient attention 
to these individual stories of change. Once these stories are considered they raise 
important questions surrounding the extent to which emancipatory processes are 
found in wider political changes, such as institutional change, as Linklater suggests, 
or in individuals becoming `global citizens', as Booth argues. What can be seen in 
this testimony is an individual emancipatory process embedded in the locality and in 
specific contexts. It is not to Europe, or to the world, that this person is looking. 
The participant is looking into herself and at the experiences of those in her local 
context. 
One testimony, this time from a workshop facilitator, provides an insight into 
the emotional nature of the conflicts and transformations which occur in the micro- 
dialogic communities. The facilitator first describes the social make-up and 
parameters of the group, outlined its divided nature which is an outcome of the 
partial settlement described in previous chapters: 
`Participants: 8 Serbs (all of them living on the Serbian side of war zone 
during Serbian occupation, one of them male who even fought against 
Croats. ) All of them speak clear Serbian language. 11 Croats (8 men are war 
veterans, 5 of them suffering of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 2 women 
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who lost their sons in the war and one who lost her husband in the war)' 
(Touch of Hope, 2010, p. 37). 
The testimony describes an early conflict in the workshop between two individuals 
from the different ethnic groups: 
`During workshops one Serbian lady wanted to talk a lot and would rather 
talk about general things but less about herself. Three Croatian women who 
lost their closest ones in war had a hard time listening to her and one of them 
expressed it clearly in the workshop. After the workshop this Croatian lady 
said she wouldn't come again because of her personal tragedy and the fact 
that she would have to hear this Serbian lady. When they met on street in 
Vukovar, the Serbian lady passed by and pretended they didn't know and see 
each other' (Touch of Hope, 2010, p. 37). 
This particular case shows that scholars such as Chris Brown, who warned that the 
necessary re-evaluation of one's values within dialogic communities could be 
painful, have been correct in their assertions (Brown, 2000, p. 208). Over time, 
however, and within informal spaces created by the workshop programme, the two 
participants began to engage with one another. 
`The Croatian lady, after missing one workshop and after we talked with her 
and the other two ladies in person (including the Serbian one), decided to 
return and continue the process with the group. During lunch breaks the two 
ladies began to interact and talk' (Touch of slope, 2010, p. 37). 
Their engagement with one another culminated in an emotional exchange, testifying 
to the power of the micro-dialogic communities in overcoming divisions between 
those who consider themselves to be radically different: 
`At the last workshop we distributed to participants somebody else's 
certificates randomly, in order for them present it to and congratulate each 
other. The Serbian lady drew (perchance) the certificate of this Croatian lady 
and had to congratulate her. Staying in the middle of the group, the Serbian 
lady had tears in her eyes and said to the Croatian: "I want to thank you; first 
of all, I have learned a lot from you! "... The Croatian lady, deeply touched, 
said: "Let us continue this by greeting each other in Vukovar and talking to 
one another. 
Most of the group cried.... even the men' (Touch of Hope, 2010, p. 37). 
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This last point indicates the emotional involvement of participants in micro-dialogic 
communities, and suggests that such engagements are exchanges of feeling as well 
as understanding. Another testimony provides supporting evidence with regards to 
this point: 
`We have many scars, sorrow that has stayed with us. We have to continue. 
Poverty, sorrow for the dear ones we have lost, our town destroyed, all our 
possessions burned in the fire. It is too painful. 
We have to hold our head up and face life. The workshops are a joy for me. I 
meet new people and receive new understanding. It is easier after all' (Touch 
of Hope, 2010, p. 11). 
The experience of the child is again invoked to explain the impact of war by another 
participant, who recalled the terrible choices that people had to make during the war 
with regards to their identity and political allegiance: 
`My son was a six-year old boy who had to answer this question: "Who are 
you, Marijo? " to his little friend. Marijo said: "My mother is Serb and my 
father was Croat. I am French. I love to eat French bread and that makes me 
French! " (Touch of Hope, 2010, p. 15). 
It is the experience of the child through which wider meaning is developed: 
`My son renounced this identity of adults who destroyed 90% of Vukovar. Is 
a human life worth that little? Is the country more important than a human 
life? What happens to a human when deciding to replace the laughter of 
children, tweet of the birds and gurgle of the river with the sound of bullets? 
Who will return to my son his lost carefree childhood? Would Ivan and Jovan 
fight again with weapon? I don't know. I think they would not' (Touch of 
Hope, 2010, p. 15). 
Even though there is a sense of hope at the end of this passage, what emanates from 
the words is the overwhelming sense of loss - of loved ones, of youth, of innocence, 
of security - which rather than having passed with the course of time have instead 
been taken suddenly and unexpectedly from oneself by another in an act of politics, 
reconfiguring time and meaning from the perspective of the individual subject. The 
disappearances are taken into the dialogic space created by the workshops. For at 
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least one participant, the participation in the workshops is an act of resistance to the 
various forms of division discussed in chapters 4 and 5: 
`Croats and Serbs live together again in Vukovar. They are segregated in 
schools, kindergartens and cafes. I do not want this. I go to places where I 
feel good. I will not agree to that kind of segregated life because of my son 
and other of Vukovar's children, and because of the people who gave their 
lives for the country. 
I still believe that love is important and that only love conquers hatred' 
(Touch of Hope, 2010, p. 15). 
Even so, and taking into account the hope evident here, the fact that dialogic 
encounters are part of a process of emancipation cannot be escaped. Participants 
must continue to deal with forms of insecurity even after their time with the 
programme has finished: 
`War brought terrible things. Mostly my relationships with my friends and 
close family at home are very bad - PTSP, stress and alcohol in combination 
are not bringing anything good in life... 
My wish for the future is that my kids have a safe future with job and place to 
live, a home... 
I pray to God for health and clear and wise mind that I can help them. 
A big Thank You for help that you gave me, being aware of it or not - doors 
for hope are now opened for me and with hearts of unknown people for me 
that are full of warmth give me the strength to live for tomorrow... ' (Touch of 
Hope, 2010, p. 35). 
Other sources in this collection continue the optimistic tone. At the end of a 
residential workshop, participants were asked to create a poem together. 
To a bowl of expectations add 
Two spoonfuls of the salt of wisdom 
Five eggs of gentleness 
A handful of love 
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Five teardrops of mercy 
Two cups of sincerity 
Half a kilo of compassion 
Hundred grams of understanding 
Two hundred grams of joy 
One bottle of trust 
Ten large spoons of friendship 
Mix it together with hope 
Add three hundred tons of smiles 
Two kilos of courage 
A cup of listening 
Bake it in a good atmosphere in good company 
In a room full of singing 
Serve it with a freshly taken picture 
And a willingness to learn 
This will ensure continuous freshness 
And endless laughter 
(Touch of Hope, 2010, p. 39). 
What these sources suggest is that the micro-dialogic communities created by the 
workshop facilitators allow participants to give voice to their emotions and to engage 
with those they consider to be an `other'. The engagement appears to result in 
individual transformations whereby participants come to identify not just with 
members of their own group, whether they be Croat or Serb, but with members of 
the other group also. The participants emphasise the ways in which they learn from 
one another in the workshops, and that they come to see the victimhood of the other 
as well of themselves. 
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To a degree this form of solidarity is created through the act of participation 
in dialogue, and authors such as Richard Rorty have written as length on this theme 
(Rorty, 1989). Linklater's recent work, which has focused on the extent to which 
universal vulnerabilities can create global compassion and a global harm principle, 
also echoes this theme (Linklater, 2006; Linklater, 2007; Linklater, 2009). But the 
form of solidarity discussed above is based upon shared experiences of insecurity, as 
much as being vulnerable to insecurity, and thus the experience of insecurity is 
central to the creation of compassionate sentimentalities in this context. 
In these testimonies participants tackle what has been referred to as 'a known 
and felt truth that unfortunately obeys the logic of dreams rather than of speech and 
so seems unreachable... as well as difficult to communicate and interpret' 
(Culbertson, 1995, p. 169). That difficulty is overcome with the help of individual 
facilitators, to be discussed in the next section. The purpose of the discussion has 
been to show how micro-dialogic communities allow people to engage with those 
they deem to be radically different, and to show how this engagement can result in 
individual transformation which constitute emancipatory processes. The evidence 
presented here contributes to previous debates regarding the empirical context of 
discourse ethics (see Risse, 2000; Deitelhoff and Müller, 2005). The intention has 
been to present evidence from a specific empirical setting where the discourse ethic 
is used as a guide to practice, in order to attempt to understand such practices in their 
own contexts as part of the wider task to understand security and emancipation 
through lived experiences. 
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The Making of a Facilitator: Individual Transformations 11 
The section above has focused on the impact of micro-dialogic communities upon 
individual transformation within emancipatory processes. This section seeks to 
provide an insight into individual transformation at a different stage in those 
processes. By focusing on the testimony of Katarina Kruhonja, one of the founders 
of the Centre for Peace, Osijek - the NGO which runs the course discussed above - 
this section explores the individual transformation which led to the foundation of the 
peace centre through which the micro-dialogic communities discussed above were 
formed. The purpose of this discussion is to show that the emancipatory processes 
facilitated by NGOs discussed in this thesis depends largely on the decisions of 
individuals themselves. Katarina's testimony begins with a reflection upon her pre- 
war life in Yugoslavia: 
'Personally it was a kind of journey which begun in a moment when I realised 
that war was coming, when the war started. Before the war, during 
socialism, I was not politically involved, I was not active in any social 
engagements, because it was not common under socialism. Everything was 
organised by state. We had some opportunities also, stability, security. I had 
an internal dialogue with myself, should I become involved in policy or not? 
I decided no because I liked my own life in my job, my family. I had no 
energy to make changes'. 
The war, however, became a catalyst for action. It is important here to recall chapter 
3 which detailed the impact of the war upon Vukovar. It is at that time, when 
Katarina was living in Osiejk, just a short distance from Vukovar, that she became 
more motivated to resist the onset of war. 
'But then I became aware that war is here, I became aware of my 
responsibility, because of my passive approach to the political and social 
reality'. I had not given anything for change; I was partly responsible, not 
guilty but could have done more. We have responsibility for community, for 
how we live. But I didn't know where to go from here, so I started to protest 
against the war, But I realised that was not possible. I took part in a mothers 
action group all over the region. Not just mothers but parents too, asked their 
sons to be released from army, and I took part in local actions trying to 
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encourage my colleagues to go into the villages, to go over the barricades to 
negotiate for peace. I also took part in a large protest on a ship by 
Dubrovnik, we opened up the channel that people could go out by. 
I became aware that each person has a responsibility' (112,2009). 
In this passage her individual process of transformation becomes apparent. Katarina 
was driven by the war to resist the oncoming violence. As with the testimonies 
discussed in the previous section, it was into herself that she looked as she began a 
personal moral deliberation. It is important here to recall Linklater's emphasis on 
moral-practical learning. `At the level of post-conventional morality', he argues, 
`subjects stand back from authority structures and group loyalties and ask whether 
they are complying with principles which have universal validity'(Linklater, 1998, p. 
91). As it became ever more clear that war in Croatia was imminent Katerina used 
her own moral resources to withdraw from the authority structures around her and to 
identify instead with people: 
`It was an obligation to fellow citizens, rather than to my religion or anything 
else. But it was related to my spiritual life and my faith. In the early days of 
the war there was so much nationalism - violence from the bombing from the 
outside, and violence on the inside also - exclusion of others "only Croats 
should be together", it was something like the logic of the total war, so we 
started to think there must be another way, they will destroy us or we should 
preserve our lives to destroy them. What does this mean, I asked myself. 
My faith became challenged; I was part of a prayer group, trying to 
understand `love your enemy'. Then someone said if the enemy was killed it 
would be for their sake - it would be to prevent evil things. I was so shocked 
with this statement, like 15th century, to preserve your soul we will burn your 
body. They were justifying killing to prevent them doing evil things' (112, 
2009). 
It was in this context that Katarina made the choice to break free of these oppressive 
structures she felt were being mounted around her. 
'This is a war actually. This is how war is operating, I should kill you, I 
should not hate you, but I should kill you because you will kill me. Such 
strong emotional pressure to community in war, you can't think with a cool or 
with an open heart, there is very strong emotional pressure from the 
situation. 
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I was very confused. So I sat down. I will not treat my enemy this way. I 
would like to love my enemy as Jesus would love his enemy, I don't know 
what this means in practical life, I don't know, but I made a choice with my 
will, I don't know how, but I would like to love my enemy as Jesus would 
have. I become free. I felt like a freedom from the pressure of war, of 
hatred, of killing each other, of logic of war, I felt free of that. I didn't know 
actually what I should do and how I should behave but I felt like free from 
the pressure on my mind, my soul, my emotions, and it was amazing, 
actually' (112,2009). 
The bonds she had managed to disconnect herself from gave way to new bonds with 
those around her, a new connection to the local: 
`At the same time I felt free I felt alone, because I felt differently from others 
in my community, but I didn't feel lonely. I didn't feel I had broken the 
relationships with those around me, friends, colleagues, I very well 
understood how they felt, I didn't judge or feel like I am better, no, I was free 
and alone but not lonely, I felt this connection with people' (112,2009) 
Once she had made this individual choice to detach herself from the structures of 
division being built around her, structures which would have a deep impact upon 
Vukovar as this thesis has illustrated, she found a small number of like-minded 
people with whom she could discuss strategies for dealing with the war informed by 
her newly formed ethical stance. With others she formed a space free from the 
authority structures of the war. It was a free space to think, she says, describing it as 
`some kind of space where we could talk, feel safe, feel that I am understood 
and he is understood, how he feels and thinks' (112,2009). 
The space that they created for themselves would be the space that Katarina and her 
colleagues would later offer to others through the formation of the Centre for Peace, 
Osijek. It would later be through the Centre that the individual transformations 
described in the previous section would be enabled: 
`It was very healing for us and I think that this kind of space, space for 
healing, was actually the space that we offered people. People who joined us 
thought, ok we feel free to think differently, not that war is something 
necessary, is good, but also that we can say we would like to look to another 
way, how it's possible to deal with injustice, poverty, abuse of human rights, 
differently, than through the violent revolution. So I think this kind of 
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possibility that you can be different to others in these moments was very 
healing, and people just came and felt good with us, so that was the 
beginning actually' (112,2009). 
In a description of these spaces that mirrors the discussion of micro-dialogic 
communities in the previous section, Katarina says that 
`this free space is a space without violence' (112,2009). 
One final passage testifies to the impact of such individuals. Having founded the 
Centre for Peace in Osijek, the teams created by Katarina and her colleagues began 
to reach out to members of local communities throughout the region surrounding 
Vukovar. They succeeded in helping people to find the courage to reach above the 
narrow concerns of ethnic rivalry and to create new forms of micro-dialogic 
community within their own specific, localised context: 
`In spring 2004 The NGO LUC (light) for dialogue and non-violence was 
founded in my village as result of the records and work of Centre for Peace, 
since then I am a member of the organisation. Other members are of different 
nationalities. I was glad to hear that there is a place where we all can sit 
together and talk about war and victims from the war. I think that every man 
has his own truth, so let us be human and listen to each other' (Touch of 
Hope, 2010, pp. 21-23). 
The purpose of this section has been to reflect upon the individual transformation in 
the early stages of war which would later lead to the formation of micro-dialogic 
communities in which further transformations could take place. 
Conclusion 
This thesis argues for considerations of the security as emancipation move which 
seek to understand it through lived experiences. This chapter has continued a theme 
raised in chapter 6, that NGOs contribute to processes of emancipation in Vukovar, 
by showing how specific NGOs succeed in creating what can be termed micro- 
dialogic communities. Two NGOs show these processes most fully, Europe House 
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and Centre for Peace, Osijek. It is the latter NGO which has provided this chapter 
with the most compelling evidence. 
The descriptions of programme workshops in which individual subjects can 
freely participate by the facilitators and by participants themselves suggest that the 
dialogic principles espoused by Linklater inform such activities. Within the political 
communities which are formed individuals encounter the other, the radically 
different. Chapter 3 described the levels of violence in Vukovar. Chapter 4 and 5 
showed how the violence continues to impact upon Vukovar in important ways, 
ensuring the post-war settlement remains partial. This chapter has explored how 
individuals take part in workshops to improve their everyday existence in such 
circumstances, to overcome the divisions, contestations and ambiguities which 
permeate everyday life, to pursue security. 
Once individuals become willing participants in the workshops they begin a 
process of transformation through which they come to widen their boundaries of 
familiarity and challenge their own truth claims by testing them against the truth 
claims of others. One conclusion which might be drawn here is that L. inklater places 
too much emphasis on the emancipatory power of institutions and not enough on the 
power of small-scale, locally entrenched practices. 
At one level this conclusion supports Booth's emphasis on the role of civil 
society and individuals as agents of emancipation and security, particularly the final 
section which explores the decisions of one individual to stand against powerful 
waves of violence. However, whereas Booth hopes for people to act as local agents 
of the global good, what can be seen here are people acting as local agents of the 
local good. Booth may well be mistaken to expect emancipatory practices to emerge 
from a notion of citizenship bound to globalisation. It could be the case that 
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emancipatory practices stem from individual considerations of how to help one's 
neighbour, rather than how to act in ways which favour the global population. 
What is also suggested by this chapter is that seeing the security as 
emancipation move through lived experiences opens up a range of new questions and 
possibilities away from the programmatic attempts of Booth and Linklater. By 
bringing different voices into the debate, scholars can engage in new dialogic 
relations with those who have experienced insecurity. As with the participants in the 
micro-dialogic communities discussed above, they may find that encountering the 
radically different challenges their own conceptions of self, truth and other. 
The individual can never be taken out of the dialogic encounter, as these 
stories attest. Individuals engaging in micro-dialogic communities are just that, 
individuals, and bring their emotions, unique experiences, tragedies and testimonies 
to the dialogue. The difficulty of bringing together individuals who have witnessed 
and felt insecurity on such a scale should not be underestimated, and it is perhaps 
here that the micro-dialogic community shows the promise of the individual as agent 
of security, understood in dialogic ways. 
Yet to characterise these agents in terms of the global - as world citizens - 
seems strangely inappropriate. Although cosmopolitan norms of the kind espoused 
by Linklater are being practised in the passages above, they are played out in specific 
local contexts and in relation to specific needs, understandings and relationships. 
The global finds expression here in the local and through the local, and as such, 
considerations of the local are just as important to any conception of global security 
as considerations of `the world' or any other universal signifier. The local is where 
difference meets the universal, where understandings of a possible cosmopolitan 
global order meet with the experiences of individuals who, while encountering 
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norms which underpin such discourse, then have to struggle with the ongoing 
implications of living according to the inclusive principles of discourse ethics in a 
place where exclusion is embedded in many forms. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis began by discussing the academic discourse of security studies with a 
specific focus on the Welsh School. It draws to a close by reflecting upon the 
experiences of those who engage in what are, it has been argued, emancipatory 
practices in specific, localised contexts. In this way it has tried to bridge the distance 
between the act of study and that being studied by claiming that the security as 
emancipation move must be understood through experiences of security and 
insecurity as they are lived. This conclusion will progress in several stages. It will 
first summarise the thesis as it has been presented above, before reflecting on 
specific aspects of the thesis. 
The critique of the Welsh School outlined how the security as emancipation 
move has been orientated towards closure, and was made in three stages. The first 
argued that greater weight was being placed on the politics of crisis rather than of 
long process. The second stated that differences with other approaches were being 
overemphasised in place of compatibility. The third highlighted the absence of voice 
in the Welsh School. A genuinely open way of exploring the security as 
emancipation move would be in the context of Andrew Linklater's adaptation of 
Habermasian discourse ethics, as was elaborated in chapter 2. 
In this way the thesis has contributed to debates about emancipation and 
security that have been developing over the last two decades, and Andrew Linklater 
and Ken Booth have been at the forefront of such debates, albeit under different 
banners. It is important not to underestimate the significance of these debates, nor 
the similarities between Booth and Linklater. It is also important to challenge their 
positions. Places like Vukovar offer the promise of exploring the notion of 
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emancipation in ways which reveal the complexity, contingency and unpredictability 
of practice. 
The analysis of Vukovar began in chapter 3 by describing a city on the 
Danube that was prosperous and relatively peaceful before the outbreak of war in 
1991. It then sought to understand the experience of insecurity that befell the city 
using secondary accounts and primary sources which offered eyewitness testimony. 
One of the key themes that emerged from these sections of the thesis was that many 
of those who witnessed the destruction of their city felt they could not describe what 
they were seeing - the events were rendered indescribable and unspeakable. The 
analysis of traumatic events in the context of discourse ethics presents an important 
challenge to scholars such as Linklater who advocate the pursuit of dialogic 
principles, for the reason that dialogic communities may not automatically be able to 
accommodate those who, like so many in Vukovar, were left without words. 
The chapter also emphasised the importance of place and personal space to 
individuals who survive the destruction of their home cities. Accounts of security 
and emancipation need to recognise that for many people the international is 
experienced through the local, and that when the international takes the local away 
from individuals the experience often inflicts deep wounds upon them. Traumatic 
changes to local contexts may well have more impact upon individuals than macro 
transformations. 
One way of understanding the reconstruction process in Vukovar is as a 
response to the traumatic experiences of destruction. Chapter 4 discussed the 
rebuilding process using the work of Jenny Edkins and showed how that process 
reflects an ethnically-particularist understanding of the war, which portrays Croats as 
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both victors and victims and Serbs as aggressors. As such the way in which the war 
is being remembered in Vukovar unjustly excludes non-Croats, a conclusion which 
is highly important given that Croatia is internationally recognised as a functioning 
European liberal democracy by the UN and EU. This ethnically-particularist 
memory of the war serves as a powerful enforcer of exclusivist norms. 
Such norms are reflected by aspects of social relations in the city, as was 
discussed in chapter 5. Interviews with a range of actors in Vukovar, including NGO 
workers, church leaders, local politicians, youth, veterans and other local residents, 
reveal the extent to which ethnic tensions characterise everyday life and to which the 
understandings of the war are still subject to contestation. It was made clear that the 
legacy of war crimes in Vukovar have severely undermined the search for mutual 
trust between ethnic groups; thus the dead and the searches for the missing are 
intimately bound with the politics of the everyday. 
These two chapters on Vukovar suggest that the international narrative built 
up around Vukovar since the war, which posits the view that settlement has been 
achieved in the region, is flawed. Although a form of settlement has materialised 
which is characterised by non-violence in physical terms, that settlement is only 
partial. Indeed, there are many reasons to believe that communication in Vukovar is 
severely restricted by the legacy of the war. Not only are individuals living with 
traumatic memories of what they witnessed during the conflict, they must also cope 
with their losses, and with living in the present with those who may well have been 
enemy combatants and informers, or who are unjustly assumed to have been. 
It is within this social and political environment framed by the partial 
settlement that NGOs in Vukovar act, as chapter 6 discussed. Seven NGOs were 
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assessed, and the nature of their work analysed in the context of previous chapters. 
The chapter detailed the range of activities pursued by these organisations, which 
included projects to monitor legal protection for minorities, youth projects which 
facilitate interaction between young people who attend segregated schools, 
campaigns to abolish the divided school system and to build a new, non-segregated 
school, workshops for dealing with trauma on an individual or group basis, 
organising seminars to encourage public debate, and documenting extraordinary 
cases of positive cross-cultural interaction, such as heroic acts in war to help 
members of a different ethnicity. In these ways the NGOs discussed in chapter 5 can 
be seen as engaged in a struggle against the totalising project in which they seek to 
create spaces where alternative understandings of the war and post-war periods can 
be articulated and played out in practice. The fact that almost all of the NGO 
workers reported the local government as having been in opposition to their work 
supports this view. 
Yet it would not be accurate to simply characterise this story in terms of a 
struggle between civil society and the sovereign state, with civil society representing 
an unproblematic emancipatory ethic. Chapter 7 reveals a different side to the 
evidence presented in the previous chapter. Competition characterises relationships 
between NGOs in Vukovar as much as common cause. Collective action has been 
almost non-existent. Rumour and gossip undermines trust between and within 
organisations and is intensified by the small size of the city and of the NGO 
operations there. For some individuals their commitment to an emancipatory cause 
has damaged their own health and may well be doing damage to others, given the 
controversial use of certain therapeutic methods. Thus an uglier and more 
destructive side to emancipatory politics comes to the fore. Scholars such as Booth 
256 
who emphasise the positive attributes of global civil society should take such 
evidence seriously, for it casts a different light on suggestions that NGOs are capable 
of political actions which are not influenced by competitive politics and human 
limitations. 
Even so, chapter 8 ends the discussion of Vukovar on a hopeful note, by 
emphasising two key projects in Vukovar which can be seen as facilitating what 
have been termed in this thesis as micro-dialogic communities. In such contexts 
individuals are able to encounter members of a different ethnicity in a space created 
by dedicated facilitators but shaped by rules of engagement agreed upon by every 
participant. They are then able to articulate their often competing claims to truth 
about the war, and to relay their experiences of war to the group. As the testimonies 
discussed in chapter 8 suggest, these processes do not always result in individuals 
changing their own assumptions about the war and its aftermath, but such changes 
do occur for many participants. 
The transformations that engagement in a micro-dialogic community of this 
nature can produce, particularly in the context of the partial settlement discussed 
previously, suggest the adoption of the discourse ethic by specialist facilitators as a 
reaction to war can have serious and positive implications for individuals living with 
the legacy of violence. The final section in the chapter attempted to take a step back 
from the transformative experience of engaging in a micro-dialogic community to 
understand the facilitator as emancipatory agent. It suggests that the steps that lead 
an individual to facilitate dialogic encounters are intensely personal and come 'from 
within'. 
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In the case discussed in the thesis, it was the experience of being thrust into 
war by the international that led to changes in self-perception, from a position of 
passive citizenship to active citizenship, which in turn led to a commitment to anti- 
war activism and ultimately to the formation of micro-dialogic communities. First 
came the reaction of the self, then a conscious decision to act, and finally collective 
action to organise and to facilitate the initiation of micro-dialogic communities that 
could help others develop their own reactions to the violence. The thesis thus ends 
with an example of individual action against insecurity, which empowered others to 
engage in dialogic processes in pursuit of security. 
This thesis has argued that understandings of security and emancipation must 
be seen through lived experiences. In doing so the discourse ethic can be seen to 
play out in specific contexts, and as such the inherent specificity of the locality, and 
therefore of emancipatory practices, becomes apparent. Furthermore, the micro- 
dialogic community has emerged as a practical reality which suggests that attempts 
to understand emancipatory practices in terms of wider institutional developments 
might be missing a vital characteristic of contemporary political developments, 
particularly in post-war environments. 
Vukovar 
The opening section to this conclusion has summarised the arguments made in the 
preceding chapters. The empirical focus of those chapters has been Vukovar, and it 
is important to offer some closing thoughts about the city that has presented this 
thesis with material that is rich in political meaning, tragic in its bare portrait of 
suffering, but not without stories of hope and compassion. 
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At the time of writing, over nineteen years have passed since war broke out 
in eastern Croatia. The war will continue to be remembered as the memorials 
portray it; a war for Croatian independence, fought by Croatian patriots, caused by 
Serbian aggression. That understanding of the war will continue to dominate social 
relations in Vukovar more generally, and the result will be that understandings of the 
war that seek to show the flaws of ethnically-particularist understandings will 
continue to be marginalised. Vukovar will continue to be seen as a symbol of the 
Homeland War, and annual memorial services for the Croatian dead will continue to 
be held there. Such structures do not easily melt away so soon after war. 
The NGOs discussed in this thesis are therefore a vital resource for creating 
spaces in which alternative understandings of the war and its impact can be 
developed, and for helping people cope with the lasting effect of trauma and 
bereavement. Yet for those sympathetic to their cause there must be concern for the 
future. Funding is a perpetual concern for all the projects discussed in this thesis. At 
least one NGO is facing the prospect of having their funding cut because they can no 
longer convince their longstanding donor that Vukovar is in need of reconciliation 
work. All face uncertainty as a consequence of the global economic downturn. 
Perhaps an even more pressing problem, however, concerns the individuals 
involved in the projects. It has been noted that some are frail and elderly, and may 
not be able to continue working in Vukovar much longer. For NGOs that do not 
have in place surefooted plans for the future, as is the case for several of the 
organisations in question here, this is very destabilising. All must face the ongoing 
struggle to attract new participants to their work in order to justify their existence as 
NGOs to donors, which given the powerful structural forces against any projects 
259 
orientated towards reconciliation is no easy task. Funding for such projects will 
inevitably decline as resources are directed towards new areas in conflict. 
One recent political development in Vukovar may be important for the causes 
advanced by the NGOs discussed here. A new mayor was elected in the city in the 
spring of 2009, ousting the nationalist HDZ party and ushering into local power the 
social democrats, a result that preceded the party's victory in the presidential 
elections of 2010. The new mayor, a veteran who is critical of dominant 
understandings of the war, has been supportive of NGO activity in the city, and 
appointed an influential former NGO worker to organise local events for the whole 
community (19,2009). 
The significance of this should not be underestimated, give the fact that local 
government has for years been a source of opposition to civil society in Vukovar. 
The moral support of the mayor for peace projects is important because it means the 
instruments of the state - engaged as it has been in the totalising project - are now 
being slowly turned towards more emancipatory possibilities. More research will be 
required during the next few years to ascertain the extent to which the election of 
social democratic parties changes dominant perceptions of the war and associated 
exclusionary practices, if at all. 
Taken as a whole, civil society activity geared towards reconciliation in 
Vukovar has been declining over the last decade, and that pattern may continue in 
the future. This may well be a pattern replicated around the world in post-war 
regions. What this means for scholars interested in the relationship between security. 
emancipation and civil society is that the kind of empirical fieldwork undertaken in 
this thesis can only be done during limited time periods. For small NGOs such as 
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those studied in this thesis, once the individuals involved withdraw from their work, 
there is a strong chance of the organisation withdrawing from the field also. This 
makes the role of the academic in recording their work and testimonies crucial for 
the wider project of furthering the security as emancipation move. 
Security and Silence 
As this thesis draws to an end, and leaving Vukovar behind also, one closing 
reflection concerns an element of the fieldwork that had a particularly powerful 
impact upon the author: those who are looking for the missing. The violence of the 
past is not wrapped up with time's passing, although it might seem that way in those 
dry documents written in the language of the law and with the lawyer's eye for the 
finite, the closed, the exact, the violence of the past continues to bum and to scold 
those who were within its reach. To not understand that is to continue the violence 
in another form, a `non-violent' violence that appears passive and is often accepted 
as such, but which by accepting the closure expressed in law and mirrored in 
memorials merely continues the journey of the bullet which had apparently found its 
target. 
Perhaps it is from those aging men and women who are still looking for the 
bodies of their sons and husbands that scholars who study security have most to 
learn about their own subject. The missing lay only to be found, each telling a story 
both unique and identical, and those who look for them speak to strangers about their 
post-war lives in the hope that the act of speaking brings their loved ones closer, that 
looking and speaking will offer a form of closure for them. 
The missing remain so, disappeared, and that unimaginable fate, the terrible 
silence of solitude, the being beneath the earth but unmarked, the vast chasm 
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between that end and the beginning that was nurtured, loved, cared for in the warmth 
of the embrace that came from life and through it, is unknowable, unspeakable. 
Words may always fail. The voices of those who remain are but traces of the dead, 
but included they must be in deliberations about security and emancipation if 
ongoing forms of insecurity are to be understood and reconciled. 
Emancipatory research and ethics 
In conclusion some remarks must also be made about the nature of the research 
conducted in this thesis. The argument throughout has been that security and 
emancipation must be understood through lived experiences. This requires scholars 
to engage with concrete, often localised circumstances, as was the case in this study. 
Emancipatory practices which embody the discourse ethic do seem to be 
occurring in the present in local, specific contexts such as Vukovar. Understanding 
how such communities operate in practice, in different contexts, is one way forward 
for the security as emancipation move. Yet understanding has limits. It may well be 
that all scholars can do is to say that instead of promising to always defend those 
who suffer at the hands of world politics, they should make an attempt to understand 
their experiences whilst fully acknowledging that they will never truly understand 
because they were not there. 
It is essential that such an attempt is made so that experiences of insecurity 
can continue to be studied as closely as possible. The final chapter showed how 
individuals make their own choices to defy dominant narratives and how NGOs 
create spaces for dialogue between different groups. It seems that for some 
individuals, a movement away from insecurity towards greater security has been 
achieved through their participation in certain NGO programmes. This is a highly 
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significant point, because it shows how individuals, within their specific contexts, 
contribute to processes of emancipation. Any account of macro-transformation must 
consider the politics of the micro also, including the contradictions with theory 
therein, so that the complexity, nuances, and dilemmas involved in emancipatory 
practices can be understood. This requires sensitivity on the part of the researcher. 
When the international is seen in the local, as this thesis has sought to 
achieve all the way through the analysis, a quality is introduced to academic studies 
which the scholar alone would normally not be able to access. The feeling and form 
that comes from including the voices in this study have infused the discussions of 
security as emancipation with real-life scenarios of security and insecurity. What 
emerges from the approach which has attempted to grasp security and emancipation 
as lived experiences is the complexity and ambiguity of practice, and the researcher 
is part of this also. 
The nature of the research conducted in this thesis does therefore raise the 
issue of research ethics. Chapter 7 demonstrated that interview subjects can turn on 
one another if they know they are making comments off the record. Yet in a city 
such as Vukovar anonymity counts for little when the NGO community is so small. 
This is a problem that scholars sympathetic to the approach outlined here need to be 
sensitive to. Getting closer to those who live security and emancipation as everyday 
experiences requires greater awareness of one's power and responsibility as a 
researcher. 
Beyond the Welsh School 
Ken Booth's move to associate security with emancipation opened up a number of 
possibilities within the subdiscipline of security studies, and many such possibilities 
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remain. It has been argued in this thesis, which has been written in the spirit of the 
seminal article Security and Emancipation (Booth, 1991a), that the development of 
the Welsh School has resulted in a number of those possibilities being closed down. 
The resulting discussion opens the question of the extent to which there is now a 
need for, instead of remoulding the Welsh School, a move beyond it. 
What is not in contention here though is the importance of the concept of 
emancipation to any further developments. Emancipation is an idea with a long 
history yet which continues to inspire political debate and action. Debates about its 
meaning and scope have been highlighted in this thesis, and will undoubtedly 
continue long into the future. All academic work is informed by theory of one kind 
or another and all theory, of course, has a purpose (Cox, 1981). Emancipation 
understood as non-repressive dialogue is a robust normative position, but it is also 
one that guides an approach to fieldwork informed by empathy. There is much more 
work to be done to explore the relationship between emancipation and security, and 
the kind of fieldwork undertaken in this thesis provides one way of taking that 
exploration further. Emancipation as a concept should continue to inform debates 
about security. A distinguished line of thinkers have been animated by the idea of 
emancipation, and their work is a vital resource in any attempt to think through the 
implications of associating security and emancipation. 
At all times though, as Booth argues, it must be remembered that theories 
about emancipation will always remain incomplete if they do not engage with actual 
experiences of security and insecurity. The crucial issue is the nature of that 
engagement. Continual emphasis on the positive role of global civil society may not 
always make for accurate accounts of capacity, nor might they always take into 
consideration the limitations of such political actors. Greater efforts should be made 
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to listen to those who are trying to follow emancipatory principles, no matter how 
small a scale this could be. The approach undertaken in this thesis has been to use 
theory as a means of identifying sites where emancipatory practices might be evident 
and to then explore them in their own contexts. 
In light of what has been said in this thesis it is perhaps more productive to 
conduct research in the spirit of the security as emancipation move rather than to be 
overly concerned with the construction of a school of thought, whether it be termed 
the Welsh School or Critical Security Studies. This is not to be anti-academic; 
indeed, academia is an ideal site for reflection on these matters. Rather, what is 
being argued for is an approach to studying security informed by the idea of 
emancipation and which is more open to the multitude of experiences through which 
security and insecurity are played out. 
One implication of adopting a more open-ended approach to the security as 
emancipation move, as this thesis has attempted to do, is that the notion of whether 
or not there should exist a Welsh School is called into question. An emancipatory 
approach to security can play a vital role in formulating new ways of thinking and 
practicing security, as was Booth's intention in his groundbreaking security as 
emancipation move. But asserting a universal programme for emancipation, as is the 
tendency of the Welsh School, is not the way forward because such an approach 
risks reifying exclusionary academic practices. 
The empirical chapters suggest that the experiences of those who have seen 
true insecurity are too great to be subsumed within a school of thought. Perhaps a 
more modest approach is required, one which diligently records their experiences of 
insecurity and their attempts to establish security rather than treating individuals as 
265 
objects of research. A further task would be to treat their experiences with more 
respect than has been the case previously. The idea that scholars can somehow 
identify with those who have lived through true insecurity - as those in Vukovar 
have - and stand with them in common cause, seems misplaced. Is it not fairer to 
the individuals themselves to simply allow their stories to stand, rather than to play 
academic games with those who have already lost so much in the violence of world 
politics? 
There is much to learn from these experiences of insecurity, and scholars 
sympathetic to the security as emancipation move should attempt forms of 
engagement that promote such learning. Furthermore, as the final chapter suggests, 
there are potentially infinite numbers of ways in which individuals seek to create 
new forms of security for themselves and for their communities. The politics of 
security as emancipation may well be ongoing in multiple forms and sites throughout 
the world. It may be impossible to know them all in their entirety. But by 
harnessing the discourse ethic, the limits and possibilities of emancipation might be 
grasped, and with such attempts understandings of security as emancipation might 
engage more fully with feeling and form, with actual experiences of security and 
insecurity as they are lived. 
Further research 
The final section of this thesis points towards the possibilities for further research. 
Follow up studies in Vukovar is an obvious place to start; as was noted above, the 
impact of social democratic local and national governments upon dominant 
understandings of the war and related exclusionary practices must be closely 
observed. Another line of inquiry might pursue those who took part on the 
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workshops discussed in the final chapter to see if they have subsequently engaged in 
any other forms of civil society activity informed by emancipatory principles. 
The scope of the approach suggested here though, to understand security and 
emancipation through lived experiences, goes far beyond the specific context of 
Vukovar. Studies that use the theoretical material developed by Booth, Linklater and 
others to identify potential emancipatory practices in other localities and to see how 
they play out in their specific contexts would be welcome. Research into similar 
contexts as that analysed in this thesis would provide interesting comparative 
material for understanding the relationship between war and dialogic practices. Yet 
it would also be useful to have studies probing security and emancipation as lived 
experiences in contexts unrelated to war, and instead focused on other forms of 
insecurity related to, for example, domestic violence, gang conflict and mass 
immigration, in order to see how dialogic practices play out in other sites of 
insecurity. 
It may well be the case that when more attempts to understand emancipation 
and security through lived experiences are made, there will be greater recognition of 
everyday discourse ethics, and with that, the possibility of an emancipated future 
might be made more likely. This thesis began by reflecting on the intellectual 
openness and creativity that inspired the new approaches to the study of security. It 
closes with a hope that more spaces of nonviolence will emerge over time, that 
individuals will continue to rise up against unjust forms of exclusion, and that 
dialogue between the radically different will lead to politics being driven by the 
desire for peace and understanding. 
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Appendix 
List of Interviews 
Numbers denote separate transcript. Multiple interviewees were recorded on some 
occasions. 
Name, place of interview, date, selected institutional affiliations. 
1. Ljiljana Gehrecke, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Europe House Vukovar). 
2. Ljiljana Gehrecke, Vukovar, Spring, 2009 (Europe House Vukovar). 
3. Ljiljana Gehrecke, Vukovar, Autumn, 2009 (Europe House Vukovar). 
4. Stanislava Malic-Gostovit, Vukovar, Spring, 2009 (Europe House Vukovar). 
5. Sinisa Mitrovie, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Youth Peace Group Danube). 
Ivana Malve, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Youth Peace Group Danube). 
6. Nebojga Ugliil, Vukovar, Autumn, 2009 (Youth Peace Group Danube). 
Sinisa Stanivuk, Vukovar, Autumn, 2009 (Youth Peace Group Danube/Coalition 
for Work With Psychotrauma and Peace). 
Saga Bjelanovie, Vukovar, Autumn, 2009 (Youth Peace Group Danube). 
7. Sinisa Stanivuk, Vukovar, Autumn, 2009 (Youth Peace Group Danube/Coalition 
for Work With Psychotrauma and Peace). 
8. Sinisa Stanivuk, Vukovar, Autumn, 2009 (Youth Peace Group Danube/Coalition 
for Work With Psychotrauma and Peace). 
9. Siniga Mitrovi6, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Vukovar City Hall). 
Ivana Malve, Vukovar, Summer, 2008. 
10. Srdjan Antic, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Nansen Dialogue Centre Osijek). 
11. Srdjan Antic, Osijek, Autumn, 2009 (Nansen Dialogue Centre Osijek). 
12. Katarina Kruhonja, Osiejk, Autumn, 2009 (Centre for Peace Osijek). 
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13. Katarina Kruhonja, Osiejk, Autumn, 2009 (Centre for Peace Osijek). 
14. Snjeiana Kovadevic, Osijek, Summer, 2008 (Centre for Peace Osiejk). 
15. Nena Arvaj, Osijek, Summer, 2008 (Centre for Peace Osijek). 
16. Snjeiana KovaLevib, Osijek, Spring, 2009 (Centre for Peace Osiejk). 
Nena Arvaj, Osijek, Spring, 2009 (Centre for Peace Osijek). 
17. Marijan Perginovi5, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Centre for Peace Osijek/Seventh 
Day Adventist Church). 
18. Marijan Perginovie, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Centre for Peace Osijek/Seventh 
Day Adventist Church). 
19. Marijan Per3inovi6, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Centre for Peace Osijek/Seventh 
Day Adventist Church). 
20. Ljubomir Mikic, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Peace Centre Vukovar). 
21. Milena Jurigic, Vukovar, Autumn, 2009 (Peace Centre Vukovar). 
22. Irena Mikulic, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Project Northern Ireland [PRONI]). 
Karolina dog, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Project Northern Ireland [PRONI]). 
23. Charles Tauber, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Coalition for Work With 
Psychotrauma and Peace). 
24. Charles Tauber, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Coalition for Work With 
Psychotrauma and Peace). 
25. Charles Tauber, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Coalition for Work With 
Psychotrauma and Peace). 
26. Charles Tauber, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Coalition for Work With 
Psychotrauma and Peace). 
27. Charles Tauber, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Coalition for Work With 
Psychotrauma and Peace). 
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28. Charles Tauber, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Coalition for Work With 
Psychotrauma and Peace). 
29. Charles Tauber, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Coalition for Work With 
Psychotrauma and Peace). 
30. Charles Tauber, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Coalition for Work With 
Psychotrauma and Peace). 
31. Charles Tauber, Vukovar, Spring, 2009 (Coalition for Work With Psychotrauma 
and Peace). 
32. Sabo Leljko, Vukovar, Spring, 2009 (Social Democratic Party, Vukovar). 
33. Sabo 2eljko, Vukovar, Autumn, 2009 (Social Democratic Party/Mayor of 
Vukovar). 
34. Vladimir Emedi, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Croatian Democratic Union [IIDZI, 
Vukovar). 
35. Vojislav Stanimirovic, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Independent Democratic 
Serbian Party [SDSS], Vukovar). 
36. Zlatko Spehar, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (The Franciscan Monastery and the Church 
of St. Philip and Jacob, Vukovar). 
37. Jovan Radivojevic, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Church of St. Nicholas, Vukovar). 
38. Laszlo Nemeth, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Agape Evangelical Church, Vukovar- 
Borovo-Naselje). 
39. Mato Dudio, Vukovar, Spring, 2009 (Vukovar Retired Policeman's Association). 
40. Vesna Bosanac, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Vukovar Hospital). 
41. Sanja Vuki6evie, Vukovar, Summer, 2008. 
42. Manda Potko, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Mothers of Vukovar). 
Mirko Kovacic, Vukovar, Summer, 2008 (Mothers of Vukovar). 
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43. Mirko Kovadic, Vukovar, Spring, 2009 (Mothers of Vukovar). 
44. Manda Potko, Vukovar, Autumn, 2009 (Mothers of Vukovar). 
45. Vesna Katic, Vukovar, Autumn, 2009 (Widows of Vukovar). 
46. Sandra Maul, Vukovar, Autumn, 2009 (Vukovar Library). 
47. Jasna Babic, Vukovar, Spring, 2009 (Vukovar Tourist Board). 
Maja Katinic, Vukovar, Spring, 2009 (Vukovar Tourist Board). 
48. Andrej Edelinski, Vukovar, Autumn, 2009. 
49. Nebojsa Dobrijevic, Vukovar, Summer, 2008. 
50. Dragica Aleksa, Berak, Summer, 2008 (Light for Dialogue [LUC]). 
51. Mihaela Kutz, Vukovar, Summer, 2008. 
Ljiljana Banovic, Vukovat, Summer, 2008. 
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